Consideration of reports, comments and information submitted by States parties under article 9 of the Convention (continued)
CONSIDERATION OF REPORTS, COMMENTS AND INFORMATION SUBMITTED BY STATES PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONVENTION (agenda item 4) (continued)
Sixth periodic report of Burundi (CERD/C/168/Add.1) and sixth and seventh periodic reports of Rwanda (CERD/C/169/Add.1)
1. Mr. BANTON, speaking on behalf of Mrs. Sadiq Ali, Country Rapporteur for Burundi, and in his capacity as Country Rapporteur for Rwanda, proposed that the Committee should defer consideration of the sixth periodic report of Burundi (CERD/C/168/Add.1) and the sixth and seventh periodic reports of Rwanda (CERD/C/169/Add.1) until its forty-fourth session in view of the recent events in those two countries. He also proposed that the Committee should ask the Burundi Government for information on the implications of the change of Government for the application of the Convention, should seek information from the Rwandese Government on the agreement reached with the Patriotic Front and its repercussions on the application of the Convention, and should ask the Governments in question to submit the information by 1 January 1994.
2. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee adopted Mr. Banton's proposal.
3. It was so decided.
Information requested from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) under article 9, paragraph 1, of the Convention (continued)
4. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia resumed its place at the Committee table.
5. Mr. ABOUL-NASR recalled that the Committee's decision to consider a report by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at its forty-third session had been taken in the light of the alarming situation in the country and the atrocities which had been committed. However, the report submitted (which had been distributed without a symbol) did not deal with the situation in Yugoslavia but instead described the statutory framework which had been created. For that reason, he wished to inform the Committee that he would be taking no part in the discussion on the report. Furthermore, he wished to draw attention to the fact that in his view the statement made by the representative of Yugoslavia was provocative and extremely disturbing in that it did not suggest any willingness on the part of the Yugoslav authorities to conduct a candid dialogue with the Committee, although such a dialogue was vitally important. He added that it was not the Committee's intention to accuse or condemn anyone but, rather, to study and analyse the situation and, as far as it was able to do so, to help States parties to apply the provisions of the Convention. In his statement the representative of Yugoslavia had portrayed his country as a victim without, apparently, asking why the Security Council had adopted 40 resolutions directed against it, why all the regional organizations had condemned it, and why there had been moves to exclude it from the General Assembly of the United Nations and from some European organizations. Refusal by Yugoslavia to admit that anything was wrong could only lead to a dialogue of the deaf with the Committee.
6. Citing the example of Kosovo, he asked why, if what had been done in Kosovo was just, the ethnic Albanians living there had suddenly expressed the wish to join Albania and why the population was boycotting the elections. In his view the political leaders, or at any rate some of them, were responsible for creating the situation by inciting people to hatred. Referring to the table in the general part of the report which gave a breakdown of the population by nationality, he noted that Muslims were placed in a separate category, although Muslims were found among the Albanians, the Macedonians and other nationalities. There was evident confusion between nationality and religion.
7. Life in Yugoslavia was the same as it had been 50 years before: the same atrocities were being committed, and hatred, destruction and death were being sown for reasons of religious affiliation. What he found equally alarming in the statement by the representative of Yugoslavia was the fact that in a forum whose priority was human rights the representative had talked about loyalty towards the State. The Yugoslav authorities persisted in their belief that the secession of the republics of the former Yugoslavia was contrary to the Constitution, although those republics had become sovereign States and Members of the United Nations. Although he personally regretted the disintegration of Yugoslavia, he thought that the authorities should turn the page, accept what had happened and see reality as it was. The leaders should stop talking about Greater Serbia, inciting people to hatred and saying that the establishment of Muslim States in Europe could not be allowed. Instead of using force and terror, they should be explaining to their people that there were better ways of living. They should abandon the notion of establishing States based on race and prevail upon the Serbs to stop their activities in Bosnia instead of providing funds and weapons to gain a few yards of territory. If Serbs were being ill-treated in the neighbouring States, why had Yugoslavia not brought the matter to the Committee's attention under article 11 of the Convention? In his view, as long as a quarter of Croatian territory and 70 per cent of Bosnian territory remained occupied by the Yugoslav army or by troops supported by Yugoslavia, there would continue to be problems.
