III. JURISPRUDENCE

ICCPR

•	Mauritian Women v. Mauritius (35/1978) (R.9/35), ICCPR, A/36/40 (9 April 1981) 134 at paras. 7.2-7.4, 9.2, 9.2(b)1, 9.2(b)2, 9.2(b)2(i)1-8, 9.2(b)2(ii)2-4, 9.2(c)2 and 10.1.

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7.2 Up to 1977, spouses (husbands and wives) of Mauritian citizens had the right of free access to Mauritius and enjoyed immunity from deportation. They had the right to be considered de facto as residents of Mauritius. The coming into force of the Immigration (Amendment) Act, 1977, and of the Deportation (Amendment) Act, 1977, limited these rights to the wives of Mauritius citizens only. Foreign husbands must apply to the Minister of the Interior for a residence permit and in case of refusal of the permit they have no possibility to seek redress before a court of law.

7.3 Seventeen of the co-authors are unmarried. Three of the co-authors were married to foreign husbands when, owing to the coming into force of the Immigration (Amendment) Acts 1977, their husbands lost the residence status in Mauritius which they had enjoyed before. Their further residence together with their spouses in Mauritius is based under the statute on a limited, temporary residence permit to be issued in accordance with section 9 of the Immigration (Amendment) Act, 1977. This residence permit is subject to specified conditions which might at any time be varied or cancelled by a decision of the Minister of the Interior, against which no remedy is available. In addition, the Deportation (Amendment) Act, 1977, subjects foreign husbands to a permanent risk of being deported from Mauritius.

7.4 In the case of Mrs. Aumeeruddy-Cziffra, one of the three married co-authors, more than three years have elapsed since her husband applied to the Mauritian a authorities for a residence permit, but so far no formal decision has been taken. If her husband's application were to receive a negative decision, she would be obliged to choose between either living with her husband abroad and giving up her political career, or living separated from her husband in Mauritius and there continuing to participate in the conduct of public affairs of that country.

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9.2 ...A person can only claim to be a victim in the sense of article 1 of the Optional Protocol if he or she is actually affected. It is a matter of degree how concretely this requirement should be taken. However, no individual can in the abstract, by way of an actio popularis, challenge a law or practice claimed to be contrary to the Covenant. If the law or practice has not already been concretely applied to the detriment of that individual, it must in any event be applicable in such a way that the alleged victim's risk of being affected is more than a theoretical possibility.

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9.2 (b) 1 The Committee will next examine that part of the communication which relates to the effect of the laws of 1977 on the family life of the three married women.

9.2 (b) 2 The Committee notes that several provisions of the Covenant are applicable in this respect. For reasons which will appear below, there is no doubt that they are actually affected by these laws, even in the absence of any individual measure of implementation (for instance, by way of a denial of residence, or an order of deportation, concerning one of the husbands). Their claim to be "victims" within the meaning of the Optional Protocol has to be examined.

9.2 (b) 2 (i) 1 First, their relationships to their husbands clearly belong to the area of "family" as used in article 17 (1) of the Covenant. They are therefore protected against what that article calls "arbitrary or unlawful interference" in this area.

9.2 (b) 2 (i) 2 The Committee takes the view that the common residence of husband and wife has to be considered as the normal behaviour of a family. Hence, and as the State party has admitted, the exclusion of a person from a country where close members of his family are living can amount to an interference within the meaning of article 17. In principle, article 17 (1) applies also when one of the spouses is an alien. Whether the existence and application of immigration laws affecting the residence of a family member is compatible with the Covenant depends on whether such interference is either "arbitrary or unlawful" as stated in article 17 (1), or conflicts in any other way with the State party's obligations under the Covenant.

9.2 (b) 2 (i) 3 In the present cases, not only the future possibility of deportation, but the existing precarious residence situation of foreign husbands in Mauritius represents, in the opinion of the Committee, an interference by the authorities of the State party with the family life of the Mauritian wives and their husbands. The statutes in question have rendered it uncertain for the families concerned whether and for how long it will be possible for them to continue their family life by residing together in Mauritius. Moreover, as described above (para. 7.4) in one of the cases, even the delay for years, and the absence of a positive decision granting a residence permit, must be seen as a considerable inconvenience, among other reasons because the granting of a work permits and hence the possibility of the husband to contribute to supporting the family, depends on the residence permit, and because deportation without judicial review is possible at any time.

9.2 (b) 2 (i) 4 Since, however, this situation results from the legislation itself, there can be no question of regarding this interference as "unlawful" within the meaning of article 17 (1) in the present cases. It remains to be considered whether it is "arbitrary" or conflicts in any other way with the Covenant.

9.2 (b) 2 (i) 5 The protection owed to individuals...is subject to the principle of equal treatment of the sexes which follows from several provisions of the Covenant. It is an obligation of the State parties under article 2(1) generally to respect and ensure the rights of the Covenant "without distinction of any kind, such as...(i.e.) sex", and more particularly under article 3 "to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment" of all these rights, as well as under article 26 to provide "without any discrimination" for "the equal protection of the law.

9.2 (b) 2 (i) 6 The authors who are married to foreign nationals are suffering from the adverse consequences of the statutes...only because they are women. The precarious residence status of their husbands...results from the 1977 laws which do not apply the same measures of control to foreign wives.

9.2 (b) 2 (i) 7 In these circumstances, it is not necessary for the Committee to decide in the present cases how far such or other restrictions on the residence of foreign spouses might conflict with the Covenant if applied without discrimination of any kind.

9.2 (b) 2 (i) 8 The Committee considers that it is also unnecessary to say whether the existing discrimination should be called an "arbitrary" interference with the family within the meaning of article 17. Whether or not the particular interference could as such be justified if it were applied without discrimination does not matter here. Whenever restrictions are placed on a right guaranteed by the Covenant, this has to be done without discrimination on the ground of sex. Whether the restriction in itself would be in breach of that right regarded in isolation, is not decisive in this respect. It is the enjoyment of the rights which must be secured without discrimination. Here it is sufficient, therefore, to note that in the present position an adverse distinction based on sex is made, affecting the alleged victims in their enjoyment of one of their rights. No sufficient justification for this difference has been given. The Committee must then find that there is a violation of articles 2 (1) and 3 of the Covenant, in conjunction with article 17 (1).

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9.2 (b) 2 (ii) 2 ...[T]he principle of equal treatment of the sexes applies by virtue of articles 2(1), 3 and 26, of which the latter is also relevant because it refers particularly to the "equal protection of the law". Where the Covenant requires a substantial protection as in article 23, it follows from those provisions that such protection must be equal, that is to say not discriminatory, for example on the basis of sex.

9.2 (b) 2 (ii) 3 It follows also in this line of argument the Covenant must lead to the result that the protection of a family cannot vary with the sex of one or the other spouse. Though it might be justified for Mauritius to restrict the access of aliens to their territory and to expel them for security reasons...[L]egislation which only subjects foreign spouses of Mauritian women to these restrictions, not foreign spouses of Mauritian men, is discriminatory with respect to Mauritian women and cannot be justified by security requirements.

9.2 (b) 2 (ii) 4 The Committee therefore finds that there is also a violation of articles 2(1), 3 and 26 of the Covenant in conjunction with the right of the three married co-authors under article 23(1).

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9.2 (c) 2 The Committee considers that restrictions established by law in various areas may prevent citizens in practice from exercising their political rights, i.e. deprive them of the opportunity to do so, in ways which might in certain circumstances be contrary to the purpose of article 25 or to the provisions of the Covenant against discrimination, for example if such interference with opportunity should infringe the principle of sexual equality.

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10.1 Accordingly, the Human Rights Committee acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that the facts, as outlined in paragraph 7 above, disclose violations of the Covenant, in particular of articles 2 (1), 3 and 26 in relation to articles 17 (1) and 23 (1) with respect to the three co-authors who are married to foreign husbands, because the coming into force of the Immigration (Amendment) Act, 1977, and the Deportation (Amendment) Act, 1977, resulted in discrimination against them on the ground of sex.

•	Broeks v. The Netherlands (172/1984), ICCPR, A/42/40 (9 April 1987) 139 at paras. 12.3, 12.4 and 13-16.

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12.3 For the purpose of determining the scope of article 26, the Committee has taken into account the "ordinary meaning" of each element of the article in its context and in the light of its object and purpose (art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). The Committee begins by noting that article 26 does not merely duplicate the guarantees already provided for in article 2. It derives from the principle of equal protection of the law without discrimination, as contained in article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which prohibits discrimination in law or in practice in any field regulated and protected by public authorities. Article 26 is thus concerned with the obligations imposed on States in regard to their legislation and the application thereof.

12.4 Although article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not of itself contain any obligation with respect to the matters that may be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for example, require any State to enact legislation to provide for social security. However, when such legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State's sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with article 26 of the Covenant.

13. The right to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law without any discrimination does not make all differences of treatment discriminatory. A differentiation based on reasonable and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of article 26.

14. It therefore remains for the Committee to determine whether the differentiation in Netherlands law at the time in question and as applied to Mrs. Broeks constituted discrimination within the meaning of article 26. The Committee notes that in Netherlands law the provisions of articles 84 and 85 of the Netherlands Civil Code impose equal rights and obligations on both spouses with regard to their joint income. Under section 13, subsection 1 (1), of the Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV), a married woman, in order to receive WWV benefits, had to prove that she was a 'breadwinner' - a condition that did not apply to married men. Thus a differentiation which appears on one level to be one of status is in fact one of sex, placing married women at a disadvantage compared with married men. Such a differentiation is not reasonable...

