III. JURISPRUDENCE

ICCPR

•	Ross v. Canada (736/1997), ICCPR, A/56/40 vol. II (18 October 2000) 69 at paras. 2.1-2.3, 3.2-3.6, 4.1-4.7, 6.8 and 11.1-11.7.

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2.1 The author worked as a modified resource teacher for remedial reading in a school district of New Brunswick from September 1976 to September 1991. Throughout this period, he published several books and pamphlets and made other public statements, including a television interview, reflecting controversial, allegedly religious opinions. His books concerned abortion, conflicts between Judaism and Christianity, and the defence of the Christian religion. Local media coverage of his writings contributed to his ideas gaining notoriety in the community. The author emphasises that his publications were not contrary to Canadian law and that he was never prosecuted for the expression of his opinions. Furthermore, all writings were produced in his own time, and his opinions never formed part of his teaching.

2.2 Following expressed concern, the author's in-class teaching was monitored from 1979 onwards. Controversy around the author grew and, as a result of publicly expressed concern, the School Board on 16 March 1988, reprimanded the author and warned him that continued public discussion of his views could lead to further disciplinary action, including dismissal. He was, however, allowed to continue to teach, and this disciplinary action was removed from his file in September 1989. On 21 November 1989, the author made a television appearance and was again reprimanded by the School Board on 30 November 1989.

2.3 On 21 April 1988, a Mr. David Attis, a Jewish parent, whose children attended another school within the same School District, filed a complaint with the Human Rights Commission of New Brunswick, alleging that the School Board, by failing to take action against the author, condoned his anti-Jewish views and breached section 5 of the Human Rights Act by discriminating against Jewish and other minority students. This complaint ultimately led to the sanctions set out in para 4.3 below.

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3.2 ...Individuals concerned about speech that denigrates particular minorities may choose to file a complaint with a human rights commission rather than or in addition to filing a complaint with the police.

3.3 The complaint against the School Board was lodged under section 5(1) of the New Brunswick Human Rights Code....

3.4 In his complaint, Mr. Attis submitted that the School Board had violated section 5 by providing educational services to the public which discriminated on the basis of religion and ancestry in that they failed to take adequate measures to deal with the author. Under section 20(1) of the same Act, if unable to effect a settlement of the matter, the Human Rights Commission may appoint a board of inquiry composed of one or more persons to hold an inquiry. The board appointed to examine the complaint against the School Board made its orders pursuant to section 20 ... of the same Act ...

3.5 Since 1982, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter") has been part of the Canadian Constitution, and consequently any law that is inconsistent with its provisions is, to the extent of that inconsistency, of no force or effect.... Provincial human rights codes and any orders made pursuant to such codes are subject to review under the Charter. The limitation of a Charter right may be justified under section 1 of the Charter, if the Government can demonstrate that the limitation is prescribed by law and is justified in a free and democratic society....

3.6 There are also several other legislative mechanisms both at the federal and provincial level to deal with expressions that denigrate particular groups in Canadian society....

4.1 On 1 September 1988, a Human Rights Board of Inquiry was established to investigate the complaint. In December 1990 and continuing until the spring of 1991, the first hearing was held before the Board....The Board found that there was no evidence of any classroom activity by the author on which to base a complaint of discrimination. However, the Board of Inquiry also noted that

"... a teacher's off-duty conduct can impact on his or her assigned duties and thus is a relevant consideration... An important factor to consider, in determining if the Complainant has been discriminated against by Mr. Malcolm Ross and the School Board, is the fact that teachers are role models for students whether a student is in a particular teacher's class or not. In addition to merely conveying curriculum information to children in the classroom, teachers play a much broader role in influencing children through their general demeanour in the classroom and through their off-duty lifestyle. This role model influence on students means that a teacher's off-duty conduct can fall within the scope of the employment relationship. While there is a reluctance to impose restrictions on the freedom of employees to live their independent lives when on their own time, the right to discipline employees for conduct while off-duty, when that conduct can be shown to have a negative influence on the employer's operation has been well established in legal precedent".