8. The Committee could not remain silent about that situation. It had a duty to say loudly and clearly that unless matters changed, there was a risk that the problems might assume unimaginable proportions. He hoped that, in the case of the report of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Committee's conclusions would reflect the tenor of the discussions on the report of Yugoslavia and draw attention to what might happen if no action were taken. He shared the wish of other members that the issue should be included in the agenda of the Committee's next session.
9. Mr. SONG said that, in his opinion, Yugoslavia's report was very far from reflecting reality. Of course, it provided a basis on which members of the Committee could ask whether the provisions of the Convention were directly applicable or whether law enforcement officers could be punished in the event of violations. Nevertheless, many questions were connected with Yugoslavia's policy, and the situation in Kosovo or Macedonia, or that of the Muslims, showed that there was a deep-rooted ethnic conflict. There was in fact a very serious crisis which might turn into something even more serious. That situation was not at all reflected in the report. The only possible solution to the current crisis would be for the parties to find a way of settling the problem of racial discrimination and ethnic conflict.
10. He hoped that the Yugoslav delegation would reply to the questions put by members of the Committee and that it would provide supplementary information on the real situation with regard to racial discrimination and racial conflicts. In short, while recognizing that Yugoslavia's report contained some interesting information on its laws and regulations, he would have liked it to be closer to reality.
11. Mr. RECHETOV agreed with Mr. Wolfrum and Mr. Aboul-Nasr that the agenda item under consideration required frank discussion. He also considered that Yugoslavia's report and its introductory statement could not satisfy the Committee, since they gave little information and did not provide a response to its concerns. In that connection, he thanked the Country Rapporteur, Mr. van Boven, who had been able to analyse what was unsatisfactory in Yugoslavia's report and in its introductory statement. The situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was worrying and the Committee must, under its mandate, try to elaborate measures which could be adopted to prevent it from worsening. He also supported the view taken by Mr. Garvalov, who had spoken about a very serious human rights situation which was forcing the representatives of ethnic minorities to leave the country. There again, the Committee must do everything it could to promote respect for human rights in Yugoslavia. He further endorsed the comments made by Mr. Diaconu, who had asked for how long the troops of the Yugoslav army would be able to act in such a way without control. He also had misgivings about the paramilitary units and wondered how far their activities involved violations of human rights. What was clear in any case was that, even if the fundamental rights of the Serbs were being violated, that did not provide any moral justification for violating the rights of other ethnic groups.
12. Admittedly, the activities of certain ethnic groups might sometimes go beyond what was lawful and therefore be punished. In that connection the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities stipulated, in article 4, paragraph 2, that States should take measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs, except where specific practices were in violation of national law and contrary to international standards. Furthermore, it was stated in article 8, paragraph 4, that nothing in the Declaration might be construed as permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States. Nevertheless, as Mr. de Gouttes had indicated in his statement, if acts committed by minority groups went beyond what was lawful, that had to be proved. With regard to Kosovo, he wondered whether human rights were being violated because the population wished to preserve its national customs; if that was so, it had to be proved.
13. Furthermore, he agreed with Mr. de Gouttes that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should be requested to state very clearly its position on the question of the international tribunal and citizens of the former Yugoslavia.