15. The circumstances in which Mrs. Broeks found herself at the material time and the application of the then valid Netherlands law made her a victim of a violation, based on sex, of article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because she was denied a social security benefit on an equal footing with men.

16. The Committee...notes with appreciation that the discriminatory provisions in the law applied to Mrs. Broeks have, subsequently, been eliminated. Although the State party has thus taken the necessary measures to put an end to the kind of discrimination suffered by Mrs. Broeks at the time complained of, the Committee is of the view that the State party should offer Mrs. Broeks an appropriate remedy.

See also:

•	Danning v. The Netherlands (180/1984), ICCPR, A/42/40 (9 April 1987) 151 at paras. 12.3 and 12.4.

•	Danning v. The Netherlands (180/1984), ICCPR, A/42/40 (9 April 1987) 151 at paras. 13 and 14.

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13. The right to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law without any discrimination does not make all differences of treatment discriminatory. A differentiation based on reasonable and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of article 26.

14. ...In the light of the explanations given by the state party with respect to the differences made by Netherlands legislations between married and unmarried couples...the Committee is persuaded that the differentiation complained of by Mr. Danning is based on objective and reasonable criteria. The Committee observes, in this connection, that the decision to enter into a legal status by marriage, which provides, in Netherlands law, both for certain benefits and for certain duties and responsibilities, lies entirely with the cohabiting persons. By choosing not to enter into marriage, Mr. Danning and his cohabitant have not, in law, assumed the full extent of the duties and responsibilities incumbent on married couples. Consequently, Mr. Danning does not receive the full benefits provided for in Netherlands law for married couples. The Committee concludes that the differentiation...does not constitute discrimination in the sense of article 26 of the Covenant.

•	Vos v. The Netherlands (218/1986), ICCPR, A/44/40 (29 March 1989) 232 at paras. 2.1, 11.3 and 12.

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2.1 The author states that since 1 October 1976 she had received an allowance from the New General Trade Association under the General Disablement Benefits Act (AAW) but that in May 1979, following the death of her ex-husband (from whom she had bee divorced in 1957), payment of the disability allowance was discontinued, in accordance with article 32, subsection 1 (b), of AAW, because she then became entitled to a payment under the General Widows and Orphans Act (AWW). Under the latter, she receives some 90 guilders per month less than she had been receiving under AAW.

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11.3 The Committee...observes that what is at issue is not whether the State party is required to enact legislation such as the General Disablement Benefits Act or the General Widows and Orphans Act, but whether this legislation violates the author's rights contained in article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The right to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law without any discrimination does not make all differences of treatment discriminatory. A differentiation based on reasonable and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of article 26. Further, differences in result of the uniform application of laws do not per se constitute prohibited discrimination.

12. It remains for the Committee to determine whether the disadvantageous treatment complained of by the author resulted from the application of a discriminatory statute and thus violated her rights under article 26 of the Covenant. In the light of the explanations given by the State party with respect to the legislative history, the purpose and application of the General Disablement Benefits Act and the General Widows and Orphans Act...the Committee is of the view that the unfavourable result complained of by Mrs. Vos follows from the application of a uniform rule to avoid overlapping in the allocation of social security benefits. This rule is based on objective and reasonable criteria, especially bearing in mind that both statutes under which Mrs. Vos qualified for benefits aim at ensuring to all persons falling thereunder subsistence level income. Thus the Committee cannot conclude that Mrs. Vos has been a victim of discrimination within the meaning of article 26 of the Covenant.

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Notes

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b/ CCPR/C/29/D/172/1984, CCPR/C/29/D/180/1984 and CCPR/C/29/D/182/1984.

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For dissenting opinion in this context, see Vos v. The Netherlands (218/1986), ICCPR, A/44/40 (29 March 1989) 232 at Individual Opinion by Messrs. Francisco Aquilar Urbina and Bertil Wennergren, 239 at paras. 1 and 5.

•	B. d. B. et al. v. The Netherlands (273/1989), ICCPR, A/44/40 (30 March 1989) 286 at paras. 6.5-6.7.

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6.5 With regard to an alleged violation of article 26, the Committee recalls that its first sentence stipulates that "all persons are entitled without discrimination to the equal protection of the law." In this connection, it observes that this provision should be interpreted to cover not only entitlements which individuals entertain vis-à-vis the State but also obligations assumed by them pursuant to law. Concerning the State party's argument that the [Industrial Insurance Board for Health and for Mental and Social Interests (BVG)] is not a State organ and that the Government cannot influence concrete decisions of industrial insurance boards, the Committee observes that a State party is not relieved of its obligations under the Covenant when some of its functions are delegated to other autonomous organs.

6.6 The authors complain about the application to them of legal rules of a compulsory nature, which for unexplained reasons were allegedly not applied uniformly to some other physiotherapy practices; regardless of whether the apparent non-application of the compulsory rules on insurance contributions in other cases may have been right or wrong, it has not been alleged that these rules were incorrectly applied to the authors...furthermore, the Committee is not competent to examine errors allegedly committed in the application of laws concerning persons other than the authors of a communication.

6.7 The Committee also recalls that article 26, second sentence, provides that the law of States parties should "guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status". The Committee notes that the authors have not claimed that their different treatment was attributable to their belonging to any identifiably distinct category which could have exposed them to discrimination on account of any of the grounds enumerated or "other status" referred to in article 26 of the Covenant. The Committee, therefore, finds this aspect of the authors' communication to be inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.

•	Gueye v. France (196/1983), ICCPR, A/44/40 (3 April 1989) 189 at paras. 9.4, 9.5 and 10.

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9.4 The Committee has noted the authors' claim that they have been discriminated against on racial grounds, that is, one of the grounds specifically enumerated in article 26. It finds that there is no evidence to support the allegation that the state party has engaged in racially discriminating practices vis-a-vis the authors. It remains, however, to be determined whether the situation encountered by the encountered by the authors falls within the purview of article 26. The Committee recalls that the authors are not generally within French jurisdiction, except that they rely on French legislation in relation to the amount of their pension rights. It notes that nationality does not figure among the prohibited grounds of discrimination listed in article 26, and that the Covenant does not protect the right to a pension, as such. Under article 26, discrimination in the equal protection of the law is prohibited on any grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. There has been a differentiation by reference to nationality acquired upon independence. In the Committee's opinion, this falls within the reference to "other status" in the second sentence of article 26. The Committee takes into account, as it did in Communication No. 182/1984, that "the right to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law without any discrimination does not make all differences of treatment discriminatory. A differentiation based on reasonable and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of article 26.

9.5 In determining whether the treatment of the authors is based on reasonable and objective criteria, the Committee notes that it was not the question of nationality which determined the granting of pensions to the authors but the services rendered by them in the past...A subsequent change in nationality cannot by itself be considered as a sufficient justification for different treatment, since the basis for the grant of the pension was the same service which both they and the soldiers who remained French had provided. Nor can difference in the economic, financial and social conditions as between France and Senegal be invoked as a legitimate justification. If one compared the case of retired soldiers of Senegalese nationality in Senegal with that of retired soldiers of French nationality in Senegal, it would appear that they enjoy the same economic and social conditions. Yet, their treatment for the purpose of pension entitlements would differ. Finally, the fact that the State party claims that it can no longer carry out checks of identity and family situation, so as to prevent abuses in the administration of pension schemes cannot justify a difference in treatment. In the Committee's opinion, mere administrative convenience or the possibility of some abuse of pension rights cannot be invoked to justify unequal treatment. The Committee concludes that the difference in treatment of the authors is not based on reasonable and objective criteria and constitutes discrimination prohibited by the Covenant.

10. The Human Rights Committee...is of the view that the events of this case, in so far as they produced effects after 17 May 1984 (the date of entry into force of the Optional Protocol for France), disclose a violation of article 26 of the Covenant.

•	Järvinen v. Finland (295/1988), ICCPR, A/45/40 vol. II (25 July 1990) 101 at paras. 6.2-6.6 and 7.

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6.2 ...[T]he prohibition of discrimination under article 26 is not limited to those rights which are provided for in the Covenant.

6.3 Article 26 of the Covenant, while prohibiting discrimination and guaranteeing equal protection of the law to everyone, does not prohibit all differences of treatment. Any differentiation, as the Committee has had the opportunity to state repeatedly, must, however, be based on reasonable and objective criteria. b/

6.4 In determining whether the prolongation of the term for alternative service from twelve to sixteen months by Act No. 647/85, which was applied to Mr. Järvinen, was based on reasonable and objective criteria, the Committee has considered in particular the ratio legis of the Act and has found that the new arrangements were designed to facilitate the administration of alternative service. The legislation was based on practical considerations and had no discriminatory purpose.

6.5 The Committee is, however, aware that the impact of the legislative differentiation, works to the detriment of genuine conscientious objectors, whose philosophy will necessarily require them to accept civilian service. At the same time, the new arrangements were not merely for the convenience of the State alone. They removed from conscientious objectors the often difficult task of convincing the examination board of the genuineness of their beliefs, and they allowed a broader range of individuals potentially to opt for the possibility of alternative service.

6.6 In all the circumstances, the extended length of alternative service is neither unreasonable nor punitive.

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7. The Human Rights Committee...is of the view that the terms of alternative service imposed on Mr. Järvinen...do not disclose a violation of article 26 of the Covenant.

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Notes

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b/ See Communication No. 196/1985 (Gueye et al. v. France), final views adopted on 3 April 1989, para. 9.4; Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/44/40, annex X, sect. B).

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For dissenting opinion in this context, see Järvinen v. Finland (295/1988), ICCPR, A/45/40 vol. II (25 July 1990) 101 at Individual Opinion by Messrs. Francisco Aquilar Urbina and Fausto Pocar, 106 and Individual Opinion by Mr. Bertil Wennergren, 107.

