Consideration of reports, comments and information submitted by States parties under article 9 of the Convention (continued)
Ninth and tenth periodic reports of Tonga
CONSIDERATION OF REPORTS, COMMENTS AND INFORMATION SUBMITTED BY STATES PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONVENTION (agenda item 4)(continued)
Information requested from Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) under article 9, paragraph 1 of the Convention (continued)
1. At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Mitic and Mrs. Spasic (Yugoslavia) resumed their places at the Committee table.
2. Mr. GARVALOV said that, given the difficult situation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) with respect to the application of the Convention, the Committee members were obliged to insist on a number of questions and make certain comments.
3. It would be unfortunate if the representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) saw the Committee as a court or if they felt that the members were prejudiced against them. That being so, neither the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) nor the Committee could afford to close their eyes to the situation there.
4. In one of his statements, in speaking of the national Bulgarian minority in Yugoslavia, he had mentioned the Treaty of Neuilly of 1919 under which a part of the territory, and therefore of the population, of Bulgaria had been ceded to the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. He had recalled that historical fact only in order to explain why there was a Bulgarian minority in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and not in order to question the Treaty of Neuilly or to prejudge the official position of the Bulgarian authorities on that question. In that regard, he wished to make it clear that he was not speaking on behalf of the Bulgarian Government, but in his capacity as an expert member of the Committee. Lastly, while he welcomed the explanations given by Mrs. Spasic, representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), he unfortunately had to disagree with her on the basis of the information which he had to the contrary about the situation of Bulgarians in that country.
5. With regard to the question of the right to self-determination, on which some members of the Committee disagreed with Mr. Mitic, representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), as far as he knew, there was no United Nations instrument - resolution or treaty - which provided for the right of minorities to self-determination, in the sense of independence or secession. The principle of self-determination was set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, without prejudice to the right to independence, and it was only in 1960, when the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1514 (XV), containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, that the organization had equated self-determination with independence. Nevertheless, the General Assembly had adopted another resolution at the same time, which had gone almost unnoticed, resolution 1541 (XV) which included six annexes, one of which set out the different means by which the right to self-determination could be exercised - association, free association, integration, full integration and independence.
6. Mrs. SADIQ ALI, pointing out that the representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had asserted that Serbia had nothing to do with Bosnia and Herzegovina, asked how 70 per cent of the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been occupied by the Bosnian Serbs in December 1992, when the latter represented only 31 per cent of the pre-war population. Furthermore, after the failure of the Vance-Owen Plan, it was claimed that the Bosnian Serbs and Croats had drawn up a new partition plan for the territory in the form of a federation among the three ethnic groups. A map drawn by Mr. Milosevic, the President of Serbia, which was used by the mediators, favoured the Serbs. It was therefore difficult to believe that Serbia was unaware of the events taking place in Bosnia and Herzegovina and she asked the representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for an explanation.
7. Mr. RECHETOV said that he did not have blind faith in unconfirmed press articles or reports of organizations and thanked the representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for providing the Committee with important and useful information. However, some doubt still persisted about the human rights situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and, like Mrs. Sadiq Ali, he was not certain that the attitude of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was altogether unconnected with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
8. Furthermore, the fact that a large national minority in Kosovo could not participate in social and political life and was not allowed to study its national language was a matter of deep concern. In that connection, he proposed that, instead of invoking yet again the resolutions of other United Nations bodies, it would be more useful to organize a fact-finding mission in the former Yugoslavia, and in Kosovo in particular, which would draw on the resources and skills of the Committee. Mr. van Boven and one other member of the Committee might take part in that mission. In that way, the Committee would dispel all the doubts which the representative of the former Yugoslavia might express about the objectivity of the information that it used.
9. Lastly, he proposed that the question of the former Yugoslavia should continue to be included in the Committee's agenda.
10. Mr. SHAHI said that the representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had expressed doubts about the credibility of the report of Mr. Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, which allegedly contained an error as to the site of a mosque which had been destroyed. However, what appeared to be a mistake in the report was not enough to discredit Mr. Mazowiecki's conclusions about the situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the other territories of the former Yugoslavia. In that connection, he recalled that the press had reported the 100 per cent destruction of mosques in the territories controlled by the Bosnian Serbs.
11. Furthermore, it was clear, as Mr. Mitic had pointed out, that the minorities had a debt of loyalty towards the State under whose jurisdiction they were placed. Nevertheless, every State was obliged to respect the human rights of its minorities. To demand unconditional loyalty was to defend totalitarianism. The persecuted minorities were therefore justified in fighting to have their human rights respected without being accused of disloyalty.
12. In addition, while the Albanians were regarded as a national minority vis-à-vis the population of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, they nevertheless constituted a majority in Kosovo.
