Consideration of reports, comments and information submitted by States parties under article 9 of the Convention (continued)
CONSIDERATION OF REPORTS, COMMENTS AND INFORMATION SUBMITTED BY STATES PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONVENTION (agenda item 4) (continued)
Information requested under article 9, paragraph 1, of the Convention: interim report of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
1. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the document containing the interim report, which would later appear as an official document of the Committee.
2. At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Mitic, Mr. Milosevic and Ms. Spasic took places at the Committee table.
3. Mr. MITIC (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), after expressing appreciation of the Committee's role in promoting the protection of human rights, said that no discussion of the present situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could be comprehensive without recognition of the fact that the international community had taken an oversimplified and biased approach to the overall crisis, which had led to unacceptable pressure on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and of the fact that international law and international organizations were being used as tools to exert that pressure.
4. The Yugoslav crisis had erupted as a result of violent unilateral acts of unconstitutional secession by some of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, and by the premature recognition of such secession, which granted the right of self-determination to territorial units but not to peoples in contradiction to the generally accepted principles. It was the denial of the right to self-determination to all the peoples in the territory of the former Yugoslavia that had led to conflict, to civil, inter-nation and religious war and to great material destruction, ethnic cleansing, mass exoduses and displacements and other evils.
5. The unprecedented internationalization of the Yugoslav crisis had led to grave abuses of international law. The most striking example was the imposition and maintenance of sanctions against his country, which had virtually cut it off from economic and other world trends. That collective condemnation of a people was a form of discrimination and contrary to the spirit of the Convention. The synchronized media campaign against his country and the Serbian people could not be ignored, nor could the blockade of information from his country, as they had significantly contributed to a one-sided approach to the Yugoslav crisis.
6. It was a matter for satisfaction that for some time the picture being given of Yugoslavia, as well as of the events in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, had been gaining in objectivity and accuracy. Unfortunately, it was only after open and brutal conflict had broken out between Muslims and Croats in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that the essence was revealed of the tragedy into which the Yugoslav peoples had been thrust by the support that had been offered to violent secession and hatred between nationalities.
7. The unjustified sanctions, which were without precedent in the history of the United Nations, were threatening the right to life and the individual and national rights not only of the citizens of his country but also of over 600,000 refugees of all national affiliations and religious backgrounds (100,000 being Muslims, Croats and members of other nationalities) who had fled the atrocities of war and taken refuge there. Reception of those refugees belied the allegations that his country pursued a policy of discrimination against members of other nations. All Yugoslav citizens and the members of other nationalities were direct victims of the sanctions. Hundreds of children, the weak and the ill were dying every day or had their lives put at risk because they were unable to obtain necessary medicaments, because of shortages of spare parts for medical equipment, because the prohibition of air traffic and the stringent visa requirements introduced during the past year prevented them from seeking adequate medical treatment abroad, because hard-earned pensions from abroad could not be transferred as a result of an inhumane interpretation of the sanctions by certain States, because the United Nations Sanctions Committee, owing to the lack of even a minimum of conscience on the part of certain of its members, refused to permit prompt delivery of medicaments, food and humanitarian aid, or because week-long delays in granting import licences caused food and medicaments to deteriorate at the Yugoslav border.
8. He would not dwell on the sanctions that prohibited or precluded contacts and cooperation in the field of science, culture, transport, sports and information. The lengths to which certain countries were prepared to go in implementation of the sanctions was illustrated by the prohibition some months previously of the publication of Disney cartoons by newspaper agencies. Yugoslav citizens living abroad did not have access to Yugoslav papers nor could Yugoslav readers obtain foreign papers.
9. Although there was much evidence that his country was constructively contributing to the resolution of the crisis in the territories of the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was termed civil war in the latest official statements, the international community had reacted by making existing sanctions more restrictive by introducing new discriminatory measures and by imposing new conditions for the lifting of sanctions. The whole situation, which marked a sensitive transitional period in the break-up of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was having a profoundly adverse effect on social conditions and in particular on the legal system, the greatest problem being the threat to the rule of law, to overall civil security and to human rights in general.
10. Such a situation increased people's disorientation, pushed up the crime rate and favoured the sector of the population that had benefited materially from the blockade and thus strengthened their positions of power. Such a climate was unlikely to contribute to efforts to create order and provide security for individuals and their property and thus helped to strengthen extremist forces promoting intolerance and prejudice.
11. His country was being criticized for violating human rights, in particular, the rights of national minorities. Although it was prepared openly to discuss all difficulties and deficiencies in the implementation of human rights and the rights of members of national minorities in its present difficult situation, it categorically refuted such charges, since the legal system of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia guaranteed the members of national minorities even greater rights than those guaranteed either by the relevant international norms or by those enshrined in the texts of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The work on the Federal Law on Minorities, which was in its final phase and complied with the highest standards in the field, should be an additional guarantee of the enjoyment and protection of rights of members of national minorities as individuals and as a collectivity. In no field and in no form could positive discrimination in favour of a minority be implemented to the detriment of the rights of members of a majority people or any other minority. International monitoring mechanisms, in particular, the CSCE instruments, also had to be applied to the honouring of obligations by minorities as well as to their enjoyment of their rights. It went without saying that the implementation of human rights must not, in any circumstances, jeopardize the territorial integrity of the State. The internationally accepted standard of loyalty due by the minority community and its members to the State in which they lived should be borne in mind. In all States the fulfilment of human rights was subject to a precondition - the principle of the loyalty of citizens to their own State, that is, loyalty to the Constitution and laws of that State and respect for its legal order and territoriality integrity.