•	Pauger v. Austria (415/1990), ICCPR, A/47/40 (26 March 1992) 325 (CCPR/C/41/D/415/1990) at paras. 7.3, 7.4 and 8.

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7.3 The Committee reiterates its constant jurisprudence that the right to equality before the law and to the equal protection of the law without any discrimination does not make all differences of treatment discriminatory. A differentiation based on reasonable and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of article 26.

7.4 In determining whether the Austrian Pension Act, as applied to the author, entailed a differentiation based on unreasonable or unobjective criteria, the Committee notes that the Austrian family law imposes equal rights and duties on both spouses, with regard to their income and mutual maintenance. The Pension Act, as amended...however provides for full pension benefits to widowers only if they have no other source of income; the income requirement does not apply to widows. In the context of the said Act, widowers will only be entitled to full pension benefits on equal footing with widows as of 1 January 1995. This in fact means that men and women, whose social circumstances are similar, are being treated differently merely on the basis of sex. Such a differentiation is not reasonable, as is implicitly acknowledged by the State party when it points out that the ultimate goal of the legislation is to achieve full equality between men and women in 1995.

8. The Human Rights Committee...is of the view that the application of the Austrian Pension Act in respect of the author after 10 March 1988, the date of entry into force of the Optional Protocol for Austria, made him a victim of a violation of article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because he, as a widower, was denied full pension benefits on equal footing with widows.

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Notes

a/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement no. 40 (A/42/40), annex VIII, sects. D and B, Zwaan-de Vries v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 182/1984, and Broeks v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 172/1984, Views adopted on 9 April 1987.

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•	Orihuela v. Peru (309/1988), ICCPR, A/48/40 vol. II (14 July 1993) 48 (CCPR/C/48/D/309/1988) at para. 6.4.

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6.4 The Committee has noted the author's claim that he has not been treated equally before the Peruvian courts in connection with his pension claims. The State party has not refuted his allegation that the courts' inaction, the delays in the proceedings and the continued failure to implement the resolution of October 1989 concerning his severance pay are politically motivated. The Committee concludes on the basis of the material before it, that the denial of severance pay to a long standing civil servant who is dismissed by the Government constitutes, in the circumstances of this case, a violation of article 26 and that Mr Orihuela Valenzuela did not benefit "without any discrimination (from) equal protection of the law". Therefore the Committee finds that there has been a violation of article 26 of the Covenant.

•	Neefs v. The Netherlands (425/1990), ICCPR, A/49/40 vol. II (15 July 1994) 120 (CCPR/C/51/D/425/1990) at paras. 7.2-7.4.

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7.2 The Committee refers to its prior jurisprudence and reiterates that, although a State is not required under article 26 of the Covenant to adopt social security legislation, if it does, such legislation must comply with article 26 of the Covenant. The right to equality before the law and to the equal protection of the law without any discrimination does not make all differences of treatment discriminatory. A differentiation based on reasonable and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of article 26. 1/

7.3 In the instant case, the Committee notes that the author's claim that he is a victim of a violation of article 26, is based on the fact that he is sharing a household with his mother and on that basis receives a lower level of benefit under the Social Security Act than he would have if he had shared it with a non-relative or with a relative in respect of whom the regulations under the Act allow evidence of a commercially shared household.

7.4 The Committee observes that benefits under the Social Security Act are granted to persons with low or no income in order to provide for their costs of living. The author himself has conceded that his costs of living are reduced since he is sharing a household with his mother, be this on a commercial basis or on a basis of mutual support...[T]he Committee finds that the different treatment of parents and children and of other relatives respectively, contained in the regulations under the Social Security Act, is not unreasonable nor arbitrary, and its application in the author's case does not amount to a violation of article 26 of the Covenant.

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Notes

1/ See inter alia the Committee's Views with regard to Communication No. 395/1990 (M.T. Sprenger v. The Netherlands, adopted on 31 March 1992, paragraph 7.2) and No.415/1990 (Dietmar Pauger v. Austria, adopted on 26 March 1992, paragraph 7.3)

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•	Pepels v. The Netherlands (484/1991), ICCPR, A/49/40 vol. II (15 July 1994) 221 (CCPR/C/51/D/484/1991) at paras. 7.2 and 7.5.

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7.2 The Committee refers to its earlier jurisprudence and recalls that, while article 26 requires that discrimination be prohibited by law and that all persons be guaranteed equal protection against discrimination, it does not concern itself with which matters may be regulated by law. Thus, article 26 does not of itself require States parties either to provide social security benefits or to provide them retroactively in respect of the date of application. However, when such benefits are regulated by law, then such law must comply with article 26 of the Covenant.

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7.5 The Committee observes that since December 1988 [The General Widows' and Orphans' Act] benefits are granted to widows and widowers alike. The Act provides for the grant of retroactive benefits for up to one year preceding the date of application; only in exceptional circumstances can benefits be granted as from an earlier date. This provision is being applied to men and women alike, and the information before the Committee does not show that Mr. Pepels was treated differently than others. The Committee, therefore, concludes that the way in which the law is applied since 1988 does not reveal a violation of article 26 of the Covenant.

•	Nahlik v. Austria (608/1995), ICCPR, A/51/40 vol. II (22 July 1996) 259 (CCPR/C/57/D/608/1995) at paras. 8.3 and 8.4.

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8.3 The Committee notes that the author claims that he is a victim of discrimination, because his pension is based on the salary before 1 January 1992, without the 200 ATS monthly entitlement which became effective for active employees on that date.

8.4 The Committee recalls that the right to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law without discrimination does not make all differences of treatment discriminatory. A differentiation based on reasonable and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of article 26. In the instant case, the contested differentiation is based only superficially on a distinction between employees who retired before 1 January 1992 and those who retired after that date. Actually, this distinction is based on a different treatment of active and retired employees at the time. With regard to this distinction, the Committee considers that the author has failed to substantiate, for purposes of admissibility, that the distinction was not objective or how it was arbitrary or unreasonable. Therefore, the Committee concludes that the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.

•	Foin v. France (666/1995), ICCPR, A/55/40 vol. II (3 November 1999) 30 at para. 10.3.

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10.3 The issue before the Committee is whether the specific conditions under which alternative service had to be performed by the author constitute a violation of the Covenant. The Committee observes that under article 8 of the Covenant, States parties may require service of a military character and, in case of conscientious objection, alternative national service, provided that such service is not discriminatory. The author has claimed that the requirement, under French law, of a length of 24 months for national alternative service, rather than 12 months for military service, is discriminatory and violates the principle of equality before the law and equal protection of the law set forth in article 26 of the Covenant. The Committee reiterates its position that article 26 does not prohibit all differences of treatment. Any differentiation, as the Committee has had the opportunity to state repeatedly, must however be based on reasonable and objective criteria. In this context, the Committee recognizes that the law and practice may establish differences between military and national alternative service and that such differences may, in a particular case, justify a longer period of service, provided that the differentiation is based on reasonable and objective criteria, such as the nature of the specific service concerned or the need for a special training in order to accomplish that service. In the present case, however, the reasons forwarded by the State party do not refer to such criteria or refer to criteria in general terms without specific reference to the author's case, and are rather based on the argument that doubling the length of service was the only way to test the sincerity of an individual's convictions. In the Committee's view, such argument does not satisfy the requirement that the difference in treatment involved in the present case was based on reasonable and objective criteria. In the circumstances, the Committee finds that a violation of article 26 occurred, since the author was discriminated against on the basis of his conviction of conscience.

For dissenting opinion in this context, see Foin v. France (666/1995), ICCPR, A/55/40 vol. II (3 November 1999) 30 at Individual Opinion by Nisuke Ando, Eckart Klein and David Kretzmer, 39.

See also:

•	Maille v. France (689/1996), ICCPR, A/55/40 vol. II (10 July 2000) 62 at para. 10.4.

•	Venier and Nicolas v. France (690/1996 and 691/1996), ICCPR, A/55/40 vol. II (10 July 2000) 75 at para. 10.4.

•	Waldman v. Canada (694/1996), ICCPR, A/55/40 vol. II (3 November 1999) 86 (CCPR/C/67/D/694/1996) at paras. 10.2 and 10.6.

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10.2 The issue before the Committee is whether public funding for Roman Catholic schools, but not for schools of the author's religion, which results in him having to meet the full cost of education in religious school, constitutes a violation of the author's rights under the Covenant.

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10.6 The Committee has noted the State party's argument that the aims of the State party's secular public education system are compatible with the principle of nondiscrimination laid down in the Covenant. The Committee...notes, however, that the proclaimed aims of the system do not justify the exclusive funding of Roman Catholic religious schools...[T]he Covenant does not oblige States parties to fund schools which are established on a religious basis. However, if a State party chooses to provide public funding to religious schools, it should make this funding available without discrimination. This means that providing funding for the schools of one religious group and not for another must be based on reasonable and objective criteria. In the instant case, the Committee concludes that the material before it does not show that the differential treatment between the Roman Catholic faith and the author's religious denomination is based on such criteria. Consequently, there has been a violation of the author's rights under article 26 of the Covenant to equal and effective protection against discrimination.

•	Kavanagh v. Ireland (819/1998), ICCPR, A/56/40 vol. II (4 April 2001) 122 at paras. 2.1-
2.3, 3.2-3.4, 3.6, 10.1-10.3,11, 12 and Individual Opinion by Louis Henkin, Rajsoomer Lallah, Cecilia Medina Quiroga, Ahmed Tawfik Khalil and Patrick Vella (concurring), 136 at para. 1-2.