4.2 In its assessment of the author's off-duty activities and their impact, the Board of Inquiry made reference to four published books or pamphlets entitled respectively Web of Deceit, The Real Holocaust, Spectre of Power and Christianity vs. Judeo-Christianity, as well as to a letter to the editor of The Miramichi Leader dated 22 October 1986 and a local television interview given in 1989. The Board of Inquiry stated, inter alia, that it had

"... no hesitation in concluding that there are many references in these published writings and comments by Malcolm Ross which are prima facie discriminatory against persons of the Jewish faith and ancestry. It would be an impossible task to list every prejudicial view or discriminatory comment contained in his writings as they are innumerable and permeate his writings. These comments denigrate the faith and beliefs of Jews and call upon true Christians to not merely question the validity of Jewish beliefs and teachings but to hold those of the Jewish faith and ancestry in contempt as undermining freedom, democracy and Christian beliefs and values. Malcolm Ross identifies Judaism as the enemy and calls on all Christians to join the battle.

Malcolm Ross has used the technique in his writings of quoting other authors who have made derogatory comments about Jews and Judaism. He intertwines these derogatory quotes with his own comments in a way such that he must reasonably be seen as adopting the views expressed in them as his own. Throughout his books, Malcolm Ross continuously alleges that the Christian faith and way of life are under attack by an international conspiracy in which the leaders of Jewry are prominent.

... The writings and comments of Malcolm Ross cannot be categorized as falling within the scope of scholarly discussion which might remove them from the scope of section 5 [of the Human Rights Act]. The materials are not expressed in a fashion that objectively summarizes findings and conclusions or propositions. While the writings may have involved some substantial research, Malcolm Ross' primary purpose is clearly to attack the truthfulness, integrity, dignity and motives of Jewish persons rather than the presentation of scholarly research."

4.3 The Board of Inquiry heard evidence from two students from the school district who described the educational community in detail. Inter alia, they gave evidence of repeated and continual harassment in the form of derogatory name calling of Jewish students, carving of swastikas into desks of Jewish children, drawing of swastikas on blackboards and general intimidation of Jewish students. The Board of Inquiry found no direct evidence that the author's off-duty conduct had impacted on the school district, but found that it would be reasonable to anticipate that his writings were a factor influencing some discriminatory conduct by the students. In conclusion, the Board of Inquiry held that the public statements and writings of Malcolm Ross had continually over many years contributed to the creation of a "poisoned environment within School District 15 which has greatly interfered with the educational services provided to the Complainant and his children". Thus, the Board of Inquiry held that the School Board was vicariously liable for the discriminatory actions of its employee and that it was directly in violation of the Act due to its failure to discipline the author in a timely and appropriate manner, so endorsing his out-of-school activities and writings. Therefore, on 28 August 1991, the Board of Inquiry ordered

(2) That the School Board

(a) immediately place Malcolm Ross on a leave of absence without pay for a period of eighteen months;

(b) appoint Malcolm Ross a non-teaching position if ... a non-teaching position becomes available in School District 15 for which Malcolm Ross is qualified.

(c) terminate his employment at the end of the eighteen months leave of absence without pay if, in the interim, he has not been offered and accepted a non-teaching position.

(d) terminate Malcolm Ross' employment with the School Board immediately if, at any time during the eighteen month leave of absence or of at any time during his employment in a non-teaching position, he (i) publishes or writes for the purpose of publication, anything that mentions a Jewish or Zionist conspiracy, or attacks followers of the Jewish religion, or (ii) publishes, sells or distributes any of the following publications, directly or indirectly: Web of Deceit, The Real Holocaust (The attack on unborn children and life itself), Spectre of Power, Christianity vs Judeo-Christianity (The battle for truth)."