12. Unfortunately, the issue of minority rights in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was being politicized and abused. Demands for collective rights, accompanied by a refusal to give loyalty to the State in which the minority lived, were becoming increasingly common. International law did not recognize collective minority rights, nor were those rights applied by other States, not even those which, under a veil of democracy, accused his country of violating such rights. Such accusations were designed to bring pressure on the Federal Republic and to secure recognition of secession, contrary to all international obligations and standards as well as the practice in all States.
13. Such abuses angered individuals belonging to the majority population and were not in the interest of national minorities, particularly as, owing to the implacable pressures and sanctions being imposed on his country, nationalistic tendencies were on the increase and a number of strong opposition parties in the Federal Parliament and in the Parliament of Serbia were beginning to put forward the thesis that the existing rights of national minorities should be restricted or even abolished.
14. As a result of the clearly secessionist aims of the Albanian national minority in Kosovo and Metohija, which were also supported by a section of the international community, the situation in that part of the Federal Republic had become extremely complex. There was no doubt that some members of the minority in Kosmet were in favour of secession from the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic, a step which, in view of the fact that the Albanians enjoyed national minority status was contrary to international law. Representatives of the minority had been taking such a stand in the negotiations within the Working Group on Ethnic and National Minorities of the International Conference on The Former Yugoslavia, completely disregarding the irrefutable fact that Kosmet and Metohija had been and remained an integral part of the territory of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as had been confirmed by the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the Ministerial Meeting of the Security Council. Furthermore, constitutional provisions guaranteed Kosmet and Metohija territorial and cultural autonomy as well as the right to regulate such matters as economic development, finance, health and social protection, culture and the use of the national minority language. No country in the world granted political autonomy to national minorities.
15. A further argument refuting charges of flagrant violations of the rights of national minorities was that the issue was not infringement of human or minority rights but of non-recognition of the legal organs of the State authorities, involving threats to the territorial integrity of the State and overt secessionist demands. There was abundant evidence of that fact, for example, refusal to participate in the democratic institutions of the State (elections), refusal to participate in population censuses and refusal to recognize the legal organs of the authorities at talks on problems in the implementation of guaranteed rights (proclamation of the Republic of Kosovo).
16. The members of the Albanian national minority also virtually boycotted school curricula in their own language and had rejected the proposal submitted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the working group on ethnic and national minorities of the International Conference on The Former Yugoslavia for an urgent solution of that problem. The decrease in the number of Albanians in the judiciary, the police and health institutions was not due to discrimination or dismissal on ethnic grounds, but solely to a blatant refusal to recognize the legitimate authorities of the State whose citizens they were. The foundation for secession was being laid through the overt creation of parallel systems of authority, such as illegal State, judicial, educational, health and other organs.
17. Allegations regarding the ethnic cleansing of Albanians from Kosmet and Metohija had been categorically refuted in the reports of the CSCE Missions of Long Duration. The migration of such Albanians, in particular, to western European countries, was motivated solely by economic reasons. The recent decisions by some of those countries to reject applications for asylum by Albanians was proof that they were not considered to be political migrants.
18. In spite of the problems caused by secessionist demands as well as by social changes, sanctions and isolation, the Government of the Federal Republic was ready, as it had always been, to deal with all outstanding issues through democratic dialogue and through legal institutions. Instead of expressing unfounded concern as to the fate of the Albanian national minority, his country expected the international community to help to solve problems on the basis of generally accepted international norms and so to influence that minority permanently to relinquish the idea of secession without in any way impairing the full implementation of their minority rights in practice.
19. The question of Vojvodina and that of the region known under the name of Sandzak were being politicized as part of the increasing pressure on the Federal Republic, which had always been ready to discuss the question of the province of Vojvodina and, in particular, the status of the Hungarian national minority. Viable improvements in the situation could be achieved only through dialogue. About 344,000 members of that minority lived in Vojvodina; their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity was completely guaranteed. There was no need or justification for granting it special rights or privileges. The size of a minority neither could be nor was a basis for according it greater rights and protection than other minorities in international instruments. The demands for guarantees of minority rights referred to earlier, in particular, with respect to minorities in so-called multi-tier autonomies, were generally only a means for achieving other objectives or for preparing the ground for their achievement. The talks held with the representative of the Government of Vojvodina, as well as the successful talks held a week previously between the party in power in the autonomous province of Vojvodina and the Democratic Union of Hungarians from Vojvodina, gave promise of a basis for a more realistic approach to the situation as well as for the settlement of outstanding issues hampering relations with a part of the minority. It should also be noted that in areas where there was a greater number of Hungarians, the representatives of the minority had a majority in all the institutions of authority, of education, of the economy and in other fields of social life. That also applied to one of the biggest towns in Yugoslavia, Subotica, as well as to the other towns and communes with a Hungarian national minority. The minority was also represented in the Republic and Federal Parliaments, as well as in the Republic and Federal administrative organs. The situation was broadly similar for members of the Croatian and some other minorities in Vojvodina. Direct talks on constitutional and legal solutions should make it possible to analyse and solve any problems.