14. In the course of the discussion the question of self-determination and the right to secession had arisen. In that connection, Mr. Wolfrum's position was surprising because ever since he had served on the Committee he had always supported the idea that the Committee should not concern itself with questions of self-determination, still less with the right to secession. Mr. Wolfrum seemed to have completely changed his mind and had just shown what was at least a curiously casual attitude for an eminent professor of international law, expressing his views on a serious matter on which numerous theories had been put forward and which had given rise to multiple commentaries, including the idea that self-determination was only a category of moral law. Mr Wolfrum had affirmed that the right to self-determination was a right of States and not of peoples. He (Mr. Rechetov) did not know what the current German doctrine on the subject was, but it seemed that use had indeed been made of the right to self-determination in Germany, at least according to the twelfth periodic report recently submitted by that country to the Committee. In a work on self-determination considered to be authoritative at the United Nations, it was stated that recognition of the right to secession might bring about a dismemberment of the world into a host of small States. The problem was certainly not simple. Quite recently a representative of the United States had clearly declared his opinion that the right to secession could be recognized as an aspect of the right to self-determination only if it had been provided for by the State's Constitution. That had been so in the case of the Constitution of the former Soviet Union and of the former Yugoslavia: everyone knew what had happened as a result. It did not therefore seem serious to try to require States to insert such a provision in their Constitutions; they should be free to do that if they so desired.
15. Confronted with such a complex problem, most members of the Committee were of the opinion that an effort must be made to influence developments with a view to avoiding such extreme solutions, particularly in Kosovo. An attempt must be made to develop dialogue, for example by inquiring into terms for autonomy or some other form of cooperation. Had the Centre for Human Rights taken any initiative to that effect? It might be possible, in that connection, to try to draw the parties to the conflict closer together.
16. The Committee, which was certainly not a court of law, must ensure that all reports were treated equitably. He was therefore surprised that Mr. Garvalov, who had rightly expressed concern regarding the fate of the Bulgarians in Yugoslavia, had not inquired at the appropriate time about the Bulgarians living in Germany, who were 10 times as many: he could, for example, have asked whether the Bulgarians there had a press, schools, representatives in Parliament, and so forth. It seemed that two different standards were being applied. Likewise, Mr. de Gouttes had asked what measures had been taken by the State party to improve the situation, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in other parts of the territory. While understanding Mr. de Gouttes' concern for human rights, he himself considered that account must be taken of the plight in which the country found itself and of the fact that many other States parties did not even see fit to reply to the Committee's questions and were even less willing to comply with that kind of obligation. In other words, members of the Committee must take care not to kick someone who was already down.
17. With regard to the question of the loyalty which members of minorities were called upon to display towards the State of which they were citizens, referred to by Mr. Aboul-Nasr, he pointed out that attention had repeatedly been drawn by United Nations bodies to the requirement of a minimum degree of loyalty on the part of minorities and of all citizens towards the State of which they were nationals.
18. The statement that in some republics of the former Yugoslavia recourse had been had to the practice of forcibly changing the surnames of Serbs raised a very interesting question; only recently a Slav State had also been guilty of a serious violation of human dignity and human rights. If that information was correct, it might provide an explanation of the Serbs' behaviour.
19. Finally, Mr. Banton had reported information according to which a member of the Committee had allegedly been subjected to repressive measures in Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In the past, the Committee had already adopted a resolution designed to protect its members from any reprisals; it should consider adopting another one along the same lines, since its members must be able to do their work without fear of being subjected to pressure from any quarter.
20. Mr. SHAHI thanked the representatives of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for the information submitted to the Committee, which had been amply discussed and had been remarkably well analysed by Mr. van Boven. He would therefore confine himself to emphasizing certain points. First of all, as had already been said, the statement by the Yugoslav delegation had been extremely disappointing in so far as it had not included the slightest self-criticism and had shown no awareness of any shortcomings on the part of the Yugoslav Government; the responsibility for the appalling situation currently obtaining in the former Yugoslavia had, on the contrary, been thrust upon others - the minorities, or the international community as a whole. The Yugoslav delegation had requested the Committee to help it; the Committee would be only too glad to oblige, but how could it do so when it had to deal with people with such closed minds?
21. The representative of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had given a moving account of the effect of sanctions on his country, where, he had stated, the dilatory procedures of the Security Council were holding up the arrival of relief and causing much suffering. However, he had not said a word about the permanent blockading of humanitarian aid for towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina that had been pounded uninterruptedly for more than a year, about the interception of humanitarian convoys, or about the atrocious conditions in the hospitals, where surgeons were operating without anaesthetics and under continuous bombardment. The representative had not uttered a word of compassion for the suffering inflicted by the Serbs on non-Serbs; he was concerned only with the hardships endured by the Serbian population.