4.4 Pursuant to the Order, the School Board transferred the author to a non-classroom teaching position in the School District. The author applied for judicial review requesting that the order be removed and quashed. On 31 December 1991, Creaghan J. of the Court of Queen's Bench allowed the application in part, quashing clause 2(d) of the order, on the ground that it was in excess of jurisdiction and violated section 2 of the Charter. As regards clauses (a), (b), and (c) of the order, the court found that they limited the author's Charter rights to freedom of religion and expression, but that they were saved under section 1 of the Charter.

4.5 The author appealed the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench to the Court of Appeal of New Brunswick. At the same time, Mr. Attis cross-appealed the Court's decision regarding section 2(d) of the Order. The Court of Appeal allowed the author's appeal, quashing the order given by the Board of Inquiry, and accordingly rejected the cross-appeal. By judgement of 20 December 1993, the Court held that the order violated the author's rights under section 2 (a) and (b) of the Charter in that they penalised him for publicly expressing his sincerely held views by preventing him from continuing to teach. The Court considered that, since it was the author's activities outside the school that had attracted the complaint, and since it had never been suggested that he used his teaching position to further his religious views, the ordered remedy did not meet the test under section 1 of the Charter ... To find otherwise would, in the Court's view, have the effect of condoning the suppression of views that are not politically popular any given time. One judge, Ryan J.A., dissented and held that the author's appeal should have been dismissed and that the cross-appeal should have been allowed, with the result that section 2(d) of the Order should have been reinstated.

4.6 Mr. Attis, the Human Rights Commission and the Canadian Jewish Congress then sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, which allowed the appeal and, by decision of 3 April 1996, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and restored clauses 2(a), (b) and (c) of the order. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court first found that the Board of Inquiry's finding of discrimination contrary to section 5 of the Human Rights Act on the part of the School Board was supported by the evidence and contained no error. With regard to the evidence of discrimination on the part of the School Board generally, and in particular as to the creation of a poisoned environment in the School District attributable to the conduct of the author, the Supreme Court held

"...that a reasonable inference is sufficient in this case to support a finding that the continued employment of [the author] impaired the educational environment generally in creating a 'poisoned' environment characterized by a lack of equality and tolerance. [The author's] off-duty conduct impaired his ability to be impartial and impacted upon the educational environment in which he taught. (para. 49)

... The reason that it is possible to 'reasonably anticipate' the causal relationship in this appeal is because of the significant influence teachers exert on their students and the stature associated with the role of a teacher. It is thus necessary to remove [the author] from his teaching position to ensure that no influence of this kind is exerted by him upon his students and to ensure that educational services are discrimination free." (para 101)

4.7 On the particular position and responsibilities of teachers and on the relevance of a teacher's off duty conduct, the Supreme Court further commented:

"...Teachers are inextricably linked to the integrity of the school system. Teachers occupy positions of trust and confidence, and exert considerable influence over their students as a result of their positions. The conduct of a teacher bears directly upon the community's perception of the ability of the teacher to fulfill such a position of trust and influence, and upon the community's confidence in the public school system as a whole.

... By their conduct, teachers as 'medium' must be perceived to uphold the values, beliefs and knowledge sought to be transmitted by the school system. The conduct of a teacher is evaluated on the basis of his or her position, rather than whether the conduct occurs within the classroom or beyond. Teachers are seen by the community to be the medium for the educational message and because of the community position they occupy, they are not able to 'choose which hat they will wear on what occasion'.

... It is on the basis of the position of trust and influence that we can hold the teacher to high standards both on and off duty, and it is an erosion of these standards that may lead to a loss in the community of confidence in the public school system. I do not wish to be understood as advocating an approach that subjects the entire lives of teachers to inordinate scrutiny on the basis of more onerous moral standards of behaviour. This could lead to a substantial invasion of the privacy rights and fundamental freedoms of teachers. However, where a 'poisoned' environment within the school system is traceable to the off-duty conduct of a teacher that is likely to produce a corresponding loss of confidence in the teacher and the system as a whole, then the off-duty conduct of the teacher is relevant." (paras. 43-45)

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6.8 As to the merits of the communication, the State party first submits that the author has not established how his rights to freedom of religion and expression have been limited or restricted by the Order of the Board of Inquiry as upheld by the Supreme Court. It is argued that the author is free to express his views while employed by the school board in a non-teaching position or while employed elsewhere.