13. Regarding the right to self-determination as provided for in the Yugoslav Constitution - presumably the Constitution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - that right was allegedly granted to the peoples and not to the republics. But the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a special one. Before that republic had become independent, the European Community had established a number of guidelines governing the recognition of any new State formed in eastern Europe and in the former Yugoslavia. At the time when Croatia and Slovenia had acceded to independence, the question of the independence of Bosnia, which had not been posed previously, had been placed on the agenda. However, the European Community had insisted that a popular referendum should be held on the subject in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite the Serbian population's boycott, that referendum had expressed a desire for independence. Bosnia and Herzegovina had therefore not exercised the right to self-determination as provided for by the Constitution of the former Yugoslavia. It had acceded to independence by virtue of a popular referendum held in accordance with a recommendation of the European Community. It was thus a sovereign State recognized by the international community.
14. Concerning the status of the Muslims, the representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had said that under the 1963 Constitution that group had been granted the status of a nation. If it was recognized that that nation was of Slav ancestry, why then had it been singled out for ethnic cleansing? Did one need to recall that 70 per cent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was occupied, whereas the Bosnians had not encroached upon one inch of the territory of the Republic of Serbia?
15. Moreover, the representative of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had asserted that the Committee had obtained its information from biased press articles or reports. However, Mr. van Boven had taken account of the debates which had taken place in United Nations bodies and had reported on the conclusions that had thus been reached. Since the members of the Committee did not have access to all United Nations documents, it was natural that they should turn to the world press, which reported very fully on the subject.
16. Similarly, the representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had said that his country was not responsible for the behaviour of the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia. If that was so, how did the Serbs obtain the heavy artillery which enabled them to advance on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
17. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia appeared to be asking the Committee for help. He welcomed such an attitude, but would rule out any formula that might end up as a "dialogue of the deaf", to quote Mr. van Boven. In his view, there was no point in sending a special rapporteur to the former Yugoslavia, because Mr. Mazowiecki had already discharged that duty, but the Committee could envisage sending a good-offices delegation. If one was to go by the first part of the interim report of Yugoslavia, dated July 1993, the country had undertaken to discharge in good faith all the international obligations contracted under the international agreements to which it was a party, including therefore the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. However, not only had the Serbs constantly flouted those obligations for months on end, but they had done their utmost to frustrate the efforts of the United Nations to relieve the suffering of the civilian population and had even gone so far as to oppose the United Nations' efforts by force of arms. Did that means that a Member State could flout the provisions of the Charter without affecting its membership of the Organization? It was unfortunate that such behaviour was being displayed by a group which had belonged to a country that had enjoyed unquestionable international prestige among all the countries of the third world.
18. Mr. de GOUTTES observed that the dialogue between the Committee and the delegation headed by Mr. Mitic was difficult and tense. To the sharp questions put by the experts, Mr. Mitic had replied at length, which was to be welcomed, and categorically, with assertions that were not always acceptable. Thus, the representative of Yugoslavia had said that biased accusations were being levelled at his Government that the other European countries shared some responsibility for the situation in the former Yugoslavia, that the international press was biased against his Government and that Mr. Mazowiecki's report contained many errors. Lastly, Mr. Mitic had asserted that the establishment of an international criminal tribunal would be unacceptable in that situation, on the one hand because such a court would not be permanent and, on the other hand, because it would compel Yugoslavia to amend its internal legislation concerning the extradition of Yugoslav nationals.
19. While it was true that a permanent international criminal tribunal would be the ideal formula one was bound to accept the fact that initially, it was an ad hoc international tribunal that was more likely to be established. As far as the objection to the application of the extradition legislation was concerned, it was disputable in that one could not equate bringing a national before an international court with a proceeding of extradition to a foreign State.
20. He recalled, however, that at the end of his statement, the representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had made a positive proposal to the Committee, by inviting it to send one or two experts to Belgrade in order to meet the Yugoslav authorities and examine the situation with regard to racial discrimination and the application of the Convention. The document on the prevention of racial discrimination (CERD/C/1993/Misc.1/Rev.2), adopted by the Committee at its previous session, would thus be applied for the first time and that was to be welcomed. It was very important for the Committee to follow up a situation as disturbing as the one under consideration and it could do so in accordance with the document on the prevention of racial discrimination, by sending one or more experts to meet the Yugoslav Government, as Mr. Mitic had proposed, by appointing a special rapporteur to coordinate the initiatives to be taken and by expressing its concerns to the Yugoslav authorities and to the United Nations Secretary-General, who would be requested to bring the matter to the attention of the other early warning mechanisms and to the Security Council.