20. Part of the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Raska region, known as Sandzak, which was its Turkish name, was merely a geographical region, part of which was in the Republic of Serbia and part in the Republic of Montenegro. The rights and status of Muslims in the area constituted a politically imposed and artificial problem, since there was no basis for Muslim demands. Of all the 11 communes in that region, Muslims were in the majority in only five - three in Serbia and two in Montenegro. The Muslims in those communes were absolutely dominant in all spheres of life, leaving no opportunity for the alleged discrimination.
21. The Government of the Federal Republic was ready to grant the minorities within it all the rights which were guaranteed by the international community and which that community considered to be absent. With a view to promoting the rights of minorities, it would undertake to stimulate the inter-ethnic and inter-cultural cooperation and tolerance that should prevail in all civilized societies, with a view to ensuring that the relations established formed a link in the chain of cooperation with other countries, and neighbouring countries, in particular.
22. Although there was rightly no reciprocity in matters of national minorities, the Government of his country found it unacceptable that the Serbian and Montenegrin national minority in some neighbouring States making exaggerated demands for a special status for their own minorities in the Federal Republic, did not enjoy even the minimum protection of their national, cultural, linguistic and religious identity, let alone their minority rights. For years, those States had been engaged in forced assimilation of the Serbian and Montenegrin national minority, the most obvious proof being the fact that members of that minority had been forced to change their Slav first and last names for names of the majority people. The Government of the Federal Republic was ready to submit detailed information on the subject.
23. During the review of the tenth periodic report of the Government of Yugoslavia, a question had correctly been asked about the rights of peoples and national minorities to self-determination in view of the fact that there had already been attempts to use that right as a screen for secessionist action aimed at the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. The right to self-determination of some peoples of Yugoslavia had since been acknowledged through the recognition of certain republics. The Serbian people, for whom Yugoslavia represented a common State and who had been recognized as part of the population in republics of the former Yugoslavia, such as Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, had been denied that right. Support of the extremist view, which was contrary to international law, that national minorities also had a right to self-determination, namely, to secession led to catastrophe and not only in the former Yugoslavia. His country considered it would be useful and, indeed, indispensable for the Committee to express an unequivocal opinion on the subject. Any hesitation could only feed illusions that might cause irreparable damage to peace and good neighbourly relations even beyond the continent of Europe.
24. Nevertheless, the obligations of States to provide national minorities, through a maximum of tolerance and good will, with all the conditions adopted by the present-day international community should always be borne in mind. His Government was ready to do everything within its power to that end, conscious not only of the need to fulfil without reserve the international obligations it had undertaken but also of the fact that ensuring and protecting the national, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of every citizen of the country was a pre-condition for its normal and harmonious development. To that end, all well-intentioned suggestions, ideas, criticisms or comments would be welcome.
25. Negative reactions by his Government had always been in response to criticism or suggestions not backed by argument but by partiality and the system of double standards applied by the politicians of some States to Yugoslavia. He trusted that the Committee would display greater objectivity and readiness for constructive dialogue.
26. Mr. van BOVEN, Country Rapporteur, recalled that, at its previous session, the Committee had adopted a decision in which it had expressed its grave doubts over the ongoing ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia and had requested the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and other Governments responsible for the implementation of the Convention in the former Yugoslavia to submit further information on such implementation by 31 July 1993 at the latest. The interim report containing that information was before the Committee. It would have made his task easier if much of what the representative of the Federal Republic had said in his introduction to the report had been included in it, for the report itself was very theoretical in nature, referring principally to legal provisions. However, as would be acknowledged by all lawyers, although the law was very important, it was the de facto situation and the effective implementation of the standards proclaimed which counted.
27. His comments would be based on the report and on information obtained from United Nations sources, since the report did not always provide sufficient information. The report by and large followed the guidelines laid down by the Committee, with a first part giving background and demographic information and a second part dealing with the application of various articles of the Convention, with considerable emphasis on the measures taken on behalf of minorities, a welcome aspect in the light of article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention. A considerable amount of supporting information had also been annexed to the report. On the surface, without any extensive knowledge of the country, the report could have been considered satisfactory, especially in view of the important role the Federal Ministry for Human Rights was described to be fulfilling. However, while he appreciated the response made by the Government to the Committee's invitation, he was not sure whether in fact the report was really what the Committee needed. It was perhaps clear evidence of the discrepancies to be found, and not only in the former Yugoslavia, between the law as it existed on paper and the realities of life. Those realities were not evident in the report before the Committee.
28. The report also compared unfavourably with the report submitted by the Federal Republic to the Human Rights Committee on 30 October 1992 (CCPR/C/88), which acknowledged problems and shortcomings in a far franker manner. Part II, section D, of that report was especially relevant to the aims and objectives of the Convention in as much as it referred to action against advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred in the context of article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was closely related to the aims of the Convention, in particular its article 4. He drew attention to paragraph 47 of that section, referring to failure to institute criminal proceedings for such advocacy and to paragraph 48, referring to the desirability of establishing a monitoring body (which could also serve the purposes of the Convention). Such information was very interesting and he asked whether the representative of the Federal Republic could provide further details.