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11.1 With regard to the author's claim under article 19 of the Covenant, the Committee observes that, in accordance with article 19 of the Covenant, any restriction on the right to freedom of expression must cumulatively meet several conditions set out in paragraph 3. The first issue before the Committee is therefore whether or not the author's freedom of expression was restricted through the Board of Inquiry's Order of 28 August 1991, as upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada. As a result of this Order, the author was placed on leave without pay for a week and was subsequently transferred to a non-teaching position. While noting the State party's argument (see para 6.8 supra) that the author's freedom of expression was not restricted as he remained free to express his views while holding a non-teaching position or while employed elsewhere, the Committee is unable to agree that the removal of the author from his teaching position was not, in effect, a restriction on his freedom of expression. The loss of a teaching position was a significant detriment, even if no or only insignificant pecuniary damage is suffered. This detriment was imposed on the author because of the expression of his views, and in the view of the Committee this is a restriction which has to be justified under article 19, paragraph 3, in order to be in compliance with the Covenant.

11.2 The next issue before the Committee is whether the restriction on the author's right to freedom of expression met the conditions set out in article 19, paragraph 3, i.e. that it must be provided by law, it must address one of the aims set out in paragraph 3 (a) and (b) (respect of the rights and reputation of others; protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals), and it must be necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose.

11.3 As regards the requirement that the restriction be provided by law, the Committee notes that there was a legal framework for the proceedings which led to the author's removal from a teaching position. The Board of Inquiry found that the author's off-duty comments denigrated the Jewish faith and that this had adversely affected the school environment. The Board of Inquiry held that the School Board was vicariously liable for the discriminatory actions of its employee and that it had discriminated against the Jewish students in the school district directly, in violation of section 5 of the New Brunswick Human Rights Act, due to its failure to discipline the author in a timely and appropriate manner. Pursuant to section 20 (6.2) of the same Act, the Board of Inquiry ordered the School Board to remedy the discrimination by taking the measures set out in para 4.3 supra. In effect, and as stated above, the discrimination was remedied by placing the author on leave without pay for one week and transferring him to a non-teaching position.

11.4 While noting the vague criteria of the provisions that were applied in the case against the School Board and which were used to remove the author from his teaching position, the Committee must also take into consideration that the Supreme Court considered all aspects of the case and found that there was sufficient basis in domestic law for the parts of the Order which it reinstated. The Committee also notes that the author was heard in all proceedings and that he had, and availed himself of, the opportunity to appeal the decisions against him. In the circumstances, it is not for the Committee to reevaluate the findings of the Supreme Court on this point, and accordingly it finds that the restriction was provided for by law.

11.5 When assessing whether the restrictions placed on the author's freedom of expression were applied for the purposes recognized by the Covenant, the Committee begins by noting8/ that the rights or reputations of others for the protection of which restrictions may be permitted under article 19, may relate to other persons or to a community as a whole. For instance, and as held in Faurisson v. France, restrictions may be permitted on statements which are of a nature as to raise or strengthen anti-semitic feeling, in order to uphold the Jewish communities' right to be protected from religious hatred. Such restrictions also derive support from the principles reflected in article 20(2) of the Covenant. The Committee notes that both the Board of Inquiry and the Supreme Court found that the author's statements were discriminatory against persons of the Jewish faith and ancestry and that they denigrated the faith and beliefs of Jews and called upon true Christians to not merely question the validity of Jewish beliefs and teachings but to hold those of the Jewish faith and ancestry in contempt as undermining freedom, democracy and Christian beliefs and values. In view of the findings as to the nature and effect of the author's public statements, the Committee concludes that the restrictions imposed on him were for the purpose of protecting the "rights or reputations" of persons of Jewish faith, including the right to have an education in the public school system free from bias, prejudice and intolerance.