...

2.1 Article 38(3) of the Irish Constitution provides for the establishment by law of Special Courts for the trial of offences in cases where it may be determined, according to law, that the ordinary courts are "inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order". On 26 May 1972, the Government exercised its power to make a proclamation pursuant to Section 35(2) of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 (the Act) which led to the establishment of the Special Criminal Court for the trial of certain offences. Section 35(4) and (5) of the Act provide that if at any time the Government or the Parliament is satisfied that the ordinary courts are again adequate to secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order, a rescinding proclamation or resolution, respectively, shall be made terminating the Special Criminal Court regime. To date, no such rescinding proclamation or resolution has been promulgated.

2.2 By virtue of s. 47(1) of the Act, a Special Criminal Court has jurisdiction over a "scheduled offence" (i.e. an offence specified in a list) where the Attorney-General "thinks proper" that a person so charged should be tried before the Special Criminal Court rather than the ordinary courts ... The Special Criminal Court also has jurisdiction over non-scheduled offences where the Attorney-General certifies, under s.47(2) of the Act, that in his or her opinion the ordinary courts are "inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice in relation to the trial of such person on such charge". The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) exercises these powers of the Attorney-General by delegated authority.

2.3 In contrast to the ordinary courts of criminal jurisdiction, which employ juries, Special Criminal Courts consist of three judges who reach a decision by majority vote. The Special Criminal Court also utilises a procedure different from that of the ordinary criminal courts, including that an accused cannot avail himself or herself of preliminary examination procedures concerning the evidence of certain witnesses.

...

3.2 On 19 July 1994, the author was arrested on seven charges related to the incident; namely false imprisonment, robbery, demanding money with menaces, conspiracy to demand money with menaces, and possession of a firearm with intent to commit the offence of false imprisonment. Six of those charges were non-scheduled offences, and the seventh charge (possession of a firearm with intent to commit the offence of false imprisonment) was a 'scheduled offence'.

3.3 On 20 July 1994 the author was charged directly before the Special Criminal Court with all seven offences by order of the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP), dated 15 July 1994, pursuant to s.47(1) and (2) of the Act, for the scheduled offences and the non-scheduled offences respectively.

3.4 On 14 November 1994, the author sought leave from the High Court to apply for judicial review of the DPP's order. The High Court granted leave that same day and the author had his application heard in June 1995. The author contended that the offences with which he was charged had no subversive or paramilitary connection and that the ordinary courts were adequate to try him. The author challenged the 1972 proclamation on the basis that there was no longer a reasonably plausible factual basis for the opinion on which it was grounded, and sought a declaration to that effect. He also sought to quash the DPP's certification in respect of the non-scheduled offences, on the grounds that the DPP was not entitled to certify non-scheduled offences for trial in the Special Criminal Court if they did not have a subversive connection. In this connection, he contended that the Attorney-General's representation to the Human Rights Committee at its 48th session that the Special Criminal Court was necessitated by the ongoing campaign in relation to Northern Ireland gave rise to a legitimate expectation that only offences connected with Northern Ireland would be put before the Court. He further contended that the decision to try him before the Special Criminal Court constituted unfair discrimination against him.

...

3.6 Concerning the contention that the author was subject to a mode of trial different from those charged with similar offences but who were not certified for trial before the Special Criminal Court, the High Court found that the author had not established that such a difference in treatment was invidious ...

...

10.1 The author claims a violation of article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, in that, by subjecting him to a Special Criminal Court which did not afford him a jury trial and the right to examine witnesses at a preliminary stage, he was not afforded a fair trial. The author accepts that neither jury trial nor preliminary examination is in itself required by the Covenant, and that the absence of either or both of these elements does not necessarily render a trial unfair, but he claims that all of the circumstances of his trial before a Special Criminal Court rendered his trial unfair. In the Committee's view, trial before courts other than the ordinary courts is not necessarily, per se, a violation of the entitlement to a fair hearing and the facts of the present case do not show that there has been such a violation.

10.2 The author's claim that there has been a violation of the requirement of equality before the courts and tribunals, contained in article 14, paragraph 1, parallels his claim of violation of his right under article 26 to equality before the law and to the equal protection of the law. The DPP's decision to charge the author before the Special Criminal Court resulted in the author facing an extra-ordinary trial procedure before an extra-ordinarily constituted court. This distinction deprived the author of certain procedures under domestic law, distinguishing the author from others charged with similar offences in the ordinary courts. Within the jurisdiction of the State party, trial by jury in particular is considered an important protection, generally available to accused persons. Under article 26, the State party is therefore required to demonstrate that such a decision to try a person by another procedure was based upon reasonable and objective grounds. In this regard, the Committee notes that the State party's law, in the Offences Against the State Act, sets out a number of specific offences which can be tried before a Special Criminal Court at the DPP's option. It provides also that any other offence may be tried before a Special Criminal Court if the DPP is of the view that the ordinary courts are "inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice". The Committee regards it as problematic that, even assuming that a truncated criminal system for certain serious offences is acceptable so long as it is fair, Parliament through legislation set out specific serious offences that were to come within the Special Criminal Court's jurisdiction in the DPP's unfettered discretion ("thinks proper"), and goes on to allow, as in the author's case, any other offences also to be so tried if the DPP considers the ordinary courts inadequate. No reasons are required to be given for the decisions that the Special Criminal Court would be "proper", or that the ordinary courts are "inadequate", and no reasons for the decision in the particular case have been provided to the Committee. Moreover, judicial review of the DPP's decisions is effectively restricted to the most exceptional and virtually undemonstrable circumstances.

10.3 The Committee considers that the State party has failed to demonstrate that the decision to try the author before the Special Criminal Court was based upon reasonable and objective grounds. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that the author's right under article 26 to equality before the law and to the equal protection of the law has been violated. In view of this finding with regard to article 26, it is unnecessary in this case to examine the issue of violation of equality "before the courts and tribunals" contained in article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant.

...

11. The Human Rights Committee...is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation of article 26 of the Covenant.

12. In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy. The State party is also under an obligation to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future: it should ensure that persons are not tried before the Special Criminal Court unless reasonable and objective criteria for the decision are provided.

Individual Opinion by Louis Henkin, Rajsoomer Lallah, Cecilia Medina Quiroga, Ahmed Tawfik Khalil and Patrick Vella

1. While the complaint of the author can be viewed in the perspective of Article 26 under which States are bound, in their legislative, judicial and executive behaviour, to ensure that everyone is treated equally and in a non-discriminatory manner, unless otherwise justified on reasonable and objective criteria, we are of the view that there has also been a violation of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant.

2. Article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, in its very first sentence, entrenches the principle of equality in the judicial system itself. That principle goes beyond and is additional to the principles consecrated in the other paragraphs of Article 14 governing the fairness of trials, proof of guilt, procedural and evidential safeguards, rights of appeal and review and, finally, the prohibition against double jeopardy. That principle of equality is violated where all persons accused of committing the very same offence are not tried by the normal courts having jurisdiction in the matter, but are tried by a special court at the discretion of the Executive. This remains so whether the exercise of discretion by the Executive is or is not reviewable by the courts.

•	Fábryová v. Czech Republic (765/1997), ICCPR, A/57/40 vol. II (30 October 2001) 103 (CCPR/C/73/D/765/1997) at paras. 2.1-2.5, 4.1, 4.2, 4.4, 9.2, 9.3, 10 and 11.

...

2.1 The author's father Richard Fischmann owned an estate in Puklice in the district of Jihlava, Czechoslovakia. In 1930, at a national census, he and his family registered as Jews. In 1939, after the occupation by the Nazis, the estate was "aryanised" 2/ and a German sequestrator was appointed. Richard Fischmann died in 1942 in Auschwitz. The author is not represented by counsel.

2.2 The rest of the family was interned in concentration camps and only the author and her brother Viteslav returned. In 1945, the estate of Richard Fischmann was confiscated under Benes decree 12/1945 because the district committee decided that he was German as well as a traitor to the Czech Republic 3/, the assumption that he was German being based on the assertion that he had lived "in a German way".

2.3 The author's appeal against the confiscation was dismissed. The decision of the district committee was upheld by a judgment of the highest administrative court in Bratislava on 3 December 1951.

2.4 After the end of communist rule in Czechoslovakia, the author lodged a complaint to the General procurator, on 18 December 1990, for denial of justice with regard to her claim for restitution. Her complaint was dismissed on 21 August 1991 for being out of time, having been lodged more than five years after the confiscation. The author states that under Communist rule it was not possible to lodge a complaint within the time limit of five years as prescribed by law.

2.5 The author states that on 17 June 1992 she applied for restitution according to the law No. 243/1992 4/. Her application was dismissed on 14 October 1994 by the Land Office of Jihlava.

...

4.1 By submission of 20 October 1997, the State party stated that the author's application for restitution of her father's property was dismissed by the Jihlava Land Office on 14 October 1994, on grounds of non-compliance with the legal requirements. It explained that the confiscated property of persons who were deprived of Czechoslovak citizenship under the Benes decrees in 1945, may be restituated in cases where the claimant has his citizenship renewed through the procedures set by law. However, the law did not expressly address the situation of persons who never lost their citizenship and whose property was confiscated in violation of the laws operative at that time. Since the author's father never lost his Czechoslovak citizenship, he could not be considered to be an entitled person and the property could not be restored.