22. Some people took the view that the Committee must refrain from commenting on the political aspects of the situation in Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), but how could it consider the application of the Convention solely from the juridical viewpoint without taking into account what was actually happening? The Serbian/Croatian proposal currently under discussion by the international mediators ignored all the previously declared principles regarding the non-acquisition of territories by force, the non-acceptance of aggression and the refusal to allow expansion through ethnic cleansing. The purpose of the plan was to force the Bosnian Muslims to accept the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into three exclusive ethnic enclaves, which amounted to the imposition of apartheid and racial segregation. What was taking place was the dismantling of a multicultural and plurinational entity, which the entire international community had recognized as an independent State, by the method of population displacement. Was that not a flagrant violation of article 3 of the Convention?
23. In 1989, the Yugoslav leaders had abrogated the autonomous status of Kosovo. In 1990, they had said that the suspension of autonomy was an interim measure, but it was no longer possible to maintain the pretence that the measure had been temporary: members of the Albanian population were subjected to all manner of pressures to make them leave Kosovo so that the Serbs and the Montenegrins could settle there. The aim was thus to make an ethnic minority out of what had been the majority through coercion and the use of flagrant discriminatory measures. Mr. van Boven had clearly shown how the Serbian authorities were using legislation and employing police forces to achieve their objectives. Mr. Diaconu had stated that autonomy was not the best way of solving the problem. In that case, what was the best way? Even in the few countries with very homogenous populations, regional autonomy was very often vitally important in preventing the disintegration of the State. Even where ethnic questions did not arise, there was a risk that separatist tendencies might develop within population groups which were not allowed to participate in the exercise of power and felt excluded. If autonomy was not the best solution for Kosovo, what other outcome was there apart from forced exodus and racial discrimination? Mr. Banton had recalled that the international community had proposed genuine autonomy accompanied by full respect for human rights. If Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were disposed to envisage a solution along those lines, there might be some hope. However, the current situation was a veritable time bomb, since the repression could not continue indefinitely.
24. The representative of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had claimed that the minorities in question had no right to demand autonomy and could not cut themselves off from the State whose territory they inhabited. In that case, why were the Serbian minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia not content to live as minorities in those countries? What justification was there for the fact that, under the Serbian/Croatian plan, 44 per cent of the population would have to be satisfied with 30 per cent of the territory while the minority would ensure its expansion at the expense of the majority? That was at the very least an indication of double standards.
25. The Committee could conduct a dialogue only with States which showed a degree of openness. During the discussions, representatives of other countries had acknowledged the inadequacy of measures taken in their countries to enforce the provisions of the Convention and had shown a willingness to act on the Committee's suggestions. The attitude of the Serbian authorities -leaving aside for the time being that of Croatia - was completely different. All they expected of the Committee was to endorse their point of view. Were the Committee to do so, it would be betraying its own mandate, the Charter of the United Nations, the various human rights instruments and the basic principles of international law. Even if it could play no more than a marginal role in the matter under consideration, as Mr. Banton had suggested, the Committee had to be unwavering in its adherence to the principles set out in the Convention and it was only right that the Committee should express its views, even if they could not change the course of events.
26. The members of the Committee would be only too pleased to offer their good offices to the parties involved, but in the absence of any willingness on the part of the authorities to engage in dialogue, it had no choice but to activate its own emergency procedures, as other speakers had advocated: the situation had if anything deteriorated since Mr. Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur on the matter, had produced his report. Furthermore, in its judgement of 8 April 1993, the International Court of Justice had ordered the authorities of the former Yugoslavia to take measures to prevent their paramilitary forces from committing or preparing to commit the crime of genocide. Neither in its report nor in its statement had the delegation of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) described any measures taken to implement the Court's directives. The situation in Kosovo was becoming increasingly volatile and the Committee was obliged to act accordingly.