11.6 The final issue before the Committee is whether the restriction on the author's freedom of expression was necessary to protect the right or reputations of persons of the Jewish faith. In the circumstances, the Committee recalls that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression carries with it special duties and responsibilities. These special duties and responsibilities are of particular relevance within the school system, especially with regard to the teaching of young students. In the view of the Committee, the influence exerted by school teachers may justify restraints in order to ensure that legitimacy is not given by the school system to the expression of views which are discriminatory. In this particular case, the Committee takes note of the fact that the Supreme Court found that it was reasonable to anticipate that there was a causal link between the expressions of the author and the "poisoned school environment" experienced by Jewish children in the School district. In that context, the removal of the author from a teaching position can be considered a restriction necessary to protect the right and freedom of Jewish children to have a school system free from bias, prejudice and intolerance. Furthermore, the Committee notes that the author was appointed to a non-teaching position after only a minimal period on leave without pay and that the restriction thus did not go any further than that which was necessary to achieve its protective functions. The Human Rights Committee accordingly concludes that the facts do not disclose a violation of article 19.

11.7 As regards the author's claims under article 18, the Committee notes that the actions taken against the author through the Human Rights Board of Inquiry's Order of August 1991 were not aimed at his thoughts or beliefs as such, but rather at the manifestation of those beliefs within a particular context. The freedom to manifest religious beliefs may be subject to limitations which are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, and in the present case the issues under paragraph 3 of article 18 are therefore substantially the same as under article 19. Consequently, the Committee holds that article 18 has not been violated.

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Notes

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8/ As it did in General Comment No. 10 and Communication No. 550/1993, Faurisson v. France, Views adopted on 8 November 1996.

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•	Leirvåg v. Norway (1155/2003), ICCPR, A/60/40 vol. II (3 November 2004) 203 at paras. 2.3, 2.4, 2.8, 2.9, 14.2-14.7, 15 and 16.

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2.3 In August 1997, the Norwegian government introduced a new mandatory religious subject in the Norwegian school system, entitled "Christian Knowledge and Religious and Ethical Education" (hereafter referred to as CKREE) replacing the previous Christianity subject and the life stance subject. This new subject only provides for exemption from certain limited segments of the teaching. The new Education Act's §2 (4) stipulates that education provided in the CKREE subject shall be based on the schools' Christian object clause 1/ and provide "thorough knowledge of the Bible and Christianity as a cultural heritage and Evangelical-Lutheran Faith". During the preparation of the Act, the Parliament instructed the Ministry to obtain a professional evaluation of the Act's relationship with human rights. This evaluation was carried out by the then Appeals Court judge Erik Møse, who stated that:

"As the situation stands, I find that the safest option is a general right of exemption. This will mean that the international inspectorate bodies will not involve themselves with the questions of the doubt raised by compulsory education. However, I cannot state that the partial exemption will be in contravention of the conventions. The premise is that one establishes an arrangement that in practice lies within their (the conventions') frameworks. Much will depend on the further legislative process and the actual implementation of the subject."

2.4 The Ministry's circular on the subject states that: "When pupils request exemption, written notification of this shall be sent to the school. The notification must state the reason for what they experience as the practice of another religion or affiliation to a different life stance in the tutoring." A later circular from the Ministry states that demands for exemption on grounds other than those governed by clearly religious activities must be assessed on the basis of strict criteria.

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2.8 Several organizations representing minorities with different beliefs voiced strong objections to the CKREE subjects. After school started in the autumn of 1997, a number of parents, including the authors, demanded full exemption from relevant instruction. Their applications were rejected by the schools concerned, and on administrative appeal to the Regional Director of Education, on the ground that such exemption was not authorized under the Act.