21. Mr. WOLFRUM said he had listened carefully to the representative of Yugoslavia and thought that his statement was more positive than his opening address. However, he wished to point out to the representative, who had stressed that the Committee was relying on information which was not objective and was perhaps casting rather too much blame on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that questions similar to the ones put to him had also been put to the representative of Croatia. It should be made clear that the Committee tried to be as impartial as possible. He also noted that most of the arguments presented by Yugoslavia centred on the past. Of course, history did play a role in the present conflict but he preferred to look towards the future. He noted that the Committee was not a court and that its role was not to deliver value judgements, but to engage in a dialogue and help the States parties to the best of its ability. There was no doubt that the current situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was very disturbing. It was not to be compared to the reunification of the two Germanies, which had taken place without any bombing or loss of human life. In the case of Yugoslavia, there were three areas: firstly, Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandzak; secondly, the regions controlled by the Serbian militias or the militias linked to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and, lastly, the other regions of the country. He thought that the Committee could play an important role in respect of Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandzak, where the situation was explosive. Consequently, he urged the representative of Yugoslavia to make use of the Committee's services, not by inviting one or more experts to assess the situation on the spot, which he thought was pointless, but by availing itself of the mediation services of one or more members of the Committee, particularly in Kosovo and perhaps in Vojvodina and Sandzak, with a view to establishing an autonomous regime. That did not mean interfering in the ongoing negotiations; the Committee was not in a position to play a significant role in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, the Committee should state that population transfers could not be permitted and that displaced persons had the right to return to their homes. It should also draw the attention of all agencies that might give assistance in respect of the situation in Yugoslavia and in Kosovo in particular, in order to prevent it from worsening and to find a peaceful solution.
22. Mr. LAMPTEY said that Mr. Mitic had been representing his country in the Committee for many years and welcomed that element of continuity. He recalled that when he had spoken during consideration of the report of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he had indicated that his statement dealt with all the States of the region, which implied Croatia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), whose reports were going to be considered by the Committee. He explained that he had not felt it necessary to take the floor earlier in the debate on the report of Yugoslavia because he was convinced that it was not that report, but the situation in the former Yugoslavia and the States comprising it that would be studied. He recognized that Yugoslavia had been unanimously criticized and that in referring to the situation in that region, most people thought of Serbia and not of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It was true that it was difficult to separate Serbia from the Bosnian Serbs. What people remembered was the word "Serbs", without making a distinction between the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbs of Yugoslavia. The fact that the Bosnian Serbs were acting on their own or had their own point of view was therefore obscured. Many people had the feeling that it was the Serbian Serbs and their dream of a Greater Serbia which were responsible for the present situation. And it was true that during the period before the break-up of the Federation, the Serbian leaders had not adopted a rational attitude. Nevertheless, it should be underlined that at the break-up of the Federation, the Bosnians of Serbian origin had had their own interests and their own concerns. When the pressure of the international community had begun to be severely felt in Yugoslavia and particularly in Serbia, the Serbian authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had tried to influence the Bosnian Serbs. Their leader had even been forced to accept Lord Owen's first plan, but the Bosnian people had rejected it. In short, the Serbian authorities of Yugoslavia should not be credited with more influence than they had. Any attempt to solve the problems of violence in that region on the basis of the principle that Serbia represented the Serbs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and those of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be doomed to failure, because there was a difference between those populations. However, the Serbs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had some influence over the Bosnian Serbs. It was therefore important to see what the Serbian authorities of Yugoslavia could do to help in finding a solution and contributing to preventing racial and ethnic hatred.
23. As far as the Committee's role was concerned, he had taken note of the proposal of the representative of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) that an expert should be sent and he thought that it should be carefully examined. While he was not against the idea a priori, the problem of financing that mission should first be solved. After that, the question should be considered of how much influence the expert sent on mission could have. He inclined to the view that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should be advised to disabuse the international community by stating that it did not wish to seize the territory of the other States and form a Greater Serbia which would bring together all the Serbs, and by recognizing, within the framework of the negotiations under way, the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina with all its ethnic groups. The proposal of members of the Committee to bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council was pointless because the Council had already been seized of that question in its full political dimension. With regard to the situation in Kosovo, he noted that everyone was of the opinion that it would soon explode and would be worse than Bosnia and Herzegovina. Everyone was aware that there were people living in Kosovo who wanted their independence and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would fight to safeguard its territorial integrity. With regard to Mr. Wolfrum's comments and his query as to why Yugoslavia did not grant the inhabitants of Kosovo the right to secede, he underlined that, whatever the provisions of its Constitution, no State accepted secession and, in that connection he cited the example of the United States of America. The question which arose was whether the people wanted peace and respect for human rights in the region or instability and political conflicts. If Yugoslavia wanted peace, its Serbian leaders should take steps to reassure the Albanians of Kosovo, who seemingly might feel that they were being discriminated against by the Serbs. He thought that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, inter alia, had known what was in store in Yugoslavia and could have acted then, but had not done so: today, in an attempt to ease the conscience, a plethora of proposals was being put forward. In respect of Kosovo, the situation should be considered objectively and realistically, taking into consideration the interests of all and not just of a single group. The Committee, for its part, should consider carefully whether there was any point in sending an expert to visit Yugoslavia.