29. The interim report before the Committee was also at variance with the report submitted by Mr. Mazowiecki, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia (E/CN.4/1993/50), chapter IV of which dealt in particular with Kosovo, with its largely Albanian population, Sandzak, with special reference to the situation of Muslims, and Vojvodina, describing the situation of Hungarians, Croats and other minorities, all of which was highly relevant in view of the scope of the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Paragraph 153 of that chapter of the Special Rapporteur's report referred to the mass dismissal of Albanians from the public sector, police brutality, the lack of freedom of the media and problems concerning education and stated that the situation of human rights had been constantly worsening since Kosovo had lost its status as an autonomous province in July 1990. Paragraphs 155 and 156 contained a long list of laws reportedly discriminating against Albanians, including the law on police institutions. Paragraph 157 listed other discriminatory legal acts against Albanians in Kosovo concerning education, cultural institutions and the use of the Albanian language. How could all those legislative measures which seriously restricted or excluded the rights of the Albanians in Kosovo be seen as compatible with the norms and standards outlined in the interim report before the Committee, in particular, with reference to articles 2 and 7 of the Convention, and with the statement by the representative of the State party that the legal system guaranteed the members of national minorities even greater rights than those guaranteed by international norms or those set out in CSCE documents? He drew attention to the final document of the Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, with its significant provisions on minority rights. Paragraphs 160 to 162 of the Special Rapporteur's report dealt with police brutality, and paragraph 165 with dismissals, while in paragraph 171, the Special Rapporteur concluded that since 1990 the Albanians in Kosovo had continued to be deprived of their basic rights, that their education system had been largely destroyed, that they were victims of dismissal for political reasons and that they faced a very difficult economic situation. More recent information did not indicate that the pattern had changed; it was a matter of the greatest concern.
30. The Committee might consider urgent measures that needed to be taken, especially for preventive purposes, to ensure that the situation in Kosovo did not further escalate into a full-scale violent conflict. He was not laying the blame on any one side, since a peaceful resolution of the problem entailed arrangements on both sides. Mr. Eide, the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, had made some useful suggestions for the peaceful resolution of potential conflicts. He therefore called on the Committee to consider such preventive measures in the light of the working paper on prevention that it had adopted at its previous session.
31. Describing the situation of Muslims in Sandzak, the Special Rapporteur stated that many of them had been victims of terrorist acts carried out by Serbian paramilitaries and extremists with the aim of intimidating them and forcing them to abandon the area. Such a case of forced ethnic segregation fell within the scope of article 3 of the Convention. The harassment of minorities, especially those of Hungarian and Croatian origin, was also reported to be a serious feature of the situation in Vojvodina. Verbal and physical threats and other acts of intimidation, including setting houses on fire and destroying cultural and religious monuments, had been perpetrated against those minorities. It was also striking that the justice and police system did not appear to provide effective protection, as required by article 6 of the Convention.
32. The Human Rights Committee, when examining the situation in the former Yugoslavia, had noted that there were links between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian nationalists responsible for massive violations of human rights in Croatian territories controlled by Serbian forces and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Committee could not overlook that aspect of State responsibilities, which was a crucial feature of the Convention. He recalled that, on 8 April 1993, the International Court of Justice had ordered provisional measures under which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "should in particular ensure that any military, paramilitary or irregular armed units which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any organizations and persons which may be subject to its control, direction or influence, do not commit any acts of genocide, of conspiracy to commit genocide, or direct or public incitement to commit genocide, or of complicity in genocide, whether directed against the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina or against any other national, ethnic, racial or religious group".
33. Against the background of the very succinct information he had provided, which had been drawn exclusively from United Nations documents, it was astonishing that the interim report before the Committee should create the impression that the situation was normal. Although the oral statement by the government representative did come closer to reality, it was striking to note that blame was put either on the international community or on the minorities in the country itself which were said to have abused their rights. He appreciated the Government's wish for a balanced view of the situation, but considered the Government's presentation itself to be unbalanced. The Committee would have to consider measures of the type indicated in its working paper on prevention of racial discrimination, including early warning and urgent procedures. Although he had no specific proposals to make, he would welcome any suggestions by other Committee members with a view to producing meaningful recommendations.
34. Finally, he would be grateful if the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could inform the Committee whether the country was planning to make the declaration under article 14, paragraph 1, of the Convention, thus recognizing the right of individual petition to the Committee.
35. Mr. GARVALOV said that the presence of the representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a welcome indication of that country's willingness to continue its dialogue with the Committee. Although he agreed with Mr. van Boven that the oral presentation was one-sided, it was an important statement on many topical issues of concern to the international community. He had been particularly interested in the point made about the obligations of members of national minorities towards the State and the position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that there should be nothing to jeopardize the territorial integrity of the State. It was a position he shared.
36. He recalled that when the Committee had examined the ninth and tenth periodic reports (CERD/C/172/Add.9), the government representatives had been asked about discriminatory practices against members of minorities, and particularly about the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, the Muslims in Sandzak, the ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina, the Gypsies and the ethnic Bulgarians in the regions of Kula, Bossilegrad and Tzaribrod and in the Republic of Macedonia. Events in the former Yugoslavia and in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) belied the statements in the ninth and tenth periodic reports, in the interim report now before the Committee and in the statement by the government representative, to the effect that all rights provided for under the Convention were fully protected in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He asked what was the real status and situation of the groups to which he had referred. There had been numerous reports from United Nations and other international governmental and non-governmental sources about mass violations of the rights of those minorities. Leaders of the minorities had themselves complained about pressure and persecution by the Serbian authorities. There were reports of widespread discriminatory measures and persecution directed against minority communities in Vojvodina, Sandzak, Kosovo, Bossilegrad and Tzaribrod. Serbian paramilitary groups were reported as exerting pressure on those minorities to submit unreservedly to Serbian demands and lose the minimal rights they still had and even to force them to leave Serbia. Was that the case? He requested information about the outcome of several unsolved murders of ethnic Muslims in Sandzak and the murders of ethnic Albanians in police custody in 1992. What had happened to a number of Muslims from the Sandzak area who had disappeared and were still unaccounted for? There were official reports of arbitrary arrests and detention, mainly of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, and of the denial of fair trials to ethnic Croats, Albanians and Muslims, and reliable reports of severe beatings of persons in detention, primarily ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Protest rallies and demonstrations in Kosovo in 1992, demanding the end of racial discrimination by Serbian authorities against ethnic Albanians, and full observance of human rights and minority rights, had been dispersed by the police by force. All those acts were in violation of the Convention, particularly article 5 (a) to (f). United Nations reports indicated that it had become commonplace for the Serbian police to refrain from interfering to prevent Serbian paramilitary forces from harassing minorities.