27. Mrs. SADIQ ALI said that, whatever the inadequacies of the report submitted by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the presence of representatives from that country was in itself very helpful. Citing her own experience during the early part of her career, she said that as a Hindu about to marry a Muslim and working for Pakistani refugees in India, she had felt very vulnerable to attacks from extremists. She had then gone to work in Yugoslavia at the request of Pandit Nehru. There she had found an atmosphere of warmth, where one could never tell whether the individuals with whom one came into contact were Serbs, Slovenes, Croats or others and where different races, religions and cultures intermingled harmoniously. The disintegration which was now taking place could then hardly have been foreseen.
28. In view of the gravity of the situation, it would behove the Serbs to adopt a less intransigent attitude. Instead of blaming the situation on the international community or extremists within the country, which served no purpose, they should have shown greater vision and generosity. But instead of that, what had happened? Kosovo's autonomy had been abrogated, while at the same time the Serbs were demanding autonomy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia, which was inconsistent to say the least. If the Yugoslav authorities were to adopt a more conciliatory stance, many problems would solve themselves. The existence of minorities was a fact, but if the parties concerned would only meet over the negotiating table, there was no reason why they should not coexist, as they did in India. Instead of that, oppression was rife in Kosovo, Vojvodina and elsewhere, and could only hasten the process of disintegration. The military and paramilitary forces would not succeed in gaining control of a situation which was bound to become still worse.
29. Mr. van Boven's analysis had shown Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to be in breach of three articles of the Convention. She herself thought that all the articles of the Convention were being violated. Under those conditions, the Committee could only endeavour to continue to consider the problem with Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) if the latter were amenable to dialogue. If not, other measures would have to be contemplated.
30. Mr. ABOUL-NASR, referring to a point raised earlier by Mr. Rechetov, explained that, in referring to loyalty towards the State, he had had in mind the abuse of that concept. A State might well use the principle of loyalty as a pretext for violating human rights, and it was a well-known fact that only recently the current leaders of most of the former communist countries would have been accused of disloyalty and eliminated if they had made the sort of speeches they now made on the market economy. That had been a frequent occurrence from the time of Trotsky until quite recently and millions of people had disappeared as a result. It was not his intention to encourage anyone to commit treason but simply to draw attention to the risks inherent in the abuse of the notion of loyalty.
31. With regard to another objection raised by Mr. Rechetov, he recalled that the Committee's mandate related to racial discrimination and not to the definition of self-determination or secession. Although he had been distressed by the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, that did not imply any hostility on his part to the right to self-determination, and each case needed to be considered on its merits. His support for Mr. Wolfrum was motivated by a desire to ensure that human rights were respected.
32. Mr. GARVALOV conceded that the criticism expressed by Mr. Rechetov had been justified: he should have raised the issue of the situation of Bulgarians in Germany when that country's report had been considered, since he had done so in the case of Yugoslavia. He had had sound reasons for speaking about the Bulgarian minority in Yugoslavia: it was made up of the descendants of Bulgarians who, at the time of the Treaty of Neuilly of 1919, had been absorbed with their land and property into the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia following Bulgaria's defeat.
33. Mr. AHMADU, recalling a visit which he had been allowed to make to Yugoslavia in 1954, shared the general nostalgia with regard to the former Yugoslavia, which had embraced diverse ethnic groups, and wondered how it had arrived at the situation in which it now found itself. He compared the situation in Yugoslavia to that of Nigeria in 1967, when a civil war had been waged to prevent the disintegration of the country. At that time, very few countries had recognized Biafra; Ethiopia and Egypt, which could have intervened, had withheld support from each of the warring parties, proclaiming that they recognized only one country, Nigeria. He had known at once that the European Community's acceptance of the independence of part of Yugoslavia was a mistake. However, what disturbed him most was not what was happening in Serbia and Montenegro but the events taking place in Kosovo and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where ethnic cleansing was rife. He noted that Muslims were now defined only as Muslims, when they had formerly been described first and foremost as Yugoslavs. They had become a group to be eliminated.