24. Mr. DIACONU thought that the Committee should take note, in its report, of the willingness of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to find a solution to the problem of Kosovo and to negotiate with the Albanian community of Kosovo and to inform the international organizations dealing with that matter so that they could take measures to facilitate dialogue between the two parties. On the other hand, he was against the idea of applying the same method in Vojvodina because the situation there was different. In Vojvodina, there were several minorities who did not share the same opinion, and it was rather a problem of balance among the different minorities than of a potential ethnic conflict. As for the proposal to send a member of the Committee to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, he was not against it, provided that the necessary money was found and that the expert appointed was not given the mandate of a rapporteur. In other words, he should not be instructed to study the situation and prepare another report as other United Nations bodies were already doing. The expert appointed by the Committee should rather be given the responsibility to facilitate the application of certain international standards or of contributing to the solution of a particular existing problem. While he shared Mr. Lamptey's point of view about the Security Council, he felt that the matter should be drawn to the attention of international agencies dealing with the question of Kosovo, so that they would do everything in their power to ensure that the parties concerned entered into negotiations.
25. Mr. ABOUL-NASR said that, before giving an opinion on the question of sending an expert and his mandate, he wished to know whether that expert would be authorized to make contact with Albanians from Kosovo so that he could hear all the parties concerned, and thus be in a position to act as a mediator.
26. Mr. SONG felt that the situation in Yugoslavia constituted the tragedy of the late twentieth century and that it was a difficult question to deal with because such a long time had been allowed to elapse. Whatever the solutions proposed, account should be taken of the interests of all the parties concerned and an attempt should be made to find the right balance, for otherwise the result would be to complicate the situation still further.
27. Mr. RECHETOV thought it was unlikely that the Committee could improve the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but hoped that the current meeting of the three parties concerned would yield some results. In the face of the explosive situation of Kosovo, he felt that no effort should be spared. With regard to the proposal to send an expert on mission he also felt that if the financial problem could be solved the Committee should give thought to the mandate of the expert appointed and decide whether he would assume the functions of a rapporteur or a mediator. He could try to clarify the situation by talking directly with inhabitants of Kosovo. That being so an effort should be made to establish a dialogue between the parties. In various countries, including those of the former Soviet Union, some people appeared to think that there was no limit to self-determination, that in that regard there was total freedom of action and that the international community should side with the minorities, whatever point of view they defended. In that context, he wished to know exactly with whom the mission or the rapporteur sent by the Committee would have talks. He asked for clarification: was it intended that the mission should meet, in the capacity of representatives of the population of Kosovo, members previously selected and appointed by the Albanian population? He feared that contacts thus limited would have no positive result. The mission should, on the contrary, be able to meet anyone in the region that it saw fit.
28. Mr. WOLFRUM drew attention, first of all, to the fact that he had never advocated the secession of Kosovo. He had gathered also that the present constitution of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) included autonomous status for that region.
29. The person or persons called upon to make the visit should above all carry out a good offices mission, with a view to resuming the dialogue that had been broken off between the Government of Serbia and the spokesmen of some Albanians in Kosovo; as Mr. Rechetov had pointed out, the members of the mission should have complete freedom to decide whom to contact - with strict respect, of course, for the Constitution of Serbia. Furthermore, the persons sent there could play a mediation role and even give advice on the autonomous regime of Kosovo, of which only the general framework was laid down in the Constitution.
30. Mr. ABOUL-NASR pointed out that it was absolutely necessary for the Committee to obtain the consent of the State concerned before starting such a procedure. He would therefore like to hear the opinion of the representative of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the subject before giving an opinion.
31. Mr. LAMPTEY asked Mr. Banton to clarify whether a working group of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was in fact already working on the question of Kosovo.
32. Mr. BANTON confirmed that a group of CSCE observers had gone to Kosovo with the aim of facilitating dialogue; but its mandate had come to an end and, for the time being an extension was not contemplated. He had referred to that group because other speakers had suggested that the Centre for Human Rights could play a part in the search for a dialogue, but in his opinion that suggestion was not feasible without the express consent of the State party; there was, however, a strong possibility that that consent might not be obtained because that State was probably fearful that the United Nations intervention might give encouragement to the advocates of secession. Consequently, he had felt that it would be better to pin hopes on the CSCE rather than on the United Nations.