37. The Committee would like to know why the Government had decided in June 1993 to discontinue the activities of the CSCE missions to Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina, whose purpose had been to monitor and investigate gross human rights violations against the minorities in those regions. The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Mazowiecki, had reported gross violations of the human rights of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo when he had visited the area in October 1992. Since the annulment of Kosovo's status as a separate federal unit and the abolition of provincial courts, a number of ethnic Albanians had been tried and sentenced by Serbian courts for "association for hostile activities" and for "endangering the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia".
38. Members of ethnic minorities who were neither Serb nor Montenegrin complained of discrimination in employment, education and housing. For example, in Vojvodina, where Serbs constituted only 15 per cent of the mainly ethnic Hungarian population, all directors of state enterprises were Serbs. Was it true that in Sandzak, where the people were mostly Muslims, the overwhelming majority of school principals were Serbs, and that in Kosovo, where Serbs accounted for less than 10 per cent of the population, they held virtually all key positions in the administration and the State sector of the economy? Gypsies complained of discrimination in employment, social services and education and of frequent political harassment by Serbian authorities and Serbian paramilitary groups; their complaints had been verified by international human rights monitoring missions.
39. When the Committee had considered the ninth and tenth periodic reports, he had requested information about the fate of the Bulgarians, questioning, in particular, the discrepancy between the figures provided in successive periodic reports and again between those figures and international censuses, but his questions had gone unanswered. The Bulgarians in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) constituted a Bulgarian minority and actually formed part of the Bulgarian nation, annexed to the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia by virtue of the Treaty signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine on 27 November 1919, which referred to that Kingdom as occupying an area of 1,545 km2, populated with 120,000 ethnic Bulgarians, a territory now embracing large parts of the Kula, Tzaribrod, Trun and Bossilegrad regions. Although that Treaty recognized the existence of Bulgarians as citizens of that Kingdom, the Serbian authorities had refused to recognize the ethnic character and origin of that population and had banned Bulgarian names, language and literature. After the Second World War, Yugoslavia had formally recognized them as a minority and restored their names, language and culture, but after 1948 the ethnic Bulgarians had once again been subjected to severe repression and grave human rights violations. They had been intentionally kept in poor conditions in one of the most underdeveloped regions of the country, which had forced many of them to emigrate to other parts of the country and to lose their ethnic identity. Official data put the number of ethnic Bulgarians at 54,391 in 1961, 49,791 in 1971, 36,189 in 1981 and now, in the interim report, at 26,922. The Bulgarian municipalities had been merged with greater Serbian municipalities, and the Bulgarians had thus lost the right to elect their own representatives to local and federal electoral bodies. There was currently a "representative of the minority" in the Federal Parliament, but he represented the ruling party and not the ethnic Bulgarians. The only possibility for Bulgarian children to study their mother tongue was in an optional two-hour class once a week. In contravention of the Constitution, the use of the Bulgarian language was not allowed in court and in administrative practice. There were systematic violations of the right to freedom of speech for Bulgarians. The only daily newspaper in Bulgarian had been discontinued in the 1950s, and there was now only a 15-minute daily radio broadcast in Bulgarian and a 10-minute weekly Bulgarian television programme. The Bulgarians were constantly subjected to harassment in regard to their political rights. Their ethnic organization, the Democratic Union of the Bulgarians in Yugoslavia (DUBY), which had not been officially registered until 1990, had been accused of "fascist activity" during the 1992 elections and had been prevented from taking part in the election campaign. There had been threats against its leaders and its representatives had not been allowed to take part in the election commissions. The Committee had never been adequately informed about the Bulgarian minority in Yugoslavia, mainly because official government representatives had not provided the relevant information.
40. Kosovo presented a serious problem of ethnic unrest in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). As a reaction to a severe restriction of their political rights, ethnic Albanians had been actively seeking independence. That should not obscure the fact that the root of the problem lay in simple acts of discrimination on ethnic grounds, which had only subsequently emerged as a full-scale political issue, with implications not only for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) but also for the immediate region.
41. Almost nothing had been done in Kosovo to restore minority rights, and tension remained extremely high. If the ultimate solution to the ethnic and religious war in Bosnia was separation into independent States along racial, ethnic and religious lines, what would be the implication for Kosovo? Would that be the recipe for solving all ethnic conflicts? What would be the implications for nations where ethnic and religious differences existed but had not yet been exacerbated to the point of conflict? On the one hand, ethnic cleansing was being condemned as a practice, but on the other, would it not be legitimized through the adoption of such a solution?