4.2 The State party further explained that the author's appeal was dismissed for being filed out of time. The author's lawyer then raised the objection that the Land Office's decision had not been served properly, since it had not been served to the lawyer directly, but to a member of his staff, who was not authorized to receive it. The Land Office accepted the objection, and served the decision again. The author subsequently appealed against the decision. The City Court dismissed the appeal by a ruling dated 6 August 1996, on the ground that the decision had been properly served the first time and should not have been served a second time. On 11 October 1996, the author filed a constitutional complaint, which was dismissed by the Constitutional Court as inadmissible ratione temporis.

...

4.4 The State party...submitted that, since the present communication had been submitted to the Committee, the Constitutional Court had decided, in cases similar to that of the author's father, that applicants who never lost their citizenship were also entitled to restitution under law no. 243/1992. As a consequence, the Central Land Office, which examined the author's file, decided that the Land Office's decision in the author's case should be reviewed, since it was inconsistent with the Constitutional Court's ruling. On 27 August 1997, the Central Land Office initiated administrative proceedings and on 9 October 1997, it quashed the Land Office's decision of 14 October 1994, and decided that the author should restart her application for restitution ab initio. Normal appeal possibilities would be open to the author if she was not satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings. Also for this reason, the State party argued that the communication was inadmissible under article 5, paragraph 2(b), of the Optional Protocol.

...

9.2 The Committee notes that the State Party concedes that under Law No. 243/1992 individuals in a similar situation as that of the author qualify for restitution as a result of the subsequent interpretation given by the Constitutional Court (para. 4.4). The State Party further concedes that the decision of the Jihlava Land Office of 14 October 1994 was wrong and that the author should have had the opportunity to enter a fresh application before the Jihlava Land Office. The author's renewed attempt to obtain redress has, however, been frustrated by the State party itself which, through a letter of the Ministry of Agriculture of 25 May 1998, informed the author that the decision of the Jihlava Land Office of 14 October 1994 had become final on the ground that the decision of the Central Land Office reversing the decision of the Jihlava Land Office had been served out of time.

9.3 Given the above facts, the Committee concludes that, if the service of the decision of the Central Land Office reversing the decision of the Jihlava Land Office was made out of time, this was attributable to the administrative fault of the authorities. The result is that the author was deprived of treatment equal to that of persons having similar entitlement to the restitution of their previously confiscated property, in violation of her rights under article 26 of the Covenant.

10. The Human Rights Committee...is therefore of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation of article 26 of the Covenant.

11. In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy, including an opportunity to file a new claim for restitution or compensation. The State party should review its legislation and administrative practices to ensure that all persons enjoy both equality before the law as well as the equal protection of the law.

_________________

Notes

...

2/ i. e. that the property was taken away from Jews as "non-Aryans" and transferred to the German State or German natural or juridical persons.

3/ The author states that according to the edict Nr. A 4600 9/11 45 VI/2 of the Ministry of the Interior of 13 November 1945 the district committees had the competence to examine the reliability of those persons who in 1930 had registered as Jews.

4/ Law no. 243/1992 provides for the restitution of property which was confiscated as a result of Benes decrees Nos. 12/1945 and 108/1945. One of the conditions to be eligible for restitution is that the claimant must have been granted Czech citizenship by decree 33/1945, Act no. 245/1948, 194/1949 or 34/1953.

_________________

•	Brok v. Czech Republic (774/1997), ICCPR, A/57/40 vol. II (31 October 2001) 110 (CCPR/C/73/D/774/1997) at paras. 2.1-2.6,7.2-7.4, 8 and 9.

...

2.1 Robert Brok's parents owned a house in the centre of Prague since 1927 (hereinafter called the property). During 1940 and 1941, the German authorities confiscated their property with retroactive effect to 16 March 1939, because the owners were Jewish. The property was then sold to the company Matador on 7 January 1942. The author himself, was deported by the Nazis, and returned to Prague on 16 May 1945, after having been released from a concentration camp. He was subsequently hospitalized until October 1945.

2.2 After the end of the war, on 19 May 1945, President Benes' Decree No. 5/1945, followed up later by Act 128/1946, declared null and void all property transactions effected under pressure of the occupation regime on the basis of racial or political persecution. National administration was imposed on all enemy assets. This included the author's parents' property pursuant to a decision taken by the Ministry of Industry on 2 August 1945. However, in February 1946, the Ministry of Industry annulled that decision. It also annulled the prior property confiscation and transfers, and the author's parents were reinstated as the rightful owners, in accordance with Benes Decree No. 5/1945.

2.3 However, the company Matador, which had been nationalized on 27 October 1945, appealed against this decision. On 7 August 1946, the Land Court in Prague annulled the return of the property to the author's parents and declared Matador to be the rightful owner. On 31 January 1947, the Supreme Court confirmed this decision.... The property thereby stayed in possession of Matador, and was later, in 1954, transferred to the state company Technomat.

2.4 Following the change to a democratic government at the adoption of restitution legislation, the author applied for restitution under Act No. 87/1991 as amended by Act No. 116/1994. The said law provides restitution or compensation to victims of illegal confiscation carried out for political reasons during the Communist regime (25 February 1948 -1 January 1990). The law also matter provisions for restitution or compensation to victims of racial persecution during the Second World War, who have an entitlement by virtue of Decree No. 5/1945. The courts (District Court decision 26 C 49/95 of 20 November 1995 and Prague City Court decision 13 Co 34/94-29 of 28 February 1996), however, rejected the author's claim. The District Court states in its decision that the amended Act extends the right to restitution to persons who lost their property during the German occupation and who could not have their property restituted because of political persecution, or who went through legal procedures that violated their human rights subsequent to 25 February 1948, on condition that they comply with the terms set forth in Act No. 87/1991. However, the court was of the opinion that the author was not eligible for restitution, because the property was nationalized before 25 February 1948, the retroactive cut-off date for claims under Act No. 87/1991 Section 1, paragraph 1, and Section 6. This decision was confirmed by the Prague City Court.

2.5 Pursuant to section 72 of Act No. 182/1993, the author filed a complaint before the Constitutional court that his right to property had been violated. This provision allows an individual to file a complaint to the Constitutional Court if the public authority has violated the claimant's fundamental rights guaranteed by a constitutional law or by an international treaty in particular the right to property.

2.6 The Constitutional Court concluded that since the first and second instances had decided that the author was not the owner of the property, there were no property rights that could have been violated. In its decision, the Constitutional Court invoked the question of fair trial on its own motion and concluded that "the legal proceedings were conducted correctly and all the legal regulations have been safeguarded". Accordingly, the Constitutional Court rejected the author's constitutional complaint on 12 September 1996.

...

7.2 The question before the Committee is whether the application of Act No. 87/1991, as amended by Act No. 116/1994, to the author's case entails a violation of his right to equality before the law and to the equal protection of the law.

7.3 These laws provide restitution or compensation to victims of illegal confiscation carried out for political reasons during the Communist regime. The law also provides for restitution or compensation to victims of racial persecution during the Second World War who had an entitlement under Benes Decree No. 5/1945. The Committee observes that legislation must not discriminate among the victims of the prior confiscation to which it applies, since all victims are entitled to redress without arbitrary distinctions.

7.4 The Committee notes that Act No. 87/1991 as amended by Act No. 116/1994 gave rise to a restitution claim of the author which was denied on the ground that the nationalization that took place in 1946/47 on the basis of Benes Decree No. 100/1945 falls outside the scope of laws of 1991 and 1994. Thus, the author was excluded from the benefit of the restitution law although the Czech nationalization in 1946/47 could only be carried out because the author's property was confiscated by the Nazi authorities during the time of German occupation. In the Committee's view this discloses a discriminatory treatment of the author, compared to those individuals whose property was confiscated by Nazi authorities without being subjected, immediately after the war, to Czech nationalization and who, therefore, could benefit from the laws of 1991 and 1994. Irrespective of whether the arbitrariness in question was inherent in the law itself or whether it resulted from the application of the law by the courts of the State party, the Committee finds that the author was denied his right to equal protection of the law in violation of article 26 of the Covenant.

8. The Human Rights Committee...is of the view that the facts before it substantiate a violation of article 26 in conjunction with article 2 of the Covenant.

9. In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy. Such remedy should include restitution of the property or compensation, and appropriate compensation for the period during which the author and his widow were deprived of the property, starting on the date of the court decision of 20 November 1995 and ending on the date when the restitution has been completed. The State party should review its relevant legislation and administrative practices to ensure that neither the law nor its application entails discrimination in contravention of article 26 of the Covenant.

For dissenting opinion in this context, see Brok v. Czech Republic (774/1997), ICCPR, A/57/40 vol. II (31 October 2001) 110 (CCPR/C/73/D/774/1997) at Individual Opinion by Mr. Nisuke Ando and Individual Opinion by Ms. Christine Chanet.

•	Pezoldova v. The Czech Republic (757/1997), ICCPR, A/58/40 vol. II (25 October 2002) 25 (CCPR/C/76/D/757/1997) at paras. 2.1-2.7, 7.1-7.3, 11.2-11.6, 12.1,12.2 and Individual Opinion by Justice Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati (concurring), 39.

...

2.1 Mrs. Pezoldova was born on 1 October 1947 in Vienna as the daughter and lawful heiress of Dr. Jindrich Schwarzenberg. The author states that the Nazi German Government had confiscated all of her family's properties in Austria, Germany, and Czechoslovakia, including an estate in Czechoslovakia known as "the Stekl" in 1940. She states that the property was confiscated because her adoptive grandfather Dr. Adolph Schwarzenberg was an opponent of Nazi policies. He left Czechoslovakia in September 1939 and died in Italy in 1950. The author's father, Jindrich, was arrested by the Germans in 1943 and imprisoned in Buchenwald from where he was released in 1944. He went into exile in the United States and did not return to Czechoslovakia after the war.