33. Mr. LAMPTEY said that, in his view, no decision could be taken unless the financial problems were solved and unless the Yugoslav delegation showed that it believed that a fact-finding or good-offices mission could be really useful in solving the problem of Kosovo.
34. Mr. SHAHI said he gathered that the financial problems were not unsurmountable. As far as he was concerned, he would rather send a good-offices mission geared towards concrete action than appoint a special rapporteur, since other United Nations agencies that were better placed to do so had already undertaken that responsibility. If a good-offices mission composed of one or two members of the Committee were sent in order to facilitate the dialogue between the Albanians of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia, they should have complete freedom to meet anyone with whom they wished to talk, without interference from the authorities.
35. Lastly, he inquired whether the legislation passed by the Yugoslav Parliament in 1992, containing the declaration on human rights and the rights of national minorities to which Mr. Wolfrum had referred, postponed for the Albanians the autonomous regime which had been in force up to 1989.
36. Mr. van BOVEN said he welcomed the turn that the discussion had taken because it had always been his view that the Committee could play a useful role in the question of Kosovo - more so than in that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was being dealt with by other United Nations bodies. Regarding human rights, experience had shown that it was not desirable to combine the tasks of information gathering and mediation, and that a choice had to be made between them. However, the Commission on Human Rights had already appointed a special rapporteur to deal with that question and therefore the Commission should not embark on a similar initiative; it should also make sure that it did not exceed the framework of the Convention and should beware of wanting to cover the whole sphere of human rights.
37. In addition, Mr. Wolfrum had rightly pointed out that one should not begin by assuming a separation of Kosovo from the present State structure; on the contrary the basis used should be the existing constitutional framework of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
38. The initiative contemplated by the Committee should be centred around the idea of good offices aimed at restoring the dialogue between the Government concerned and the Albanian minority. The mission entrusted with that responsibility should play a role of mediation, advice and reconciliation and seek to ensure better application of the provisions of the Convention. Lastly, as Mr. Shahi had clearly stated, the mission should enjoy complete freedom of movement and meet whomever it wished. Persons in contact with the mission should be free from any subsequent acts of retaliation or intimidation by the authorities. He looked forward to receiving the replies of the representative of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on those questions.
39. Mr. MITIC (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) thanked the members of the Committee for the interest which they had shown in his country and for their efforts to help in solving the problems facing it. However, he regretted that Mr. Shahi and Mrs. Sadiq Ali had adopted such a biased attitude and one that was so unfavourable to the search for solutions: they had tried to politicize the debate, when, in the United Nations and elsewhere, there were bodies competent to deal with political questions. The question of the crimes that had allegedly been committed fell within the competence of the International Court of Justice. The Court would soon be examining the request of the so-called Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Yugoslav Government had itself submitted an application, with supporting documents, about the abuses committed against the Serbian population of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Muslim forces and paramilitary groups.
40. Mr. Shahi had spoken of the destruction of mosques, but one could also speak about the hundreds of Orthodox churches which had been demolished: he would refrain from doing so, because that was not the best way of advancing the dialogue. The document referred to, concerning violations of humanitarian law, did not fall within the purview of the Committee, but rather of other bodies and in particular of the International Court of Justice; those would be the appropriate bodies to examine the evidence adduced and determine who was responsible.
41. Mr. SHAHI had asked why the Bosnian Serbs had Yugoslav weapons. Only recently, Bosnia and Herzegovina had constituted one of the largest centres for the manufacture and stockpiling of weapons in Europe. The arms and ammunition there would probably be enough to continue hostilities for years to come and everyone, Serbs, Croats and Muslims of Bosnia, had weapons factories. For his part he would refrain from asking about the presence of Pakistani weapons in Bosnia, because that was a question that did not concern the Committee.
42. Some of the views expressed in the Committee tended to encourage the minority of Kosovo to secede. Why did the Albanians of Kosovo refuse to participate in the social life of Serbia, to take part in elections, and educational curricula, to join the police force and to be registered by the census. While not wishing to deny the fact that the authorities had sometimes made mistakes, it should be recognized that that was the crux of the problem and that explained why that minority was deprived, by its own action, of its fundamental rights. It was dangerous to encourage the illusions of the populations regarding accession to independence; international law did not grant minorities the right to secession in the name of self-determination. The day that Pakistan or India granted the right of secession to their minorities, the question might arise again, but for the time being, it was inadmissible that a country should be asked to do something that no other country was doing.