34. He could set little store by the report submitted by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) since it did not reflect reality. He hoped that the Yugoslav delegation would come back for a further discussion with the Committee, since dialogue, rather than bombing and massacring, was the appropriate activity for the warring parties in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
35. The CHAIRMAN, speaking in his personal capacity and agreeing with his colleagues, said he wished to highlight a number of points. First of all, the report did not correspond to reality. It was theoretical and the legal provisions it presented were certainly not applicable in practice, for the situation had changed completely since their adoption. It was, however, an interim report; the final report would have to be entirely different in content.
36. He asked the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to adopt a constructive attitude towards the Committee, as cooperation was impossible if the State party did not fully respect its obligations under the Convention.
37. The Committee was convinced that grave violations of the Convention were being committed as a result of the political difficulties which had arisen in the region. Yugoslavia was a key actor in that process, even if other States had also contributed to the situation. The Committee could not avoid noting the human rights violations of which it was informed, asking for the cooperation of the State party, and drawing the attention of the international community to the continuation of those violations. He was sure that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would take those facts into account and understand that the international community was asking only to help end the suffering of all the populations that had been the victims of racial discrimination. The Committee, in turn, should promote dialogue between the parties to the conflict as the only way to resolve all the region's problems and put an end to the acts of racial discrimination.
38. Mr. MITIC (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), in accordance with the request of Mr. Ahmadu, offered to explain what had happened to Yugoslavia, the disintegration of which had brought with it so many problems, within the borders both of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of the former Yugoslav republics. He reaffirmed his Government's willingness to engage in dialogue and to be sincere. The Government had no interest in hiding problems; on the contrary, it had every reason to wish them resolved, within both its borders and those of the former Yugoslav republics, even if in the latter case it had no responsibilities. If the position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia aroused some suspicion, it was because the international community was biased against it.
39. The disintegration of Yugoslavia had begun with the violent secession of Slovenia, which had gained control of the border posts. The Yugoslav Government had sent almost 2,000 soldiers, lightly armed and with virtually no ammunition, to take them back. The then Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister, a Slovene, had warned the Slovene Government, but 40 Yugoslav soldiers had been killed in the operation. One had only to look at the photographs of the so-called war between Yugoslavia and Slovenia to see who was responsible. Admittedly, as some of its own members had pointed out critically, the Yugoslav Government should perhaps not have undertaken the operation and sent soldiers who were so inadequately equipped. At the time, Yugoslavia had accepted the help of the European Community, which had expressed support for the status quo - in other words, for maintaining Yugoslavia's jurisdiction over the borders. That decision had never been given practical effect. The European Community had then pressed the Yugoslav presidency to elect a Croat as its head, who had then publicly proclaimed the end of Yugoslavia.
40. Moreover, the European Community had asked the Badinter Commission to come up with criteria it could use as a basis for recognizing the new Yugoslav republics. The London Conference had recommended that no new State should be recognized before the end of the process then under way. The Badinter Commission had expressed the view that Slovenia and Macedonia could be recognized, but not Croatia or Bosnia. However, the European Community had ignored the conclusions of its own Commission; it had recognized Croatia and Slovenia but not Macedonia or Bosnia.
41. He cited statements made during the course of the year by various politicians, including Mr. Kissinger, the United Kingdom Defence Minister, the United States Secretary of State, the President of the London Conference, the President of the French Republic, and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, which suggested that the events in Yugoslavia did not constitute an invasion of one country by another, nor a holocaust like the one perpetrated by Nazi Germany, but rather an inter-ethnic conflict of a type which was common in the Balkans. The statements also suggested that the hasty recognition of independent republics had been a mistake, made under pressure from Germany.
42. Some people reproached Yugoslavia for casting itself in the role of victim. The fact was that Yugoslavia truly was a victim of disintegration. The country understood the desire of the Croats and Slovenes to have their own State, but the text proclaiming the establishment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was clear: the Republic had no territorial claims beyond its own borders.
43. Explaining what had happened more specifically in Croatia, he said that even before the beginning of the secessionist movement, the Croats had begun to attack the Serbs living on their territory, to set fire to Serbian homes, and to dismiss Serbian employees. After the proclamation of independence, attacks against some cities inhabited by Serbs and against Yugoslav garrisons preparing to evacuate Croatia had marked the beginning of the armed conflict.