42. He ventured to suggest that the subtler forms of racial and ethnic discrimination, which had occupied the Committee, had proved to be surprisingly resistant and obdurate. He was beginning to have serious doubts about giving too much prominence to "national" minorities. Too much emphasis on almost unlimited minority rights vis-à-vis the State and the majority of the population, linked with internal and external political schemes, had fuelled nationalist and separatist tendencies. Ethnic and minority issues had become a monster problem, as evidenced by events in the former Yugoslavia.
43. He agreed with the Country Rapporteur's comments on the interim report. The situation in Kosovo warranted the use by the Committee of the procedures and measures set out in its Working Paper on prevention of racial discrimination, including early warning and urgent procedures, of March 1993. It should also offer its good offices to the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the search for a peaceful solution in the interests of both sides.
44. Mr. de GOUTTES said that against the background of events in the former Yugoslavia and the negotiations over Bosnia and Herzegovina, the submission of an interim report by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the presence of a representative of the Government was of great interest to the Committee, although it had no illusions. He commended the Country Rapporteur on his objective analysis.
45. Looking back to the Committee's consideration of the tenth periodic report, he noted from the summary records that no one at that time had appreciated the scale of the cataclysm that was looming. The former Yugoslavia had been cited as a model and a leading member of the group of non-aligned countries. Serious signs of a crisis were, however, already appearing in Kosovo and Vojvodina and had been noted by members of the Committee. He recalled the case of Lebanon, once known as the "Switzerland of the Middle East", which had subsequently become the victim of religious and ethnic conflict. The lesson for the Committee was that vigilance was needed in all regions of the world to prevent similar crises, since the social fabric of nations was very fragile.
46. In the former Yugoslavia, the worst had happened. Reports by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, CSCE, non-governmental organizations and the Human Rights Committee all recorded massive use of military force by the federal army of the former Yugoslavia, first in Croatia, then in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They reported ethnic cleansing, which Mr. Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, had described as elimination by one ethnic group of individuals belonging to other ethnic groups, using methods such as threats, harassment, intimidation, firearms, explosives, destruction of religious and cultural buildings, expulsions, summary executions, and other atrocities.
47. In Kosovo, there was a different situation. According to information received, ethnic cleansing was occurring not through the use of massive military force, but through coercion and police pressure. There were massive dismissals of Albanians, who were replaced by Serbians, particularly in hospitals, so that Albanian patients no longer had confidence in hospital treatment. Albanian language schools were closed, their teachers were not paid and obstacles were placed in the way of producing books in the Albanian language. There were also general obstacles to the use of the Albanian language and the dissemination of Albanian culture. Similar observations could be applied to Vojvodina and Sandzak.
48. Neither the report, which was too legalistic, nor the oral explanations by the representative of the Federal Republic were convincing. Some of the statements made lacked objectivity. The suggestion that the problem in Kosovo resulted from the demand for independence was too simplistic. Neither could he accept the claim that there was no discrimination against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, because in reality the Albanians were refusing to participate in the work of State institutions, for instance, by leaving their jobs and boycotting teaching in their own language. According to the representative of the Federal Republic, the rights of minorities were recognized in Vojvodina and Sandzac. The Committee required precise factual evidence in support of such a statement.
49. He would like to ask what pledge the representative of the Federal Republic could give the Committee of its will to normalize relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandzac. Under its resolution S/808 (1993), the Security Council had decided to institute an international war crimes tribunal to try those accused of serious violations of human rights in the former Yugoslavia. He asked the representative of the Federal Republic to give a formal commitment that his country's authorities would cooperate by providing lists of all criminals in their possession, arresting them and sending them for trial.
50. He agreed with the Country Rapporteur that the Committee should include the situation in the Federal Republic on the agenda of its next session in order to monitor developments closely.
51. Mr. DIACONU said that the presence of the representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was evidence of a will for dialogue. He commended the balanced analysis by the Country Rapporteur. Although legislation in the Federal Republic was satisfactory and indeed advanced, he would like more information on how the Convention was being implemented in practice.
52. He shared the view expressed by the representative of the Federal Republic that the country faced many difficulties, though he did not share his view concerning the illegality of sanctions. Neighbouring countries also faced difficulties. It was evident that violations of human rights in the former Yugoslavia were as bad, if not worse, than those which had occurred during the Second World War. That must be of concern to the Committee.
53. With regard to Vojvodina, he asked for a breakdown of the population by ethnic groups. He did not believe that the Hungarians were in a majority. They were not the only minority in the area; there were also Romanians, for example, who could not accept that another minority should enjoy greater rights.
54. With regard to Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, he asked if the Federal Republic accepted the principle that a country was responsible for acts of its agents both inside and outside its territory. Would the Federal Republic accept responsibility for elements of the former Yugoslav Army acting outside the control of Belgrade? There had been many reports of atrocities on ethnic grounds. How would the Federal Republic punish those guilty of such acts? The Committee was, of course, aware that atrocities had also been committed against Serbs, but that did not justify atrocities against the Croatians and Muslims.
55. The situation in Kosovo could be likened to a time bomb. He agreed with the representative of the Federal Republic that the creation of a separate State by the Albanian minority was unacceptable and he could also agree that autonomy was not necessarily the best solution. However, the stage had been reached when there were no local authorities, no local elections and no representation of the majority. The Albanians had no schools, health services, radio or television and there was widespread unemployment among them. That situation could not be allowed to continue.