2.9 On 14 March 1998, the NHA and the parents of eight pupils, including the authors in the present case, instituted proceedings before the Oslo City Court. By judgement of 16 April 1999, the Oslo City Court rejected the authors' claims. On 6 October 2000, upon appeal, the Borgarting Court of Appeal upheld this decision. The decision was confirmed upon further appeal, by the Supreme Court in its judgement of 22 August 2001, thus it is claimed that domestic remedies have been exhausted. Three of the other parents in the national court suit, and the NHA, decided to bring their complaint to the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter denominated ECHR)).

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14.2 The main issue before the Committee is whether the compulsory instruction of the CKREE subject in Norwegian schools, with only limited possibility of exemption, violates the authors' right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion under article 18 and more specifically the right of parents to secure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions, pursuant to article 18, paragraph 4. The scope of article 18 covers not only protection of traditional religions, but also philosophies of life, 12/ such as those held by the authors. Instruction in religion and ethics may in the Committee's view be in compliance with article 18, if carried out under the terms expressed in the Committee's general comment No. 22 on article 18: "[A]rticle 18.4 permits public school instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics if it is given in a neutral and objective way", and "public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or belief is inconsistent with article 18, paragraph 4 unless provision is made for non-discriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents or guardians." The Committee also recalls its Views in Hartikainen et al. v. Finland, where it concluded that instruction in a religious context should respect the convictions of parents and guardians who do not believe in any religion. It is within this legal context that the Committee will examine the claim.

14.3 Firstly, the Committee will examine the question of whether or not the instruction of the CKREE subject is imparted in a neutral and objective way. On this issue, the Education Act, section 2-4, stipulates that: "Teaching on the subject shall not involve preaching. Teachers of Christian Knowledge and Religious and Ethical Education shall take as their point of departure the object clause of the primary and lower secondary school laid down in section 1-2, and present Christianity, other religions and philosophies of life on the basis of their distinctive characteristics. Teaching of the different topics shall be founded on the same educational principles". In the object clause in question it is prescribed that the object of primary and lower secondary education shall be "in agreement and cooperation with the home, to help to give pupils a Christian and moral upbringing". Some of the travaux préparatoires of the Act referred to above make it clear that the subject gives priority to tenets of Christianity over other religions and philosophies of life. In that context, the Standing Committee on Education concluded, in its majority, that: the tuition was not neutral in value, and that the main emphasis of the subject was instruction on Christianity. The State party acknowledges that the subject has elements that may be perceived as being of a religious nature, these being the activities exemption from which is granted without the parents having to give reasons. Indeed, at least some of the activities in question involve, on their face, not just education in religious knowledge, but the actual practice of a particular religion (see paragraph 9.18). It also transpires from the research results invoked by the authors, and from their personal experience that the subject has elements that are not perceived by them as being imparted in a neutral and objective way. The Committee concludes that the teaching of CKREE cannot be said to meet the requirement of being delivered in a neutral and objective way, unless the system of exemption in fact leads to a situation where the teaching provided to those children and families opting for such exemption will be neutral and objective.

14.4 The second question to be examined thus is whether the partial exemption arrangements and other avenues provide "for non-discriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents or guardians". The Committee notes the authors' contention that the partial exemption arrangements do not satisfy their needs, since teaching of the CKREE subject leans too heavily towards religious instruction, and that partial exemption is impossible to implement in practice. Furthermore, the Committee notes that the Norwegian Education Act provides that "on the basis of written notification from parents, pupils shall be exempted from attending those parts of the teaching at the individual school that they, on the basis of their own religion or philosophy of life, perceive as being the practice of another religion or adherence to another philosophy of life".