43. The decision to send a mission to Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was one for the Committee to take, just as it was for the Committee to decide on the mandate of such a mission. Mr. van Boven's idea of a mediation mission to encourage the establishment of a dialogue was appealing. The Yugoslav Government, for its part, was always willing to receive missions or rapporteurs on its territory and in the best circumstances. The Committee's emissaries could meet not only representatives of the Government but also members of the minorities, as they saw fit. During the previous six months, over 100 missions from all sources had visited Kosovo. It was in no way the practice of the Yugoslav authorities, who were in favour of dialogue and cooperation, to restrict their activities and freedom.
44. Mr. SHAHI said that he regretted that Mr. Mitic had accused him of being biased. He had based his statement that the Yugoslav Government was violating the Charter of the United Nations on an article which had appeared in the July 1993 issue of the New York Review, entitled "The Balkan Crises, 1919 and 1993". That charge of bias was therefore directed also at the author of that article. With respect to the destruction of mosques, he had only spoken about them because the representative of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had himself indicated that the leaders of Serbia had some influence over the Bosnian Serbs: he hoped that, in a spirit of conciliation, they might be able to ask the latter not to destroy places of worship. Freedom of worship was a human right and, if there had been destruction of Orthodox churches (a fact not mentioned in the report under consideration), that was to be condemned, whoever the perpetrators were.
45. With regard to the presence of Pakistani weapons in Bosnia, it was well known that, in flagrant violation of the sanctions decreed by the Security Council, banned goods and weapons in particular were flooding into the region. Consequently, shortly after the recognition of Croatia, one European country had reportedly sent a large stock of weapons into Serbia. It was therefore an extremely wide-ranging question, which certainly did not fall within the competence of the Committee.
46. At no time had he ever spoken of secession. He had only asked about the autonomous regime of Kosovo which had been suspended in 1989 - provisionally, according to the Government itself: he would therefore like to know when that regime would be restored. To say that asking such a question was tantamount to advocating secession was not in keeping with a constructive spirit and only created confusion. No one had said anything about secession in respect of Kosovo, but only about the rights of the minorities living there, which moreover were recognized by the Constitution of Serbia adopted by the National Parliament in 1992. In that case, Mr. Mitic had levelled unfounded accusations and, there again, he had not displayed the spirit of conciliation that was to be desired.
47. Mr. LAMPTEY said that he too regretted the fact that Mr. Mitic had questioned the impartiality of some members of the Committee. There were different points of view and approaches within the Committee, but it always reached fair conclusions.
48. Concerning the plan that seemed to be emerging to send a possible good-offices mission that would mediate in the Kosovo problem, it would be desirable for the representative of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to inform the Committee, before the end of the session, whether his Government considered it useful to send such a mission, in other words, whether that Government felt that, given the explosive situation prevailing in the region, such a mission would have a role to play. Was it prepared to give all the support and all the freedom of action that would perhaps allow it to succeed where others had failed? It was on the basis of the answers to those questions that the Committee could take a decision.
49. Mr. ABOUL-NASR, referring to the distinction made by Mr. van Boven between a fact-finding mission and a mediation mission, remarked that, from his experience, a fact-finding mission had to confine itself merely to collecting information, whereas a mediation mission had a much broader remit, since it would first have to obtain the information and then contribute to starting a dialogue. The Committee should return later to the question of the mandate to be given to such a mission.
50. He also regretted that Mr. Mitic continued to make out that his country was an innocent victim which was the butt of the most unfair criticism. The members of the Committee displayed considerable independence of opinion and were completely impartial. It was quite unacceptable that the delegation of Yugoslavia should question the credibility of anyone who did not espouse its cause - whether it was the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, the United Nations as a whole, or some members of the Committee. Besides, one could well ask what would be the point of the proposed mission if the Government disapproved of and rejected its action as not being fully in keeping with its views - which would be inevitable considering that it would have to reconcile two opposing points of view. It was to be hoped that the Yugoslav authorities would adopt a more open attitude.
51. Mr. RECHETOV said he felt that Mr. Lamptey's question to the Yugoslav delegation had not been couched in appropriate language. The delegation had, of course, to convince the Committee that everything would be done to facilitate the task of its representatives, that they could work without restrictions and that the people whom they met would under no circumstances be victims of retaliation. The experience of the mission sent to Chile showed that there was some purpose in discussing those points. One might wonder whether it was desirable to embark on such a mission and what results it could produce, but the representative of the Yugoslav Government was hardly in a position to answer everything. The outcome of the mission would largely depend on the Committee and on the way it organized that mission and, even if the Government cooperated in the most satisfactory manner, success would not necessarily follow. It would depend, rather, on objective facts such as the situation in Yugoslavia and on the possibility or impossibility of starting a conciliation process among the different parties. In any case, whatever the object of that mission, careful thought should be given to its mandate, functions and composition. For that reason, he completely disagreed with Mr. Aboul-Nasr: it should not be stated at the outset that the group appointed would definitely not have the approval of the Yugoslav Government. If the Committee's aim was to begin a process of consolidation and of rapprochement, it should not start out with an aggressive attitude. On the contrary, if that mission was in fact sent, it should make sure that its members observed strict criteria of objectivity. Within the Committee, Mr. van Boven, more than anyone else, had the necessary experience and qualities to carry out a mission of that kind successfully.