56. The Country Rapporteur had spoken of the need for compromise between both sides. He asked why there was no dialogue between the Serbs and the Albanians with a view to finding a solution. If Vojvodina could have the status of an autonomous province, why could Kosovo not have a similar status? The suggestion that the international community should assist in finding a solution was helpful. Perhaps the Human Rights Centre could provide support in the form of advisory services. Indeed, the Committee itself could offer its good offices, on the understanding that any solution reached must comply with the Convention.
57. With regard to Sandzak, he agreed that separatist claims could not be accepted. However, clear measures were needed to prevent intimidation by paramilitary forces. He questioned why the Federal Republic needed paramilitary forces, when it already had an army and police. Why did it not prohibit such forces?
58. Mr. BANTON said he associated himself with the content of the Country Rapporteur's report and with much of what previous speakers had said.
59. He agreed that the Committee should include the item on the agenda of its forty-fourth session and should ask the Country Rapporteur to continue his work. On the question of Kosovo, the Committee needed better information on other work being done, for example by CSCE. The Committee should avoid pronouncements on political aspects of the problem, but it did need to understand their relevance. It also needed to be fully informed of United States proposals on the use of military force and of the position taken by the Islamic Conference. With regard to the Special Working Group on Kosovo, political leaders must accept that full independence was not possible, although some degree of autonomy was necessary. The Working Group should concentrate on specific matters to begin with, for example, educational facilities, perhaps followed by health, which would then lead on to general principles.
60. The CSCE mission of 20 monitors had been set up to promote dialogue, which was a very important function. It had also collected information on human rights violations, distributed information on solutions achieved in other countries, and had generally had a stabilizing effect. However, that mission had ended recently, because Belgrade had refused to renew it. He would like an explanation on that point from the representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
61. He was concerned by the suggestion that the Human Rights Centre could play a role. In his view, CSCE was better placed, since involvement of United Nations treaty bodies might be taken as a sign of encouragement by secessionists.
62. At the time the previous report had been submitted, the Yugoslav representative had stated that non-Albanians had been forced to leave Kosovo partly as a result of intolerance by the Albanian authorities, but also because of the misguided attitudes and policies of certain Serbian and Yugoslavian politicians. On the same occasion, in replying to Mrs. Sadiq Ali, he had spoken of dangers posed by the rise of nationalist parties. In his statement today, the representative had referred to "extremists". Extremists could exert great influence: whether or not they were permitted to do so depended on political leaders, and in that regard he believed that the current leaders of the Federal Republic would be censured by impartial historians in the future. On the previous occasion, Mr. Mitic had stated that no distinction was made in terms of administration, remuneration, and working or other conditions between teachers of Albanian and non-Albanian origin. He could hardly make the same statement today.
63. Reference had been made to the Law of 14 July 1990, designed to favour the return of Serbs and Montenegrins who had left Montenegro. If that law was being used to promote the settlement in Kosovo of Serbs and Montenegrins who had not lived there previously, it would be contrary to the Convention, since the law would be being applied not on the basis of individual circumstances but on the basis of ethnic classification.
64. The representative had referred to dismissals of police officials and teachers in Kosovo. There, too, it would seem that the measures had been taken on the basis of ethnic origin. The claim that the grounds for dismissal were that the individuals concerned would not acknowledge the legitimacy of the State would appear to be a mere rationalization.
65. Mr. de Gouttes had referred to the description given of events in Kosovo as "a definition of ethnic cleansing". He himself would resist any suggestion that the records should show the Committee as having adopted that definition. If any definition was needed, he would suggest the following: "Ethnic cleansing is the expulsion or elimination from a given territory of persons who do not belong to the ethnic group responsible for such actions. It is an enforced segregation contrary to article 3 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination".
66. Article 8 of the Convention required members of the Committee to serve in their personal capacity. He would ask the Yugoslav representative if his Government's Foreign Ministry had a policy in that regard. For instance, should a Yugoslav diplomat elected to serve on a treaty body be criticized in the Belgrade press, did the Foreign Ministry see to it that some informal explanation was given to the editor of the newspaper concerned that the diplomat was serving in a personal capacity?
67. Mr. WOLFRUM joined with earlier speakers in congratulating Mr. van Boven on his assessment of the situation in Yugoslavia.
68. He recalled that at the time of his delegation's previous appearance before the Committee, the representative had stated that the six republics which formed part of the Federal Republic "were entitled to self-determination, including the right to secession" (CERD/C/SR.874, para. 30). Today, however, the representative had spoken of "unlawful" secession, which called for some explanation.
69. The representative had also stated that minorities had no right to self-determination, and certainly not to secession - a statement with which he himself agreed. However, the Government was encouraging Serbian minorities in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to call for secession. Would it consider giving the Albanians in Kosovo the same rights as those which were granted to the Serbian minority in Croatia?
70. Although Mr. Banton had urged the Committee to confine its comments to the situation in Kosovo, he would like to make some observations on the human rights situation in the country generally. He had been greatly disappointed by the introductory statement, which had been completely devoid of any willingness to achieve compromise, understanding or dialogue. Could the representative comment on allegations by the Human Rights Committee that flagrant violations of basic human rights had occurred during military operations? What concrete measures had been taken by the Government to ensure strict compliance with humanitarian law, including articles 1, 2 and 5 of the Convention? Had any investigations been carried out in respect of such violations, including cases of torture, disappearances, and killings during military operations, and had any attempt been made to punish the culprits and to prevent a recurrence?