14.5 The Committee notes that the existing normative framework related to the teaching of the CKREE subject contains internal tensions or even contradictions. On the one hand, the Constitution and the object clause in the Education Act contain a clear preference for Christianity as compared to the role of other religions and worldviews in the educational system. On the other hand, the specific clause on exemptions in section 2-4 of the Education Act is formulated in a way that in theory appears to give a full right of exemption from any part of the CKREE subject that individual pupils or parents perceive as being the practice of another religion or adherence to another philosophy of life. If this clause could be implemented in a way that addresses the preference reflected in the Constitution and the object clause of the Education Act, this could arguably be considered as complying with article 18 of the Covenant.

14.6 The Committee considers, however, that even in the abstract, the present system of partial exemption imposes a considerable burden on persons in the position of the authors, insofar as it requires them to acquaint themselves with those aspects of the subject which are clearly of a religious nature, as well as with other aspects, with a view to determining which of the other aspects they may feel a need to seek - and justify - exemption from. Nor would it be implausible to expect that such persons would be deterred from exercising that right, insofar as a regime of partial exemption could create problems for children which are different from those that may be present in a total exemption scheme. Indeed as the experience of the authors demonstrates, the system of exemptions does not currently protect the liberty of parents to ensure that the religious and moral education of their children is in conformity with their own convictions. In this respect, the Committee notes that the CKREE subject combines education on religious knowledge with practising a particular religious belief, e.g. learning by heart of prayers, singing religious hymns or attendance at religious services (para 9.18). While it is true that in these cases parents may claim exemption from these activities by ticking a box on a form, the CKREE scheme does not ensure that education of religious knowledge and religious practice are separated in a way that makes the exemption scheme practicable.

14.7 In the Committee's view, the difficulties encountered by the authors, in particular the fact that Maria Jansen and Pia Suzanne Orning had to recite religious texts in the context of a Christmas celebration although they were enrolled in the exemption scheme, as well as the loyalty conflicts experienced by the children, amply illustrate these difficulties. Furthermore, the requirement to give reasons for exempting children from lessons focusing on imparting religious knowledge and the absence of clear indications as to what kind of reasons would be accepted creates a further obstacle for parents who seek to ensure that their children are not exposed to certain religious ideas. In the Committee's view, the present framework of CKREE, including the current regime of exemptions, as it has been implemented in respect of the authors, constitutes a violation of article 18, paragraph 4, of the Covenant in their respect.

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15. The Human Rights Committee...is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation of article 18, paragraph 4, of the Covenant.

16. In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the authors with an effective and appropriate remedy that will respect the right of the authors as parents to ensure and as pupils to receive an education that is in conformity with their own convictions. The State party is under an obligation to avoid similar violations in the future.

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Notes

1/ Paragraph 2 (4) of the Education Act reads as follows: "Section 2-4. Teaching the subject CKREE. Exemption from regulations, etc: Teaching in CKREE shall:

- Provide a thorough knowledge of the Bible and Christianity both as cultural heritage and Evangelical-Lutheran faith;

-Provide knowledge of other Christian denominations;

- Provide knowledge of other world religions and philosophies of life, ethical and philosophical topics;

- Promote understanding and respect for Christian and humanist values and;

- Promote understanding, respect and the ability to carry out a dialogue between people with different views concerning beliefs and philosophies of life.

CKREE is an ordinary school subject that shall normally be attended by all pupils. Teaching in the subject shall not involve preaching.

Teachers of CKREE shall tale as their point of departure the objects clause of the primary and lower secondary school laid down in section 1-2, and present Christianity, other religions and philosophies of life on the basis of their distinctive characteristics. Teaching of the different topics shall be founded on the same educational principles.

On the basis of written notification from parents, pupils shall be exempted from attending those parts of the teaching at the individual school that they, on the basis of their own religion or philosophy of life, perceive as being the practice of another religion or adherence to another philosophy of life. This may involve religious activities either in or outside the classroom. In cases where exemption is notified, the school shall, as far as possible and especially in the lower primary school, seek solutions involving differentiated teaching within the curriculum.

Pupils who have reached the age of 15 may themselves give written notification pursuant to the fourth paragraph."

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12/ General comment No. 22 on article 18, adopted on 30 July 1993.

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