2.2 After the Second World War, the family properties were placed under National Administration by the Czechoslovak Government in 1945. Pursuant to the Decrees issued by the Czechoslovak President Edward Benes, No. 12 of 21 June 1945 and No. 108 of 25 October 1945, houses and agricultural property of persons of German and Hungarian ethnic origin were confiscated...

2.3 On 13 August 1947, a general confiscation law No. 142/1947 was enacted, allowing the Government to nationalize, in return for compensation, agricultural land over 50 hectares and industrial enterprises employing more than 200 workers. This law was, however, not applied to the Schwarzenberg estate because on the same day a lex specialis, Law No. 143/1947 (the so-called "Lex Schwarzenberg"), was promulgated, providing for the transfer of ownership of the Schwarzenberg properties to the State without compensation, notwithstanding the fact that the properties had already been confiscated pursuant to Benes' Decrees 12 and 108.2/ The author contends that Law No. 143/1947 was unconstitutional, discriminatory and arbitrary, perpetuating and formalizing the earlier persecution of the Schwarzenberg family by the Nazis. According to the author, the Law did not automatically affect the previous confiscation under the Benes' Decrees. However, on 30 January 1948, the confiscation of the Schwarzenberg agricultural lands under Decrees Nos. 12 and 108 was revoked. Schwarzenberg's representative was informed by letter of 12 February 1948, and the parties were given the possibility to appeal within 15 days. The author submits therefore that the revocation only took effect after 27 February 1948 (two days after the qualifying date 25 February 1948 for restitution under law 229/1991).

2.4 According to the author, the transfer of the property was not automatic upon the coming into force of Law No. 143/1947, but subject to the intabulation (writing into the register) in the public register of the transfer of the relevant rights of ownership. In this context, the author states that National Administration (see paragraph 2.2) remained in force until June 1948, and that intabulation of the properties by land offices and Courts shows that, at the time, Law No. 143/1947 was not considered as having immediately transferred title.

2.5 Following the collapse of communist administration in 1989, several restitution laws were enacted. Pursuant to Law No. 229/1991,3/ the author applied for restitution to the regional land authorities, but her applications for restitution were rejected by decisions of 14 February, 20 May and 19 July 1994.

2.6 The Prague City Court, by decisions of 27 June 1994 4/ and 28 February 1995,5/ refused the author's appeal and decided that the ownership of the properties had been lawfully and automatically transferred to the State by operation of Law No. 143/1947, on 13 August 1947. Since according to restitution Law No. 229/1991 the qualifying period for claims of restitution started on 25 February 1948, the Prague City Court decided that the author was not entitled to claim restitution.6/ The Court refused the author's request to suspend the proceedings in order to request the Constitutional Court to rule on the alleged unconstitutionality and invalidity of Law No. 143/1947.

2.7 On 9 March 1995 the author's application before the Constitutional Court concerning the City Court's decision of 27 June 1994 was rejected. The Court upheld the City Court's decision that ownership had been transferred to the State automatically by operation of Law No. 143/1947 and refused to consider whether Law No. 143/1947 was unconstitutional and void. The author did not appeal the City Court's decision of 28 February 1995 to the Constitutional Court, as it would have been futile in light of the outcome of the first appeal.

...

7.1 By submission of 23 March 2002, the author refers to the Committee's Views in case No. 774/1997 (Brok v. The Czech Republic), and, with respect to the issue of equal access, within the limits of the admissibility granted for issues under articles 2 and 26 of the Covenant, alleges that the Ministry of Agriculture and various State archives, until the year 2001, consistently denied to the author and to all land authorities access to the complete file on the confiscation procedures against her grandfather Dr. Adolph Schwarzenberg and his appeals lodged in due course...In particular, it is stated that as late as 2001 author's counsel was denied the inspection of the Schwarzenberg file by the director for legal affairs in the Ministry, Dr. Jindrich Urfus, and only when the author had found other relevant documents in another archive, was counsel informed by the Ministry, on 11 May 2001, that the file indeed existed and he was allowed to inspect it. Moreover, it is stated that on 5 October 1993 the head of the State archive in Krumlov, Dr. Anna Kubikova, had denied the author the use of the archive in the presence of her assistant Ing. Zaloha, dismissing her with the words "All Czech citizens are entitled to use this archive but you are not entitled to do so." The author complains that such denials of access illustrate the inequality of treatment to which she has been subjected by the Czech authorities since 1992.

7.2 The documents suppressed prove that, in fact, the Schwarzenberg estate was confiscated pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 12/45. The authorities of the State party not only prevented the author from detecting and reporting the complete facts of her case to the land authorities and courts and to meet the deadlines for lodging claims according to laws 87/91 and 243/92, but also wilfully misled all land authorities and the Human Rights Committee.

7.3 On 29 November 2001, the Regional Court of Ceske Budejovice (15 Co 633/2001-115) as court of appeal confirmed that the Schwarzenberg estate was indeed confiscated pursuant to Section 1, par. 1, lit (a) of Decree No. 12/45, thus underlining the inapplicability of Law 143/47. However, the Court granted no redress to the author, because according to the author, there was no remedy available for anybody deemed to be of German or Hungarian stock.

...

11.2 The question before the Committee is whether the author was excluded from access to an effective remedy in a discriminatory manner. According to article 26 of the Covenant, all persons are equal before the law and every person has the right to equal protection of the law.

11.3 The Committee notes the statement of the author that the essence of her complaint is that the Czech authorities have violated her right to equal treatment by arbitrarily denying her right to restitution on the basis of Laws Nos. 229/1991 and 243/1992 with the argument that the properties of her adoptive grandfather were confiscated under Law No. 143/1947 and not under Benes' Decrees Nos. 12 and 108/1945 and therefore the restitution laws of 1991 and 1992 would not apply. The Committee notes further the author's argument that the State party constantly, until the year 2001, denied her access to the relevant files and archives, so that only then could documents be presented that would prove that, in fact, the confiscation occurred on the basis of the Benes' Decrees of 1945 and not of Law No. 143/1947, with the consequence that the author would be entitled to restitution under the laws of 1991 and 1992.

11.4 The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that the interpretation and application of domestic law is essentially a matter for the courts and authorities of the State party concerned. However, in pursuing a claim under domestic law, the individual must have equal access to remedies, which includes the opportunity to ascertain and present the true facts, without which the courts would be misled. The Committee notes that the State party has not addressed the allegation of the author that she was denied access to documents which were crucial for the correct decision of her case. In the absence of any explanation by the State party, due weight must be given to the author's allegations.

11.5 In this context, the Committee also notes that by decision of 29 November 2001, the Regional Court of Ceske Budejovice recognized that the taking of Dr. Adolph Schwarzenberg's property had been effected pursuant to Benes' Decree 12/1945. The Committee further notes that on 30 January 1948 the confiscation of the Schwarzenberg agricultural lands under Benes' Decrees Nos. 12 and 108/1945 was revoked, apparently in order to give way for the application of Law 143/1947. The point in time when the revocation became effective seems not to have been clarified, because the courts proceeded from the premise that Law No. 143 was the only applicable legal basis.

11.6 It is not the task of the Committee but of the courts of the State party to decide on questions of Czech Law. The Committee finds, however, that the author was repeatedly discriminated against in being denied access to relevant documents which could have proved her restitution claims. The Committee is, therefore, of the view that the author's rights under article 26 in conjunction with article 2 of the Covenant were violated.

12.1 The Human Rights Committee...is of the view that the facts before it reveal a violation of article 26, in conjunction with article 2 of the Covenant.

12.2 In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a) of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy, including an opportunity to file a new claim for restitution or compensation. The State party should review its legislation and administrative practices to ensure that all persons enjoy both equality before the law as well as the equal protection of the law.

...

Individual Opinion by Justice Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati (concurring)

I agree with the Committee's conclusion that the facts before it reveal a violation of articles 26 and 2 of the Covenant. However, I am persuaded that there is also a violation of article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, which stipulates that all persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals and be entitled to a fair and public hearing of their rights and obligations in a suit at law. As a prerequisite to have a fair and meaningful hearing of a claim, a person should be afforded full and equal access to public sources of information, including land registries and archives, so as to obtain the elements necessary to establish a claim. The author has demonstrated that she was denied such equal access, and the State party has failed to explain or refute the author's allegations. Moreover, the protracted legal proceedings in this case, now lasting over 10 years, have not yet been completed. In the context of this particular case and in the light of previous Czech restitution cases already adjudicated by the Committee, the apparent reluctance of the Czech authorities and of the Czech courts to process restitution claims fairly and expeditiously also entails a violation of the spirit, if not the letter of article 14. It should also be remembered that, subsequent to the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the Czech Republic, the State party has continued to apply Law No. 143/1947 (the "law Schwarzenberg") which targeted exclusively the property of the author's family. Such ad hominem legislation is incompatible with the Covenant, as a general denial of the right to equality. In the light of the above, I believe that the appropriate remedy should have been restitution and not just the opportunity of resubmitting a claim to the Czech courts.

In 1999 the Committee had declared this communication admissible, insofar as it might raise issues under articles 26 and 2 of the Covenant. I do not think that this necessarily precluded the Committee from making a finding of a violation of article 14, since the State party was aware of all elements of the communication and could have addressed the article 14 issues raised by the author. Of course, the Committee could have revised its admissibility decision so as to include the claims under article 14 of the Covenant, and requested relevant observations from the State party. This, however, would have further delayed disposition of a case which has been before the Courts of the State party since 1992 and before the Committee since 1997.