71. The representative had said nothing about complaints of human rights violations on the part of the army and paramilitary groups: what was being done to look into such complaints and to punish those responsible? What measures had the Government taken to ensure efficient supervision of places of detention, and were there any independent procedures under which complaints could be made, and investigated, of ill-treatment of detainees by police, members of the security forces, or prison officials? What had been the findings of the Investigation Commission set up to investigate reported violations of international humanitarian law, to which the Yugoslav delegation had referred during the deliberations of the Human Rights Committee?
72. He fully endorsed the comments made by Mr. de Gouttes concerning the Security Council decision on the establishment of an international war crimes tribunal. With regard to the decision of the International Court of Justice on the application of Bosnia and Herzegovina instituting proceedings against the Federal Republic, he would point out that that decision had been based on violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which indicated that, at least prima facie, those events amounted to genocide in certain parts of Yugoslavia.
73. It should be recalled that Kosovo, under the Constitution of 1974, had enjoyed autonomy as part of what might be called the constitutional balance within the Federal Republic, which in former times had been greatly admired. Indeed, Yugoslavia had for many years been regarded as a model where the treatment of ethnic groups, including minorities, was concerned. However, Kosovo had been deprived of its autonomy in 1989 by constitutional changes; troops had been sent in to deal with protesters, and the Albanian leadership had been purged. He would argue that that act had greatly contributed to tensions in Kosovo, and considered that the representative's remark that everything that had happened in Kosovo was to be blamed on the Albanians fell somewhat short of the truth.
74. He would also like the representative to comment on the educational system in Kosovo, which was very important in a part of the country where nearly 80 per cent of the population belonged to the same ethnic group. As he understood it, in 1990 the Serbian Government had introduced a new curriculum in schools, increasing the emphasis on Serbian history and culture. It had been reported that publication of Albanian textbooks had been prohibited, and many Albanian books confiscated and burned. If true, that was a violation of article 5 of the Convention. Teachers had been dismissed because they had refused to teach the new curriculum, and as a result there had been a gradual loss of access to education by students of Albanian origin. That again was a clear-cut violation of the Convention.
75. It had been estimated that some 400,000 children had not attended school in Kosovo for over two years, because many parents did not want their children to be taught the Serbian curriculum. At Prestina University, 780 professors and deans had been dismissed with no right of appeal, and their posts had since been filled by Serbs. That too constituted a violation of the Convention.
76. In addition, there were restrictions on the freedom of the press, to which he had referred at the time of the submission of the previous report, but which had then been denied by the Yugoslav delegation. He would again ask to what extent newspapers in the Albanian language still existed, and to what extent they received the same treatment as other newspapers. The same question applied to radio and television. Was it true that some 13,000 Albanian-speaking staff, out of a total of 18,000, had been dismissed, and that programmes in the Albanian language, which had formerly totalled some 10 hours a day, had now been considerably cut down?
77. Some earlier speakers had taken the view that no one side could take all the blame for tensions in Kosovo. However, the Government showed no sign of willingness to enter any kind of dialogue with the Albanian minority. Did it have any concrete plans to improve the situation, or did it intend to continue its policy of oppression?
78. Reference had been made to activities of paramilitary groups not only in the Republic itself, but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. It was the Committee's view that a country was responsible for implementation of the Convention not only within its territory, but also in all territories under its control. What had been done by the Government to ensure implementation of the Convention in areas currently under the control either of its own forces or of other forces working with them?
79. In the prevailing situation, it was difficult to see how the Committee could help to solve the problems of the region, or to prevent new ones being created. It would be encouraging if the representative could express his Government's willingness to work closely with the Committee, and also with the CSCE, to improve the situation, making every effort to use CSCE as a mediator. The fact that the CSCE's mission had not been extended was discouraging, and called for some explanation.
80. The Committee was gravely concerned at the situation in the country, and would go to great lengths to assist in any promising and fruitful exercise if called upon to do so.
81. Mr. YUTZIS said he regarded it as highly positive that representatives of the Federal Republic were present to take part in the discussion of their Government's report. However, as earlier speakers had pointed out, there was a striking contrast between the claim made in the representative's introductory statement that no problems existed in the country, and the actual situation. That contradiction was aggravated by the representative's insistence that no blame whatsoever was to be attached to the Yugoslav authorities for the events that had taken place. Such a claim was very difficult to accept.
82. He had noted from the oral introduction a tendency to see the State as a kind of abstract entity, over and above the actual individual elements constituting it. That concept had always been a dubious one, since it was liable to find expression in action of a dangerous kind.
83. He would like to know whether at any point in recent history the Serbian Academy of Sciences in Belgrade had taken a deliberate decision to implement a policy defending the ethnic integrity of a single group, a policy which would tend to lead to the disintegration of other ethnic groups. It was easy to interpret recent events as having random causes, but if such a decision had been taken, it would mean that they would have a much more rational explanation.
84. He drew attention to article 2 (1) (d) of the Convention, which required States parties to prohibit and bring to an end racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization, and to article 2 (1) (e), which required them to discourage anything which tended to strengthen racial division. He would welcome information from the representative as to what specific measures had been taken in that connection.
85. As had been pointed out by other speakers, there existed a number of mechanisms which, if they could not solve problems completely, could at least contribute to their solution, and the Committee was one of those mechanisms. He urged the Yugoslav delegation to convey to his Government that the Committee was ready and willing to do all it could to help in that regard.