44. In Bosnia, in defiance of the wishes of its Serbian population, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats had proclaimed the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That Republic had first been recognized by the European Community, then by the international community. Its Government, made up of leaders of the three national communities, could hardly be said to be a government at all; not only Serbs but Croats and even some Muslims, had left it.
45. In considering the problem of the responsibility of Yugoslavia, one must look at exactly which acts had been committed by its agents or leaders, including its military forces. The war that was raging in Bosnia was an inter-ethnic war between Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims. It was no secret that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia took a keen interest in the rights of the Bosnian Serbs, but it did not recognize the Serbian Republic of Bosnia any more than it did the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to cooperate with the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was convinced that the fate of Bosnia was the affair neither of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nor of Croatia, but that of the three national communities which made it up.
46. The Yugoslav Government condemned all acts which were contrary to humanitarian law, no matter who had committed them. Some people thought that the Yugoslav Republic was delivering arms to the Bosnian Serbs, but they should be aware that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was electronically monitoring everything that was going on at the borders, and they should obtain their information from somewhere other than copy-hungry newspapers.
47. Without wishing to minimize the responsibility of his Government, he recalled that there were three parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Muslims, the Serbs, and the Croats.
48. Moreover, the Government of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia had no direct relations with the Yugoslav Government. There were two distinct Governments and two distinct territories, and it was not possible to amalgamate them. Naturally, the Serbs of Yugoslavia took a particular interest in the rights of the Serbs of Bosnia, as well as in the rights of the Serbs of Krajina and Croatia.
49. The international community accused the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of violating the principles of international law yet he wondered what the Governments of the countries of which the Committee members were nationals would do in such a situation. If the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were to blame for facing up to the secessionists, what should one think of other countries such as the United States, which had been in similar circumstances? Outlining the background to the situation in the former Yugoslavia, he said the Serbs had lived for centuries in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the most recent Constitution of those two countries had recognized their nationhood. Following independence, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina had flouted the wishes of the Serbian people. The conflict in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina had its origin in the fact that the Serbs living in those republics were now deprived of their rights.
50. He wished moreover to emphasize two points: first, when the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had also proclaimed independence the Yugoslav army had withdrawn without incident, contrary to the situation which had developed in other republics, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia; second, while recognizing the independence of the separatist republics, the European Community and certain European countries had taken care to accept only the recognized frontiers of Yugoslavia.
51. Much had been said about the question of Kosovo. Yugoslavia had no interest in seeing the situation of the Albanian minority in Kosovo deteriorate. The fact was that, between 1974 and 1989, Kosovo and Vojvodina had officially been autonomous provinces but in fact had assumed the status of States; neither the Yugoslav nor the Serbian authorities were prepared to recognize that status. One member of the Committee had spoken of the abrogation of the autonomy of Kosovo. What was at issue was in fact the abrogation of the status of Kosovo and Vojvodina as States. That decision, taken pursuant to an amendment to the Constitution of Serbia, had not been an arbitrary act but had been a decision taken with the consent of the six Yugoslav republics. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was prepared, in collaboration with the Committee, to seek a solution to the Kosovo crisis. However, clear and precise proposals must be submitted. The best example of autonomy in western Europe was Trentino-Alto Adige, which had withstood the test of time. The Yugoslav Government however was not prepared to accept any solution which did not have a precedent in any other country and which was not consistent with international texts or the norms of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
52. In reply to the questions raised by Mr. van Boven regarding the use of the Albanian language and the problem of the Albanian minority, he said he was puzzled by the attitude of that minority which, in 1981, had rejected the 1974 Constitution but was now insisting on it. In fact, the Albanian minority did not recognize the Yugoslav State: it refused to participate in public life, in elections and in national censuses and rejected proposed educational programmes. On the latter point, and notwithstanding the very strong criticisms of certain opposition parties, the Yugoslav Government had agreed to start a dialogue with the Albanians. The fact was that more than 300,000 Albanian children attended "parallel educational schools", in other words, schools administered by minority organizations. Even less understandable was the Albanian minority's refusal to set up its own educational programmes as the Federal Minister of Education had proposed. The principal victims of that state of affairs were Albanian children and members of that minority in general. Certainly the Albanians were victims of discriminatory measures in Kosovo but, without wishing to condone the weaknesses and errors of the different local or federal authorities, he considered that the most important thing was to identify the real problems. One fact stood out: no Serbian Government was prepared to accept the independence of Kosovo.