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Notes

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2/ The law reads:

"1 (1) The ownership of the property of the so-called primogeniture branch of the Schwarzenberg family in Hluboká nad Vlatavou - as far as it is situated in the Czechoslovak Republic - is transferred by law to the county of Bohemia ...

"4 The annexation of the property rights as well as all other rights according to paragraph 1 in favour of the county of Bohemia will be dealt with by the courts and offices, which keep public records of immobile property or other rights, and that following an application by the National Committee in Prague.

"5 (1) The property is transferred into the ownership of the county of Bohemia without compensation for the former owners..."

3/ Act No. 229/1991 enacted by the Federal Assembly of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic came into force on 24 June 1991. The purpose of this law was "to alleviate the consequences of some property injuries suffered by the owners of agrarian and forest property in the period from 1948 to 1989". According to the Act persons who are citizens of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic who reside permanently on its territory and whose land and buildings and structures belonging to their original farmstead devolved to the State or other legal entities between 25 February 1948 and 1 January 1990 are entitled to restitution of this former property inter alia if it devolved to the State by dispossession without compensation under Law No. 142/1947, and in general by expropriation without compensation. By judgement of 13 December 1995 the Constitutional Court - held that the requirement of permanent residence in Act no. 229/1991 was unconstitutional.

4/ Concerning the "Stekl" property.

5/ Concerning properties in Krumlov and Klatovy.

6/ The Prague City Court decided that the author was not an "entitled person" under section 4 (1) of Act No. 229/1991 on the ground that the transfer of the Schwarzenberg property to Czechoslovakia occurred immediately upon the promulgation of Act No. 143/1947 on 13 August 1947, before the qualifying date of 25 February 1948 prescribed by section 4 (1) of Act no. 229/1991. However, before the judgement by the Prague City Court, the interpretation had been that the material date was the date of intabulation of the property, which in the instant case occurred after 25 February 1948. In this context, the author states that the Constitutional Court, by judgement of 14 June 1995, concerning Act No. 142/1947 recognized that until 1 January 1951 intabulation had been necessary for the transfer of property.

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For dissenting opinion in this context, see Pezoldova v. The Czech Republic (757/1997), ICCPR, A/58/40 vol. II (25 October 2002) 25 (CCPR/C/76/D/757/1997) at Individual Opinion by Mr. Nisuke Ando, 38.

•	Love et al. v. Australia (983/2001), ICCPR, A/58/40 vol. II (25 March 2003) 286 (CCPR/C/77/D/983/2001) at paras. 2.1, 8.2, 8.3 and Individual Opinion of Mr. Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati, 302.

...

2.1 On 27 October 1989, 24 November 1989, 10 January 1990 and 24 March 1990, respectively, Messrs. Ivanoff, Love, Bone and Craig, all experienced pilots, commenced contracts as pilots on domestic aircraft operated by Australian Airlines, now part of Qantas Airlines Limited. Australian Airlines was wholly State-owned and operated by government-
appointed management. The airline terminated the authors' contracts upon their reaching 60 years of age pursuant to a compulsory age-based retirement policy. The respective dates of the authors' compulsory retirement were the day before they reached 60 years of age, that is, for Mr. Craig, 29 August 1990; for Mr. Ivanoff, 18 September 1990; for Mr. Bone, 12 October 1991, and, for Mr. Love, on 17 May 1992. The contracts under which they were employed did not include a specific clause to provide for compulsory retirement at that or any other age. Each of the authors held valid pilot licences, as well as medical certificates, at the time of the terminations...

...

8.2 The issue to be decided by the Committee on the merits is whether the author(s) have been subject to discrimination, contrary to article 26 of the Covenant. The Committee recalls its constant jurisprudence that not every distinction constitutes discrimination, in violation of article 26, but that distinctions must be justified on reasonable and objective grounds, in pursuit of an aim that is legitimate under the Covenant. While age as such is not mentioned as one of the enumerated grounds of prohibited discrimination in the second sentence of article 26, the Committee takes the view that a distinction related to age which is not based on reasonable and objective criteria may amount to discrimination on the ground of "other status" under the clause in question, or to a denial of the equal protection of the law within the meaning of the first sentence of article 26. However, it is by no means clear that mandatory retirement age would generally constitute age discrimination. The Committee takes note of the fact that systems of mandatory retirement age may include a dimension of workers' protection by limiting the life-long working time, in particular when there are comprehensive social security schemes that secure the subsistence of persons who have reached such an age. Furthermore, reasons related to employment policy may be behind legislation or policy on mandatory retirement age. The Committee notes that while the International Labour Organization has built up an elaborate regime of protection against discrimination in employment, mandatory retirement age does not appear to be prohibited in any of the ILO Conventions. These considerations will of course not absolve the Committee's task of assessing under article 26 of the Covenant whether any particular arrangement for mandatory retirement age is discriminatory.

8.3 In the present case, as the State party notes, the aim of maximizing safety to passengers, crew and persons otherwise affected by flight travel was a legitimate aim under the Covenant. As to the reasonable and objective nature of the distinction made on the basis of age, the Committee takes into account the widespread national and international practice, at the time of the author's dismissals, of imposing a mandatory retirement age of 60. In order to justify the practice of dismissals maintained at the relevant time, the State party has referred to the ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] regime which was aimed at, and understood as, maximizing flight safety. In the circumstances, the Committee cannot conclude that the distinction made was not, at the time of Mr Love's dismissal, based on objective and reasonable considerations. Consequently, the Committee is of the view that it cannot establish a violation of article 26.

...

Individual Opinion of Mr. Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati (concurring)

The question is whether imposing a mandatory age of retirement at 60 for airline pilots could be said to be a violation of article 26 of the Covenant. Article 26 does not say in explicit terms that no one shall be subjected to discrimination on ground of age. The prohibited grounds of discrimination are set out in article 26, but age is not one of them. Article 26 has therefore no application in the present case, so runs an argument that could be made.

This argument, plausible though it may seem, is in my opinion not acceptable. There are two very good reasons why I take this view.

In the first place, article 26 embodies the guarantee of equality before the law and non-
discrimination. This is a guarantee against arbitrariness in State action. Equality is antithetical to arbitrariness. Article 26 is therefore intended to strike against arbitrariness in State action. Now, fixing the age of retirement at 60 for airline pilots cannot be said to be arbitrary. It is not as if a date has been arbitrarily picked out by the State party for retirement of airline pilots. It is not uncommon to find that in many countries 60 years is the age fixed for superannuation of airline pilots, since that is the age at which it would not be unreasonable to expect airline pilots would be affected, particularly since they have to fly airplanes which require considerable alacrity, alertness, concentration and presence of mind. I do not think that the selection of the age of 60 years for mandatory retirement for airline pilots can be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable so as to constitute a violation of article 26.

In the second place, the words "such as" preceding the enumeration of the grounds in article 26 clearly indicate that the grounds there enumerated are illustrative and not exhaustive. Age as a prohibited ground of discrimination is therefore not excluded. Secondly, the word "status" can be interpreted so as to include age. It is therefore a valid argument that if there was discrimination on the grounds of age, it would attract the applicability of article 26. But it must still be discrimination. Every differentiation does not incur the vice of discrimination. If it is based on an objective and reasonable criterion having rational relation to the object sought to be achieved, it would not be hit by article 26. Here, in the present case, for the reasons given above, prescribing the age of 60 years as the age of mandatory retirement for airline pilots could not be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable, having regard to the need for maximizing safety, and consequently it was not in violation of article 26.

For dissenting opinion in this context, see Love et al. v. Australia (983/2001), ICCPR, A/58/40 vol. II (25 March 2003) 286 (CCPR/C/77/D/983/2001) at Individual Opinion of Mr. Nisuke Ando, 300.

•	G. Pohl et al. v. Austria (1160/2003), ICCPR, A/59/40 vol. II (9 July 2004) 378 at paras. 2.1-
2.6 and 9.3-9.8.

...

2.1 The first and second authors jointly own, and reside on, property measuring some 1,600 square metres located in the community of Aigen (part of the Municipality of Salzburg). The third author formerly owned a plot of land of some 2,300 square metres, also located in Aigen, adjacent to the plot owned by the first and second authors. On 15 June 1998, the fourth author purchased the plot formerly owned by the third author from a company, which had acquired it at a public auction. As the current owner of the plot, on which he also resides, the fourth author is contractually obliged to reimburse the third author for any expenses associated with that plot.

2.2 Both plots of land are designated as "rural areas", in accordance with the 1998 Salzburg Provincial Zoning Law, which divides real estate located in the Province of Salzburg into "building land", "traffic/transportation areas" and "rural areas".

2.3 On 1 December 1998, the Municipality of Salzburg informed the first, second and third authors of a preliminary assessment of the financial implications of the construction, in 1997, of a residential sewerage adjacent to their plots and gave them an opportunity to comment on the assessment.

2.4 According to Section 11 of the Salzburg Provincial Landowners' Contributions Act (1976), which regulates financial contributions of landowners to certain public services in the Municipality of Salzburg, owners of plots of land located adjacent to a newly constructed sewerage must contribute to the construction costs; the contribution is calculated pursuant to a formula based on the square measure of a plot, from which an abstract "length" is deducted. Contributions of landowners in all other municipalities of the Province of Salzburg are regulated by the Provincial Act on Landowners' Contributions to the Construction of Municipal Sewerages in all Municipalities of the Province of Salzburg with the Exception of the City of Salzburg (1962), which provides that owners of land, from which wastewater is dumped into the sewerage, are required to pay contributions for newly constructed sewerages, calculated on the basis of a formula that links the construction costs to the living space of the dwellings built on the plots. The number of "points", calculated on the basis of living space (in square metres), are multiplied by the amount to be paid per point to arrive at an individual landowner's contribution.