52. Mr. DIACONU agreed with Mr. Rechetov that an open attitude should be adopted towards the mission and its outcome. He reminded the Committee that any good-offices mission called for a thorough knowledge of the situation in the country visited and that its purpose was to bring together the conflicting parties, then make suggestions to them, together or separately. In any event, it was important to maintain the climate of trust in which the talks should take place. With a good-offices mission, the Committee would make a valuable contribution to settling the situation in Yugoslavia. It would be better for the Committee to receive a prompt reply to its offer, but it should maintain that offer even if the reply was slow in coming.
53. Mr. ABOUL-NASR said that the Committee was proceeding rather hurriedly. Its decisions still depended on many factors and, in particular, on the acceptance of its proposal by the Yugoslav Government. He suggested that the members of the Committee should take a little more time to reflect and have a more thorough exchange of views in order to clarify what form their action would take - whether the appointment of a committee or a special rapporteur, or some other mechanism - and to define the mandate of the person or the group of persons appointed.
54. The CHAIRMAN said that the consideration of the reports of three countries of the former Yugoslavia that were before the Committee should be completed, then a working group should be formed - as had been proposed - and it should be asked, when it drew up the conclusions about those countries, to make proposals also for the appointment of a person or group of persons who could represent the Committee in those countries.
55. Mr. LAMPTEY said that he was surprised by the statements of Mr. Rechetov and Mr. Aboul-Nasr, although he shared their views, for Yugoslavia was a State party, and until it had indicated its acceptance of the Committee's proposal, the latter could take no decision. If the Yugoslav delegation could not reply immediately to the Committee's offer, it should be able to consult its Government and give its reply a little later.
56. Mr. SHAHI, speaking on a point of order, proposed that the experts should discuss the question among themselves, and not in the presence of the representatives of the State party in question. They should agree on a proposal and then submit it to the State party.
57. Mr. YUTZIS, taking up Mr. Shahi's point of order, said that, when the reports of Croatia and Yugoslavia had been submitted, some speakers had openly put forward the innovative idea that an invitation should be issued to the Committee, and that it should be allowed complete freedom to decide on the criteria to be applied in implementing the proposals which it formulated. The representative of Yugoslavia had repeatedly stated that there was no intention of limiting one or other of the Committee's attributes and had merely extended an invitation. He could not question the goodwill of the Yugoslav delegation; therefore he associated himself with Mr. Shahi's point of order and suggested waiting until the proposed working group had been formed and had submitted a proposal to the Committee, before resuming the debate.
58. Mr. de GOUTTES said that he could not allow the serious challenges to the impartiality of some of the experts, made during the meeting, to stand without a formal response. In the three years that he had sat on the Committee, he had never heard such serious charges, sometimes to experts mentioned by name. He recalled, first of all, that the experts of the Committee were not delegated by their Governments, but served in an individual capacity and that, under article 8 of the Convention, they were of acknowledged impartiality. He pointed out further that those experts had been elected by the Meeting of States Parties, and that to question the impartiality of some experts was tantamount to challenging the election of the members of the Committee by States parties, which was at variance with the provisions of article 8 of the Convention. Lastly, he recalled that the Committee had made a special recommendation on the independence of the experts.
59. Regarding the debate on the terms and conditions of the possible mission of experts of the Committee, he shared Mr. Shahi's view and felt that the experts should discuss the matter among themselves.
60. The CHAIRMAN said that the actual consideration of the report of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been concluded.
61. The Yugoslav delegation withdrew.
62. The CHAIRMAN recalled that, during the consideration of the reports of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia, the idea of establishing a working group of five or seven members after consideration of the reports of those three countries had been well received by the Committee as a whole. It had been agreed that that working group would propose conclusions on the three reports, taking into account the correlation between them. He proposed that that working group should be constituted of the three country rapporteurs, namely, Mrs. Sadiq Ali, Mr. Yutzis and Mr. van Boven, together with Mr. Shahi, Mr. Aboul-Nasr, Mr. Garvalov and Mr. Rechetov. The working group would also consider the possibility of sending one or more experts to one or more countries of the former Yugoslavia, and propose a draft mandate for them.