53. With regard to justice and the judicial system, which allegedly did not offer effective protection to the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina and Sandjak, he provided examples, supported by statistics, of the composition of the magistrature in certain communes of Vojvodina showing that the Hungarians were very much in the majority. Concerning the participation of the Albanian minority in the legal system of Kosovo, it was to be regretted that, out of 48 Albanian judges who had been elected, 47 had declined the office.
54. It was true that the size of the Bulgarian minority in Yugoslavia had declined. Nevertheless, it was not possible to talk of discrimination in connection with that minority. In one of the communes where ethnic Bulgarians lived, the president of the commune, the vice-president of the communal council, the communal secretary, all the members of the communal council and of the executive board, the chiefs of the police, financial and public services, the president and all the judges of the communal court, the administrative judge and the directors of the secondary and the primary schools were Bulgarians. There might be problems in realizing the human rights of that community, but it would be ridiculous to claim that the Bulgarian minority in such a commune were victims of discrimination.
55. Concerning the situation in Sandjak, Muslims were in a majority in only 3 communes out of 11. In one of them, Novi Pazar, they comprised 74 per cent of public officials in the economic and financial services sectors as against 25 per cent Serbs; 24 per cent as against 21 per cent in the social services; 8 per cent as against 7 per cent in the public administration; 57 per cent as against 39 per cent in all other services; and 70 per cent in State bodies.
56. In that connection, Muslims as a nation should not be confused with Muslims as a religious community. In 1963 the Yugoslav Constitution had recognized six nations, including the Muslims. The latter were Slavs who spoke Serbo-Croat and were usually of Serbian or Croatian ancestry. If they had not been recognized as a nation, they would have been forcibly assimilated with the Croats or Serbs; that had been their status before 1963. Currently the Muslims constituted a national minority in Yugoslavia while the Serbs were not a minority in Croatia or in Bosnia and Herzegovina, any more than the Albanians in Kosovo.
57. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had very serious objections to the establishment of an international tribunal for crimes against humanitarian law. A letter to that effect had been sent to the President of the Security Council through the Secretary-General of the United Nations. On that issue the question of universality arose: why establish a tribunal which would only recognize crimes committed in certain regions and not in others? In any case, Yugoslavia could not extradite its own citizens unless the Constitution was amended, a function which was within the competence of Parliament and not of the Yugoslav Government. In that connection, a document setting out the objections of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could be provided to interested members of the Committee.
58. Vojvodina had the same status as Kosovo under the Yugoslav Constitution and Hungarians were not a majority there. Serbs represented 57.3 per cent of the population there, Hungarians 16.9 per cent and Slovaks 3.2 per cent.
59. With reference to aspects of the minorities policy of the Republic of Serbia which had been criticized by some members of the Committee, he read out extracts from a declaration by the Serbian Parliament, dated 27 November 1992, concerning human rights and the rights of minorities. That declaration showed that, despite their desire for dialogue, the authorities of the Republic of Serbia had constantly run up against a determined attitude of obstructionism and separatism on the part of certain citizens. Notwithstanding the suspension of participation by the Yugoslav Government, and consequently by the Republic of Serbia, in the activities of the international organizations and of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the national Parliament of the Republic of Serbia had stated that it was ready to cooperate with all countries and all international institutions in the protection of human rights and freedoms in the Republic of Serbia.
60. He was not in a position to give information on the question of the name changes of certain Serbs.
61. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Committee would conclude its consideration of the report of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) at its next meeting.
62. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia withdrew.