2.5 In their observations on the preliminary assessment, the authors argued that the envisaged calculation of their contributions based on the length of the plot was discriminatory, if compared to the calculation of contributions of owners of plots in areas designated as "building land", as it disregarded the special situation of plots in rural areas, which were significantly larger than average parcels in areas designated as "building land". The calculation method in all other municipalities in the Province of Salzburg was therefore based on available living space instead of the abstract length criterion so as to take such special circumstances into account. The authors also stated that the existing waste-water disposal facilities were adequate.

2.6 On 22 February 1999, the Municipality of the City of Salzburg issued two administrative acts, requiring the first and second authors to pay ATS 193,494.20 ( 14,061.77) and the third author to contribute ATS 262,838.70 ( 19,101.23), pursuant to Section 11 of the Landowners' Contribution Act. It rejected the third author's objection to his treatment as a party to the proceedings despite the fact that he was no longer the registered owner of the plot, stating that the owner registered at the time of the construction of the sewerage was to be considered the obligated party.

...

9.3 The question before the Committee is whether the relevant legislation regarding the financial contributions of landowners in the Municipality of Salzburg to the construction of municipal sewerages violates article 26 of the Covenant by first not distinguishing between plots of an urban character designated as "building land" and "rural" plots of land with a building site, and second by using the size of plots of land (so called "length") as basis for the calculation of the contributions instead of linking them to the size of living space as is done in all other municipalities of the Province of Salzburg.

9.4 The Committee recalls that under article 26, discrimination in the equal protection of the law is prohibited on any grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.12/ It notes that an indirect discrimination may result from a failure to treat different situations differently, if the negative results of such failure exclusively or disproportionally affect persons of a particular race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.13/ While the Committee does not exclude that "residence" may be a "status" that prohibits discrimination, it notes that the alleged failure to distinguish between "urban" and "rural" plots of land is not linked to a particular place of residence within the municipality of Salzburg but depends on their assignment to a particular zoning area. The Committee also takes note of the State party's explanation that the degree of contributions for "rural" parcels does depend on how much of the plot its owner sought to have designated as an area where a building may be constructed. The Committee concludes that the failure to distinguish between urban "building land" and "rural" plots of land with a building site is neither discriminatory by reference to any of the grounds mentioned in article 26 of the Covenant, nor arbitrary.

9.5 With regard to the claim that the different treatment of landowners in the City of Salzburg and landowners elsewhere in the Province of Salzburg, concerning the calculation of their landowners' contributions for the construction of new sewer systems for their plots of land, is not based on objective and reasonable criteria, as required by article 26 of the Covenant, the Committee considers that the authors' argument relating to the perceived more dynamic increases in population and incidence of construction in other parts of the Province of Salzburg does not exclude that the construction costs for the sewer network in the more densely populated Municipality of Salzburg may still be higher than in the rest of the Province, as claimed by the State party.

9.6 In this connection, the Committee notes that the authors admit that their landowners' contributions would still be three to four times higher, if compared to the rest of the Province, even if the calculation was based on the size of the living space of the dwelling situated on the plot of land. It cannot therefore be concluded that the different levels of contributions in and outside the City of Salzburg result exclusively from the different calculation methods applied under the 1976 Salzburg Provincial Landowners' Contributions Act and the 1962 Act applicable to the other municipalities in the Province of Salzburg. The Committee therefore considers that the authors have failed to demonstrate that their different treatment was not based on objective and reasonable criteria.

9.7 The Committee, moreover, considers that nothing in the decisions of the Appeals Commission in Building Matters of the Municipality of the City of Salzburg, dated 28 May and 2 July 1999, or in the decision of the Administrative Court of 28 April 2003 indicates that the application by these tribunals of the relevant provisions of the Landowners' Contributions Act (1976) was based on manifestly arbitrary considerations.

9.8 The Human Rights Committee...is of the view that the facts before it do not disclose a violation of article 26 of the Covenant.

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Notes

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12/ Communication No. 196/1983, Gueye v. France, Views adopted on 3 April 1989, at para. 9.4.

13/ See, e.g., communication No. 998/2001, Althammer v. Austria, Views adopted on 8 August 2003, at para. 10.2.

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•	Marik v. Czech Republic (945/2000), ICCPR, A/60/40 vol. II (26 July 2005) 54 at paras. 2.1-
2.4, 6.2-6.5, 7 and 8.

...

2.1 In 1969, the author emigrated from Czechoslovakia to the United States with his family. He later became a United States citizen. In 1972, he was convicted of fleeing the country by the Plzen District Court; his property was confiscated, inter alia his two houses in Letkov and in Plzen.

2.2 On 23 April 1990, the Czech and Slovak Republic passed Act No. 119/1990 Coll. on Judicial Rehabilitation, which rendered null and void all sentences handed down by Communist courts for political reasons. Persons whose property had been confiscated were, under section 23.2 of the Act, eligible to recover their property, subject to conditions to be spelled out in a separate restitution law.

2.3 On 1 February 1991, Act 87/1991 on Extra-Judicial Rehabilitation was adopted. Under it, a person claiming restitution of property had to (a) be a Czech-Slovak citizen and (b) be a permanent resident in the Czech Republic to claim entitlement to regain his or her property. In addition, according to the Act, (c) the claimant has a burden for proving the unlawfulness of the acquisition by the current owner of the property in question. The first two requirements had to be fulfilled during the time period in which restitution claims could be filed, between 1 April and 1 October 1991. A judgement of the Czech Constitutional Court of 12 July 1994 (No. 164/1994), however, annulled the condition of permanent residence and established a new time frame for the submission of restitution claims by persons who had thereby become entitled persons, running from 1 November 1994 to 1 May 1995. According to the author, this judgement established a right to restitution which could be exercised by those who did not have permanent residence in the country and met the citizenship condition in the new time period. However, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court supported an interpretation to the effect that the newly entitled persons were persons who, during the original period of time (1 April to 1 October 1991), had met all the other conditions, including the citizenship condition, with the exception of permanent residence. Although the author claims that he never lost Czech citizenship, he formally became Czech citizen again in May 1993.

2.4 In 1994, the author filed two separate restitution claims with regard to his houses in Letkov and Plzen. In the first case (the Letkov property), the Plzen-mesto District Court refused the restitution claim on 13 November 1995, because the author did not fulfil the citizenship requirement during the initial period open for restitution claims, i.e. 1 October 1991 at the latest. It also found that the third requirement for restitution, concerning the unlawfulness of the current owners acquisition, was not met in the case. This decision was confirmed by the Plzen Regional Court on 25 March 1996. The author's appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed on 20 August 1997 on the ground that he did not fulfil the precondition of citizenship in 1991. The judgement confirmed that the new established time frame did not change this original requirement but gave non-residents additional time to lodge their restitution claims. It did not consider the other requirements. A further appeal to the Constitutional Court was rejected on 12 May 1998.

...

6.2 The issue before the Committee is whether the application to the author of Act 87/1991 amounted to a violation of his right to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law, contrary to article 26 of the Covenant.

6.3 The Committee reiterates its jurisprudence that not all differentiations in treatment can be deemed to be discriminatory under article 26. A differentiation which is compatible with the provisions of the Covenant and is based on objective and reasonable grounds does not amount to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of article 26 6/. Whereas the citizenship criterion is objective, the Committee must determine whether its application to the author was reasonable in the circumstances of the case.

6.4 The Committee recalls its Views in the cases of Simunek, Adam, Blazek and Des Fours Walderode,7/ where it held that article 26 of the Covenant had been violated: "the authors in that case and many others in analogous situations had left Czechoslovakia because of their political opinions and had sought refuge from political persecution in other countries, where they eventually established permanent residence and obtained a new citizenship. Taking into account that the State party itself is responsible for the author's...departure, it would be incompatible with the Covenant to require the author...to obtain Czech citizenship as a prerequisite for the restitution of [his] property or, alternatively, for the payment of appropriate compensation" 8/. The Committee further recalls its jurisprudence 9/ that the citizenship requirement in these circumstances is unreasonable. In addition, the State party's argument that the citizenship condition was included in the law to incite owners to take good care of the property after the privatization process has not been substantiated.

6.5 The Committee considers that the precedent established in the above cases also applies to the author of the present communication. The Committee notes that in the case of the Letkov property, the State party argues that the author did not fulfil the third requirement, i.e. proving that the property was acquired unlawfully by the present owners. However, the Committee further notes that although the lower courts took this element into consideration, the Supreme Court based its decision only on the non-fulfilment of the citizenship precondition. In the light of these considerations, the Committee concludes that the application to the author of Act 87/1991, which lays down a citizenship requirement for the restitution of confiscated property, violated his rights under article 26 of the Covenant.

7. The Human Rights Committee...is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation of article 26 of the International Covenant.

8. In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy, which may be compensation, and in the case of the Plzen property, restitution, or, in the alternative compensation. The Committee reiterates that the State party should review its legislation to ensure that all persons enjoy both equality before the law and equal protection of the law.

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Notes

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6/ See communication No. 182/1984, Zwaan-de Vries v. The Netherlands, Views adopted on 9 April 1987, para. 13.

7/ See footnote 8.

8/ See communication No. 586/1994, Adam v. The Czech Republic, Views adopted on 23 July 1996, para. 12.6 and communication No. 857/1999, Blazek v. The Czech Republic, Views adopted on 12 July 2001, para. 5.8.

9/ See communication No. 516/1992, Simunek v. The Czech Republic, Views adopted on 19 July 1995, para. 11.6.

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