63. Mr. van BOVEN said that, as he would very shortly have to submit a final report to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, he could not commit himself to participating in the deliberations of the working group.
Ninth and tenth periodic reports of Tonga (CERD/C/209/Add.5)
64. Mr. de GOUTTES (Country rapporteur for Tonga) said that he welcomed the regularity with which the Kingdom of Tonga submitted its reports to the Committee, but pointed out that while the absence of a representative from Tonga was understandable because that State was small and far away, the inadequacy of the report was less justified. In his view, the Kingdom of Tonga should be reminded that every State party to the Convention should fully discharge the obligations deriving therefrom and it should be invited to call upon the advisory services of the Centre for Human Rights in drafting the forthcoming reports, if it so desired.
65. There were some positive features to document CERD/C/209/Add.5, which combined the ninth and tenth periodic reports of that country. He referred to the table on the ethnic composition of the population in paragraph 3 of the report, and the announcement that, in 1990, article 3 of the Constitution of Tonga had been repealed. That article had contained a provision which discriminated against Asian workers, including Javanese, who could only be admitted into the country if they had a labour contract approved by the Government.
66. He also pointed out some negative aspects of the report of the Kingdom of Tonga. First of all, he regretted that no information had been given about the religions practised in the country and that the analysis of the demographic trends had not been pursued further; it was a known fact that the increase in population was unusually low because of substantial emigration, that the population was concentrated primarily in the Island of Tongatapu, and that the unemployment rate was close to 15 per cent of the population considered to be economically active.
67. More generally, he regretted the lack of any general description of the political, social and economic framework of the country, the extreme originality of which particularly warranted explanations. According to the information available to him, the Kingdom of Tonga was one of the last monarchic bastions in the Pacific; it was also an oligarchic regime marked by tradition and hierarchy. The monarchy was constitutional, but political life was dominated by a ruling dynasty that had held a monopoly on power for four centuries. The Parliament was composed of 30 members, but only 9 were elected by the people, and the vote was restricted to tax-paying citizens. The society was highly stratified, with three classes: the royal family, the nobles - whose titles were granted by the King - and the commoners. The land tenure system was unique in the Polynesian world, with lands being distributed to the nobles in the form of fiefs. Attitudes were deeply affected by strict Methodist morality, which imposed, for example, mandatory Sunday observance. The economic situation had worsened considerably, with 16 per cent inflation in 1991 and a growing trade deficit. In addition, there were corruption and trading of favours among the privileged classes. Lastly and above all, a recent movement in favour of democratic reforms had resulted in the holding of a "Convention for democracy" in November 1992 at the initiative of the "Movement for democracy" which had received the support of reforming deputies and of the principal members of the clergy.
68. He also regretted the gaps in the information provided concerning the practical application of articles 2-7 of the Convention. Regarding article 4, for example, the claim that discrimination was non-existent and that there was no reason to take the measures set forth in that article, as stated in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the report, had always been rejected by the Committee because the measures contemplated should also be preventive. The Committee should recall that fact firmly in its conclusions.
69. Concerning article 5, he wondered whether the appointment of a majority of the deputies by the King or nobles, the restriction of the vote to tax-paying citizens, the distribution of lands to the nobles in the form of fiefs and the conspicuous absence of trade unions in Tonga, were compatible with the rights recognized without discrimination by the Convention. The Committee should also have information on the usual social indicators, which might reveal that certain categories of the population were not integrated.
70. Lastly, with regard to article 6 of the Convention, the Committee would like a more detailed explanation than the one given in paragraph 13 of the report concerning the procedure to be followed in lodging a complaint and in having criminal proceedings initiated in Tonga.
71. He concluded by asking for more precise information in the next periodic report of the Kingdom of Tonga on the social and political life of the country and the practical application of the Convention. He suggested that the Government should be invited to request the assistance of the advisory services of the Centre for Human Rights in preparing that report.
72. Mrs. SADIQ ALI asked for more information on the sale by the Government of Tonga of passports to foreigners who did not meet the naturalization conditions stipulated in the Constitution. That sale had begun in 1984, and when the representatives of the people had referred that initiative to the courts, a special session of Parliament had amended the Constitution in order to legalize the practice. A march of Tongan citizens on the Royal Palace to protest against that retroactive legislation proved unavailing. She asked which persons did not meet the conditions of naturalization. She also wished to know whether the court of appeal established in 1988, when the judicial system had been reorganized, was the highest judicial body today, and what were its relations with the court of appeal of the King's Privy Council.
73. The CHAIRMAN declared that consideration of the tenth periodic report of the Kingdom of Tonga had thus been completed. The Committee would consider draft conclusions on that consideration.